Defendant’s time and place was reasonable suspicion here. “We affirm because the facts support the investigatory stop where the arresting officer was aware of numerous theft complaints in the area, including thefts of construction equipment; the officer observed Hansel’s pickup drive towards the back of a closed construction business late at night; and the officer had never observed a vehicle at the business at that late hour during prior patrolling of the area.” State v. Hansel, 2010 Iowa App. LEXIS 942 (September 9, 2010).*

Defendant consented to a blood draw under the implied consent statute after a fatal accident, where he was informed that if he had a prior record (he did) he could lose his license for up to two years for refusal. Temperly v. State, 933 N.E.2d 558 (Ind. App. 2010).*

The search of defendant’s car after a detention for suspected DWI in a parking lot was justified by search incident or the automobile exception. Torn baggies for cocaine were seen on the seat. Commonwealth v. Elliott, 322 S.W.3d 106 (Ky. App. 2010).*

Furtive movements in extremis (reclining in passenger seat and turning away from the officer as he approached and reaching for the waistband) justified a patdown. United States v. Craver, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63305 (S.D. Ohio June 4, 2010).*

In this death penalty case, defendant was found to have consented to the search, so his lawyer was not ineffective for not challenging it. Pitchford v. State, 45 So. 3d 216 (Miss. 2010).*

Ohio’s burden of consent is clear and convincing evidence, more than a preponderance, and this consent satisfies that requirement. State v. Black, 2010 Ohio 2916, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 2439 (2d Dist. June 25, 2010).*

Defendant abandoned drugs when he saw the police, and the seizure of the drugs was probable cause to arrest. State v. Taylor, 2010 Ohio 2926, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 2445 (2d Dist. June 25, 2010).*

Considering all the details of reasonable suspicion along with the officer’s experience, there was reasonable suspicion on the totality. United States v. Simpson, 609 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2010).*

Fourth Amendment applied to a search of an American citizen in Thailand by ICE officers investigating defendant’s international travel for the purpose of sex with minors in violation of U.S. law. However, the warrant clause does not require an American judge issue a warrant, and the search warrant here was issued by a Thai provincial court. United States v. Stokes, 710 F. Supp. 2d 689 (N.D. Ill. 2009):

It is a matter of first impression in this Circuit whether the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment governs searches and seizures of U.S. citizens in foreign lands. The court is not aware of any case, and Stokes presents no authority, that holds that the Warrant Clause ever applies in foreign territory. Such an extension of the warrant requirement would be, in Justice Harlan’s words, “impractical and anomalous.” Accordingly, the court holds that the Warrant Clause does not apply to the search of Stokes’s residence in Thailand. Stokes’s objections to the search based on the invalidity of the Thai warrant and the scope of the search are overruled.

Though it has not addressed the issue directly, the Supreme Court has strongly suggested that the Warrant Clause has no extraterritorial application. Writing for the Court in Verdugo, Justice Rehnquist explained that warrants issued to conduct searches abroad “would be a dead letter outside the United States.” 494 U.S. at 274. Justice Kennedy elaborated:

The absence of local judges or magistrates available to issue warrants, the differing and perhaps unascertainable conceptions of reasonableness and privacy that prevail abroad, and the need to cooperate with foreign officials all indicate that the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement should not apply in Mexico as it does in this country.

Id. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Steven’s brief concurrence and Justice Blackmun’s dissent also similarly suggest that the Warrant Clause does not govern overseas searches, at least where the targets of those searches are not U.S. citizens. Id. at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring)(“[The Warrant Clause has no] application to searches of noncitizens’ homes in foreign jurisdictions because American magistrates have no power to authorize such searches.”); Id. at 297(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“l agree with the Government, however, that an American magistrate’s lack of power to authorize a search abroad renders the Warrant Clause inapplicable to the search of a noncitizen’s residence outside this county.”) All told, seven Justices in Verdugo seemed to agree that, because United States courts lack the sovereign authority to issue warrants abroad, the procedures and requirements set forth by the Warrant Clause do not apply to foreign searches.

