Defendant’s arrest on an outstanding bench warrant for something else, for which there was probable cause, was not sufficiently pretextual to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment. State v. Jenkins, 782 N.W.2d 211 (2010)*:

With respect to Jenkins’ claim that the police misused the bench warrant to arrest him for the two murders, we first note that there can be no question that an arrest pursuant to a valid warrant is supported by probable cause and is therefore reasonable. Jenkins has not identified, and we have not found, any case in which we have held otherwise. Nor are we aware of any case in which we have looked beyond the validity of the warrant and examined law enforcement’s motive for executing the warrant, and we decline to do so in this case. Jenkins did not challenge the validity of the Crow Wing County bench warrant at the trial court, nor has he done so here. Further, the record before us does not contain anything that calls into question the validity of the bench warrant. Thus, we conclude that Jenkins’ arrest pursuant to that warrant was proper.

Defendant was not seized as officers talked to him and he kept walking away from them. He stopped, turned around, and returned with his hands in his pockets, and officers told him to take his hands out of his pockets. One officer told the other to hook him up (for safety reasons), and defendant removed his hands discarding cocaine. The seizure of the cocaine was not the result of a Fourth Amendment violation. State v. Hamilton, 36 So. 3d 209 (La. 2010).*

The lady who lived in the other half of a duplex who reported suspected drug dealing was presumptively reliable where she was named and remained there when the police arrived. State v. Brown, 35 So. 3d 1069 (La. 2010).*

Defendant was stopped for playing music too loudly. A DL check showed that his license was suspended. The stop and running his license was valid. People v Tolentino, 2010 NY Slip Op 2643, 14 N.Y.3d 382, 926 N.E.2d 1212, 900 N.Y.S.2d 708 (2010).*

Information from a known CI and another officer formed the basis of defendant’s stop for DUI, and it was not unreasonable. State v. Lockhart, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 253 (March 24, 2010).*

Probable cause to seize cash came from defendant’s differing stories of the source of the funds, the packaging in Ziploc bags, and the odor of drugs. State v. Property Seized from Martin, 2010 La. App. LEXIS 443 (1st Cir. March 30, 2010).*

Officers were surveilling a bank that they anticipated would be robbed, and plaintiffs show up at the bank and were stopped at gunpoint as suspected bank robbers. Plaintiffs were there to deposit a paycheck, and the person who was the suspected bank robber was dressed different and nearly 200 lbs heavier than the person they were looking for. Taking the case most favorably to the plaintiffs on qualified immunity, they stated enough to get to trial for the unreasonable stop. Hopkins v. Vaughn, 363 Fed. Appx. 931 (3d Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

The stop in this case was valid for window tinting, and the conversation gave the officer reasonable suspicion. The defendant was told he could leave but that the officer wanted to search the car, and the defendant consented. United States v. Hanson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7903 (N.D. Iowa February 1, 2010).*

Defendant was a momentary passenger in a vehicle stopped with probable cause for a traffic offense, so he lacked standing to contest the search. He had standing, of course, to contest the stop. United States v. Henderson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7710 (W.D. La. January 5, 2010).*

Seizure of non-drug evidence under a search warrant for drugs depends upon its own apparent incriminating nature and it does not have to be related to the drug crime to be valid. Sostre v. County of Suffolk, 364 Fed. Appx. 677 (2d Cir. 2010) (unpublished):

Here, Plaintiffs seem to believe that the fact that possession of chukka sticks is a crime is not enough to support either seizure or arrest because the incriminating character of chukka sticks in drug dealing was not immediately apparent. There is no requirement that the “incriminating character” relate to the objects of the warrant. The chukka sticks were in the closet, plainly covered by the search warrant. See U.S. v. Shi Yan Liu, 239 F.3d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 2000) (explaining that so long as the police act within the scope of the warrant, evidence will not be suppressed simply because it was not particularized in the warrant). It is well-established that “seizure of property in plain view involves no invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasonable, assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980). Because it is against New York state law to own or possess chukka sticks, there was also sufficient probable cause to support Sostre’s arrest.

The law of the scope of immigration stops and inquiries was not clearly established, so the officers could not be held liable for a stop, questioning, and transport to another place for further questioning. Estrada v. Rhode Island, 594 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2010).

Defendant’s argument that the IP address alone could not provide probable cause to believe that he downloaded child pornography from another website was rejected. He argued that there could have been other computers there, another could have done it through his wireless network, and somebody could have used a proxy server to fake the IP address. United States v. Massey, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128662 (E.D. Mo. September 15, 2009).*

Whether the county attorney violated state law in issuing a subpoena for utility records was not pertinent in federal court. United States v. Mc Intyre, 683 F. Supp. 2d 1020 (D. Neb. 2009).*

Defendant’s arrest for bank robbery justified a search incident of the getaway car. United States v. Singletary, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128661 (W.D. Mo. October 15, 2009).*

Defendant put her purse in the cargo area of the vehicle, and when the officers asked about it, she specifically denied that it was hers. This was abandonment. United States v. Anderson, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128668 (E.D. Mo. September 30, 2009).*

Mere inquiry about a search warrant was not a refusal of consent. United States v. Fletcher, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21611 (N.D. Ind. March 9, 2010):

The Court finds no support in the case law for the proposition that Defendant’s inquiry about a search warrant is tantamount to an express refusal of consent. C.f. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 107 ( where the police asked defendant for permission to search the house, “which he unequivocally refused.”) See also United States v. Sims, 435 F. Supp. 2d 542, 545-46 (S.D. Miss. 2006) (defendant’s attempt to slam the door shut as police were entering an express refusal of consent); United States v. Henderson, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88404, 2006 WL 3469358, *2 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (the statement “Get the f*** out of my house” a direction that the police refrain from searching the residence); United States v. Foster, 654 F. Supp. 2d 389, 397 (E.D.N.C. 2009) (defendant’s ambiguous statement to officers that he was going to make them earn their pay not an express refusal of consent). Therefore, the Court concludes that Randolph is distinguishable and the search was constitutional on the basis of Mrs. Fletcher’s consent. Accordingly, the Court need not address the Government’s good faith argument.

Smell of marijuana from car and nervousness was reasonable suspicion. United States v. Stein, 694 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (D. Kan. 2010).*

Illegal search led to interrogation of the defendant, and it cannot be said that it was attenuated. United States v. Martinez, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21585 (D.N.M. February 25, 2010).*

Defendant challenged the PC for the SW because of an alleged Franks violation because the officer omitted from the affidavit for the search warrant that defendant was towing a lawnmower behind his bicycle when he got to the place of the search. The officer testified that he did not see that it was relevant, but the defendant explained that it showed his innocent reason for going to the house. The court found that there was probable cause despite the omission because there was plenty of probable cause without it. United States v. Butler, 594 F.3d 955 (8th Cir. 2010).*

The district court’s finding that defendant was not a co-resident or an overnight guest with standing to contest the search was supported by the evidence, so the judgment is affirmed. United States v. King, 364 Fed. Appx. 781 (3d Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

Defendant’s stop was justified by a temporary tag that was in the over tinted back window such that the numbers could not be read. United States v. Cano, 364 Fed. Appx. 490 (10th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

Defendant’s consent to search his laptop computer after he was arrested at the Atlanta airport for traveling interstate for sex with a minor in an internet sting case came after he knew what was under investigation and he was told of his right to refuse. The seizure of his briefcase and the subsequent search of it was valid at least as an inventory. United States v. Farley, 607 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2010).* This is an interesting (and long: 112 pages long) opinion raising a huge number of issues, including that fact there was no minor therefore no crime (he lost), and an aside by the court about the defendant wondering seven times in the chat sessions whether this was a sting operation:

As Farley had suspected out loud to “Stephanie” on seven different occasions, it was a sting operation. Still, he had single-mindedly pursued his “dream.”FN4

4 Farley’s damn-the-suspicions-and-full-speed-ahead recklessness is not unusual with sex predators who prey on children.

What follows is a quote from Louis Freeh’s biography.