According to the only federal appellate court to have considered the issue, the “warrant requirement does not govern searches conducted abroad by U.S. agents; such searches of U.S. citizens need only satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of reasonableness.” In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa, 548 F.3d 276, 287 (2nd Cir. 2008). In the Terrorist Bombings case, U.S. officials wiretapped and searched the home of an American citizen living in Kenya pursuant to a Kenyan warrant that authorized a search for “stolen property.” Id. at 279. The homeowner was suspected of assisting the bombings of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, not of possessing stolen property. Id. Relying on Verdugo, the Second Circuit determined that the Warrant Clause did not apply to any search of a U.S. citizen abroad by American officials. The court offered four reasons for its decision: “First, there is nothing in our history or our precedent suggesting U.S. officials must first obtain a warrant before an overseas search.” Id. at 289. “Second, nothing in the history of the foreign relations of the United States would require that U.S. officials obtain warrants from foreign magistrates before conducting searches overseas or, indeed, to suppose that all other states have search and investigation rules akin to our own.” Id. at 290. “Third, if U.S. judicial officers were to issue search warrants intended to have extraterritorial effect, such warrants would have dubious legal significance, if any, in a foreign nation.” Id. at 290. “Fourth and finally, it is by no means clear that U.S. judicial officers could be authorized to issue warrants for overseas searches.” Id.

The court finds the Second Circuit’s reasoning persuasive here. The Thai court in Pattaya, not some distant American magistrate, was the sole sovereign entity with the power to authorize a search of Stokes’s home.

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not forecasting Gant, and it was not a “new rule.” Wright v. United States, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57875 (D. S.D. June 11, 2010)*:

The Supreme Court of the United States has never held that Gant articulated a “new rule” of criminal procedure and has not made Gant retroactive to cases on collateral review. See, e.g., Lopez v. Vazquez, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46225, No. 1:10-cv-00345, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2010) (finding that Gant did not state it was articulating a “new rule” and that the Supreme Court did not hold that Gant should be retroactively applied on collateral review); Bess v. United States, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46690, No. CV209-160 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 19, 2010) (“the Supreme Court has not made Gant retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review); United States v. Brown, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47425, No. 8:06-246, at *4 (D.S.C. June 5, 2009). Therefore, assuming the accuracy of Petitioner’s factual allegations, counsel did not perform ineffectively under Strickland when failing to advise Petitioner of the law as subsequently articulated in the Gant opinion.

The evidence supports the fact finding of the district court that there consent was not coerced. United States v. Cienfuegos-Pompa, 381 Fed. Appx. 353 (5th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

The officer’s cursing at defendant as he threatened to “blow [his] head off” did not itself make the stop unreasonable to require suppression. United States v. Craig, 381 Fed. Appx. 459 (5th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).

The license plates did not match the vehicle, so the officer was justified in the stop. Defendant was handcuffed and placed in the back of a police car. The search of the car was valid as a vehicle search and it was supported by plain view of crack in the car. Gant did not apply. United States v. Hunley, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60036 (W.D. N.Y. February 26, 2010).*

The trial court erred in granting a suppression motion without a hearing since the facts were controverted by the state. The issue was whether credit cards seen during the execution of a search warrant that were not in the defendant’s name could be seized as being in plain view. People v. Mele, 2010 NY Slip Op 5425, 74 A.D.3d 1095, 903 N.Y.S.2d 133 (2d Dept. 2010).*

Failure to raise exceeding scope of consent is a waiver. “We have held on multiple occasions that ‘just as failure to file a timely motion to suppress evidence constitutes a waiver, so too does a failure to raise a particular ground in support of a motion to suppress.’ E.g., United States v. Murillo, 288 F.3d 1126, 1135 (9th Cir. 2002).” United States v. Valencia-Reuvelta, 380 Fed. Appx. 684 (9th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

Defendant agreed to answer further questions during traffic stop. “About then, a second officer with a drug-sniffing dog arrived. Van Buren asked Norwood for permission to search the car. Norwood declined, saying ‘I just want to get home.’ Van Buren told him, ‘Wait right here.’ About a minute and a half later, the drug-sniffing dog went around Norwood’s car, and indicated the trunk. Searching there, officers found a kilogram of cocaine.” The additional two minutes was “de minimus” for the Fourth Amendment under $404,905 since there was reasonable suspicion from the suspicious travel plans, fast food wrappers in the car, and nervousness. United States v. Norwood, 377 Fed. Appx. 580 (8th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).