The inspection of a military servicemember’s iPod was necessary and conducted under military necessity (Mil. R. Evid. 313, “to locate and confiscate unlawful weapons and other contraband”) under standard military protocol without any individualized suspicion at a base for processing out. Child pornography was found, and defendant admitted that more would be found at the computer at his parent’s house. A search warrant was issued for the house. The search of the iPod was reasonable. Military necessity is governed by U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 14, although service members are protected by the Fourth Amendment as well. Military necessity alters the “special needs” doctrine (United States v. Jenkins, 986 F.2d 76, 78 (4th Cir. 1993)). United States v. Rendon, 607 F.3d 982 (4th Cir. 2010):

In this case, as noted above, there is no evidence in the record that anyone had a particularized suspicion of Rendon when he was first inspected, nor is there any evidence that he was treated any differently from any other soldier entering the unit. The search of his personal property was conducted pursuant to a regularly scheduled intake protocol for new members of the unit, and the search stayed within the parameters authorized by the commanding officer in the DSCB Handbook and defined in Military Rule of Evidence 313. Even though a purpose of the search was the detection of contraband, it appropriately related to the good order and discipline of the unit. The search was, therefore, a valid military inspection, conducted as part of the regular procedure performed for all entrants into the unit to ensure discipline within the unit and service members’ compliance with military rules. See United States v. Hay, 3 M.J. 654, 656 (A.C.M.R. 1977). Because the search of Rendon’s MP3 player was conducted as part of a valid military inspection, no reasonable expectation of privacy in its contents was violated.

The driver in control of a vehicle has the power to consent to a search of the vehicle even if he is not the registered owner and the registered owner is present at the time. A general consent to search a vehicle extends to all objectively reasonable places in which the implied object of the search may be found, and that includes closed containers so long as no forcible destruction of property is necessary to access its contents. People v. Minor, 222 P.3d 952 (Colo. 2010).

Plaintiff’s decedent was robbing a store and had employees hostage. Through an open telephone line, the police heard threats to kill for money, and they had the place surrounded. The officers believed they saw muzzle flash inside. The robbers came out and made a run for it and were shot. Gilbert’s alleged attempt to stop and surrender was not clear enough to defeat summary judgment for excessive force in killing him fleeing from the robbery scene. Gilbert v. French, 364 Fed. Appx. 76 (5th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

Knock-and-talk entry was not shown to be without consent. Defendant’s cursory argument that a protective sweep could not occur in the face of facts showing reason to do so was insufficient. United States v. McKinney, 363 Fed. Appx. 665 (10th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

A valid ex parte order of protection was served on defendant away from his house, but defendant could not show that it was for the purpose of keeping him from objecting to the search under Randolph. His wife was asked for consent in his absence. United States v. Brewer, 588 F.3d 1165 (8th Cir. 2009).*

Two cell phones and unusual travel plans were reasonable suspicion. Defendant was in Wichita heading to the East Coast but on a five day vacation. The officer saw Bondo for body work, which indicates a hidden compartment. The drug dog alerted. United States v. Guerrero-Sanchez, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116869 (D. Kan. December 15, 2009).

The defendant had a carry permit and he told the officer, as required to do, that he had the gun. The officer looked for it and smelled marijuana. That gave cause to search. United States v. Smith, 694 F. Supp. 2d 1242 (M.D. Ala. 2009).*

The affidavit for the search warrant supported the inferences drawn and that defendant had contraband in the house. Possession of a gun 15 days earlier was not stale. United States v. Collins, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117232 (E.D. N.C. October 16, 2009).*

A police reality show videotaped plaintiff in secure areas of the jail after her arrest, and she sued the network which was showing it. She stated enough to hold in the media defendants under Wilson v. Layne. Frederick v. Biography Channel, 683 F. Supp. 2d 798, 38 Media L. Rep. 1362 (N.D. Ill. 2010).*

A person who says she lives in a dwelling and has keys is a person who can be asked for consent.
United States v. White, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9494 (E.D. Mich. February 4, 2010).*

“Can I ask you a few more questions” after a traffic stop is not a seizure. United States v. Barraza-Martinez, 364 Fed. Appx. 453 (10th Cir. 2010) (unpublished):

Both defendants rely heavily on Sandoval, in which the Tenth Circuit held the officer’s response of “No, wait a minute,” to the motorist’s question “That’s it?” rendered the subsequent questioning non-consensual. Id. at 542. The present case, however, is distinguishable from Sandoval on two grounds. Unlike Sandoval, Deputy Bentley indicated the original investigative detention was terminated by handing Barraza-Martinez a copy of the warning citation and stating he was free to go. Barraza-Martinez then began opening the patrol car door, demonstrating he understood he was free to leave. Deputy Bentley’s subsequent question, “Hey, William, can I ask you a few more questions?” did not retract Barraza-Martinez’s freedom to leave the patrol car. Unlike the “No, wait a minute” directive at issue in Sandoval, Deputy Bentley’s question, along with his earlier statement that Barraza-Martinez was free to go, served to give a reasonable person in Barraza-Martinez’s position the choice to submit to the additional questions. Barraza-Martinez’s consent to the search of the vehicle was a product of the subsequent consensual exchange. Accordingly, the district court properly denied the defendants’ motions to suppress.

Defendant abandoned a cup from which his DNA was collected and used to connect him to a rape. He threw it away for others to collect. Williamson v. State, 413 Md. 521, 993 A.2d 626 (2010):

The writers for the NBC television series Law & Order Special Victims Unit would be hard pressed to author an episode full of more issues involving DNA than found in this case in which the Anne Arundel County police, in 2006, matched DNA of the Appellant, Kelroy Williamson, retrieved from his discarded McDonald’s cup to the DNA found in two separate rape victims’ forensic medical examinations in 1994 and 2002. Williamson was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County in 2007 on charges of rape and related offenses for the 2002 crime, and he appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing that his arrest warrant for the 2002 rape was based on a statement of probable cause predicated upon the illegal testing of the DNA from the discarded cup and the 1994 forensic examination, as well as the uploading of his DNA profile into a local database and search of that database for a profile match. His challenges are premised in the Maryland DNA Collection Act and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and he seeks review of the trial judge’s denial of his motion to suppress the obtaining and testing of the 2006 DNA sample and his statement to police as the poisonous fruits of an illegal arrest. We granted certiorari, Williamson v. State, 409 Md. 47, 972 A.2d 861 (2009), prior to any proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals, to consider the following question: [¶] Was it error to deny the motion to suppress evidence obtained in violation of Appellant’s statutory and Fourth Amendment rights?

We hold it was not error to deny the motion to suppress the DNA evidence obtained in 2006 or the Appellant’s statement to police, and we affirm the Circuit Court judge’s dismissal of the motion to suppress.

An objective view of the officers’ questions during this traffic stop indicate that the defendant was not in custody and not coerced. Nava v. State, 2010 WY 46, 228 P.3d 1311 (2010).*

The consent was voluntary. The court finds that the officer said that they would come back with a warrant if he did not consent, but that his admissions were enough to get a search warrant. Johnson v. State, 2010 WY 47, 228 P.3d 1306 (2010).*

An Arkansas municipal police department engaged in racial profiling in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment. Giron v. City of Alexander, Arkansas, 693 F. Supp. 2d 904 (E.D.Ark. 2010):

As a Law Enforcement Officer, my fundamental duty is to serve mankind; to safeguard lives and property; to protect the innocent against deception, the weak against oppression or intimidation, and the peaceful against violence or disorder; and to respect the Constitutional rights of all men to liberty, equality and justice.
– Law Enforcement Code of Ethics, signed by Defendant Leath on January 8, 2007. See Defendant’s Exhibit 3.

For the reasons explained below, the Court concludes that Defendant Alexander Police Officer Tommy Leath, contrary to his own sworn oath, violated the constitutional rights of each of the Plaintiffs whose claims were tried in this proceeding. Officer Leath engaged in racial profiling prohibited by Arkansas statute, the Arkansas Constitution, the United States Constitution, and the City of Alexander’s own written policy. Officer Leath also illegally seized one of the Plaintiffs, thereby violating the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Arkansas Constitution. Chief Spears, who supervised Officer Leath and ran the Alexander Police Department (“Department”), was deliberately indifferent to ongoing and systemic racial profiling of which he was aware. Additionally, municipal liability is imposed on the City of Alexander because it permitted Office Leath to establish and to carry out a custom and practice of engaging in racial profiling.

[Note: Plaintiff’s counsel is a former police officer himself.]

The City of Alexander’s mission statement:

To provide quality services to all individuals and to treat our citizens and coworkers in a kind and friendly manner. To be a positive influence in the community.

The City’s website notes it was settled by German immigrants in 1879.

The fact defendant was dealing drugs from her former residence justifies the conclusion that she would be dealing drugs from her current residence. The affidavit for the search warrant showed probable cause. Impeachment evidence under Brady should have been turned over to the defense before the suppression hearing. In this case, however, it would not make a difference in the outcome. United States v. Best, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119802 (M.D. Pa. December 23, 2009).*

Defendant was overheard being told by his brother to bring “snow bunny” into a prison visit as USP-Pollock so his brother could barter for protection. Thus, the prison officials had reasonable suspicion for him when he showed up. Defense counsel was, thus, not ineffective for not challenging his search. United States v. Morris, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119766 (W.D. La. October 6, 2009).*

Defendant’s car was stopped with probable cause to believe he was involved in theft, and the stolen property was seen in the car. The stop was thus not governed by the search incident doctrine under Gant. Once the stolen property was found, the officers were not obligated to stop searching. United States v. Southerland, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119851 (E.D. N.C. November 13, 2009) (USMJ R&R)*, adopted United States v. Southerland, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119844 (E.D. N.C. December 22, 2009) (USDJ).* [The USMJ applied the “good faith exception” to Gant, but the USDJ didn’t even mention if, or have to.]

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not challenging a protective sweep of defendant’s premises after a stand-off with police there. United States v. Jennings, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119767 (W.D. La. December 23, 2009).*

Officers had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant when he was seen unconscious or asleep in his car in a middle school parking lot with his pants down. People v. Barrus, 232 P.3d 264 (Colo. App. 2009).*

59 minute wait for a drug dog after an accident on a rural highway did not make the continuation of the stop unreasonable. United States v. Porras-Palma, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59293 (D. N.D. May 24, 2010).*

Where the stop for suspicion of drug sales was valid, the immediate use of a drug dog was not unreasonable. State v. Johnson, 2010 Ark. 294, 2010 Ark. LEXIS 336 (June 17, 2010).*

Seizure “incident to arrest” in the forfeiture statute means around the time of the arrest, not a standard SI. Mycka v. 2003 GMC Envoy, 783 N.W.2d 234 (Minn. App. 2010).*

If an officer has the authority to order the occupant of a vehicle to exit a vehicle, the officer can open the door, too. A gun was seen. State v. Mai, 202 N.J. 12, 993 A.2d 1216 (2010):

We see no reason to depart from the elegant reasoning that undergirds this settled principle in making the parallel determination of whether a police officer has the authority to open a vehicle door as part of issuing an order to exit the vehicle. In the realm of defining reasonable searches and seizures, no meaningful or relevant difference exists between the grant of authority to order an occupant of a vehicle to exit the vehicle and the authority to open the door as part of issuing that lawful order. Plain logic demands that the principles that govern whether a passenger of a vehicle lawfully can be ordered out of the vehicle must apply with equal force to whether a police officer is entitled, as a corollary and reasonable safety measure, to open the door as part of issuing a proper order to exit. See State v. Matthews, 330 N.J. Super. 1, 6 (App. Div. 2000) (holding that “[s]ince the officer was entitled to order defendant out of the car, he was equally entitled to open the door to accomplish that object”); State v. Conquest, 243 N.J. Super. 528, 533 (App. Div. 1990) (combining authority to order passenger from vehicle with authority to open door, holding that “both the order to exit and the method of effectuating it [opening door] were proper”). We therefore turn to the application of that rule to this case.

The officer had probable cause to search defendant’s vehicle for a police radio after he heard radio traffic from under the car seat. Gant was inapplicable. Merchant v. State, 926 N.E.2d 1058 (Ind. App. 2010).*

Defendant was legitimately evicted from his hotel room after his arrest by the FBI for sex trafficking. The hotel essentially had control over the power to evict. Also, when the officers were in the room, there was a plain view of some additional evidence. They also validly conducted a protective sweep of the room for a weapon. Defendant handed the FBI his car keys to be delivered to the other person in the room which brought them to the room. United States v. King, 693 F. Supp. 2d 1200 (D. Haw. 2010).*

The officer stopped the defendant’s vehicle without reasonable suspicion. The officer directed the passenger out of the car, and saw a holster inside the open door. A gun was observed under the vehicle, which the officer did not see put there. The gun would not be suppressed because the officer did not exploit any illegality. United States v. Elmore, 692 F. Supp. 2d 915 (E.D. Tenn. February 23, 2010):

The facts of this case, Magistrate Judge Shirley concluded, are distinguishable. First, the police officer did not take any additional active step in discovering the handgun, but only passively observed the handgun contemporaneously with the seizure. Second, the handgun was lying on the surface of an alleyway outside the defendant’s vehicle–an alleyway connecting a public street to a parking lot–and a location in which the defendant had no privacy interest. Moreover, the defendant did not, and has not since, claimed any privacy, possessory, or ownership interest in the handgun. Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Shirley found, the defendant cannot be said to have any privacy, possessory, or ownership interest violated by the police officer’s conduct.

The Court of Appeals of the Armed Forces held today there is no general Fourth Amendment exception to military quarters in a combat zone. The court declined to rely on the military judge’s alternate ruling “that Appellant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his living quarters.” Under the facts of this case, the court held that the military judge appropriately concluded that the commanding officer “had a substantial basis for making a probable cause determination to authorize the search.” United States v. Huntzinger, 69 M.J. 1 (C.A. A.F. 2010):

[T]he granted issues concern the unique powers of search and seizure granted to military commanders under the application of the Fourth Amendment to members of the armed forces. These rules apply in domestic and deployed locations. Although the application of the rules and the exceptions therein depend upon the context, there is no general exception for locations or living quarters in a combat zone.

Hat tip to CAAFlog.

Seven hour delay between alleged offense and officer obtaining a penile DNA swab did not show dissipation of the exigency. Time was still of the essence because of the evanescent nature of the evidence and its ability to disappear. Kaliku v. United States, 994 A.2d 765 (D.C. 2010):

We are convinced that the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress the penile swab evidence by applying the exigent circumstances doctrine to this case. In response to cross-examination questions, Officer Strong, who gave instructions to Mr. Kaliku and Mr. Matthews about how to obtain the penile swab samples, testified that he did not seek a court order or transport the appellants to a hospital where the sample could have been taken because “[e]vidence could have been wiped away … [or] contaminated … [or] rubbed away at any time.” Because of the delicate nature of the DNA evidence in this case and the area in which it was located, it could easily have disappeared. Therefore, there was an urgency to its collection which justified the officer’s reliance on exigent circumstances, rather than seeking a court order. Schmerber, supra, 384 U.S. at 770 (“The officer … might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened the destruction of evidence”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment by seeing defendant through the open door and then entering. Oxner v. United States, 995 A.2d 205 (D.C. App. 2010)*:

These principles govern the present case. The police did not conduct an unreasonable search or seizure in contravention of the Fourth Amendment merely by knocking on the door of appellant’s apartment and looking in from the hallway after the door was opened. At that point, before they crossed the apartment threshold without a warrant or consent, the officers saw a man matching the detailed description of the seller standing inside the apartment from which, only minutes earlier, the seller had emerged with the drugs. That correspondence of description, time and location provided at least reasonable suspicion to justify an investigative detention of the man–appellant–for purposes of a show-up identification (as the trial judge concluded), if not probable cause to arrest him then and there. Appellant therefore was in legal custody when he was shown to Officers Washington and Turner, and their identifications of him were not excludable as the fruit of the warrantless and nonconsensual entry into his home, even if that intrusion was not supported by exigent circumstances.