Brendlin only gives standing to object to the stop of the car, which was found to be with probable cause. It does not extend standing to a search of the car. United States v. Collins, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53939 (E.D. Wis. April 9, 2010), R&R adopted 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53933 (E.D. Wis. June 2, 2010).*

District court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to reopen the suppression hearing to test the officer’s credibility on the failure of the video in the police car during the stop. United States v. McWhorter, 380 Fed. Appx. 965 (11th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

Defendant is entitled to photographs of evidence seized under F.R.Crim.P. 16 discovery. United States v. Landron-Class, 714 F. Supp. 2d 278 (D. P.R. 2010).*

Defendant’s consent was not involuntary because he was suffering from hypoglycemia a few hours after the stop. His first contention was no consent. As the hearing progressed, it moved to he was ill. The magistrate’s findings are supported by the evidence. United States v. Mbodji, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53367 (E.D. Tenn. May 28, 2010).*

Defendant’s arrest allegedly in violation of state law as to the officer’s jurisdiction was irrelevant under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Johnson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51961 (E.D. Pa. May 26, 2010).*

Officer could smell marijuana coming from the car after defendant’s stop, and that justified a search of the car. United States v. Lewis, 606 F.3d 193 (4th Cir. 2010).*

Application of Randolph to petitioner’s case was dealt with in the military courts, so it was not cognizable in habeas, even assuming that habeas review was possible from the military courts. Garcia v. Commandant, United States Disciplinary Barracks, 380 Fed. Appx. 762 (10th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

DUI is an offense for which evidence of an offense might be found, so a search incident is valid, rejecting Brown v. State, 24 So. 3d 671, 679 (Fla. Dist. 5DCA 2009). United States v. Reagan, 713 F. Supp. 2d 724 (E.D. Tenn. 2010).*

Police were called to a motel room because the manager suspected that defendant and his 12 year old daughter were having sex there. The officer knocked at the door, and asked to talk to the defendant, who showed at the door in only a towel. The officer asked if they could talk inside, and defendant said no and stepped into the hall and shut the door behind him. The interaction between the defendant and the officer was consensual. In any event, the conversation was based on reasonable suspicion. The entry into the room was also by consent, and incriminating evidence was in plain view. United States v. Pelling, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50195 (D. Ore. May 20, 2010).*

Defense counsel did not file a motion to suppress the search of defendant’s bedroom because he believed it was valid as a search incident. The location of a gun found there was never referred to at trial. Cash was found in a nightstand drawer and that came into evidence. Even if there was a Fourth Amendment violation, the cash was harmless error in light of the other evidence at trial. Womack v. United States, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50016 (S.D. Ill. May 20, 2010).*

GSR test at the police station shortly after arrest was constitutionally valid because of exigent circumstances. United States v. Simmons, 380 Fed. Appx. 323 (4th Cir. 2010) (unpublished), cert. denied 2010 U.S. LEXIS 7135 (U.S., Oct. 4, 2010):

Recently, the Fifth Circuit concluded that a GSR test is a reasonable search incident to arrest. United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 793, 795-96 (5th Cir. 2006). As the court explained, “[b]ecause the presence of gun powder on his hands was relevant evidence that [the defendant] (or merely time) could have eventually removed or destroyed, if his arrest was valid, the performance of the gun powder residue test was lawful, and the admission of the results at trial was proper.” Id. at 795-96. Such a result is dictated by Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 93 S. Ct. 2000, 36 L. Ed. 2d 900 (1973), in which the Supreme Court concluded that police, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, could take fingernail samples incident to a lawful arrest. Id. at 295-96. In Cupp, the Court explained the basis for the search incident to arrest doctrine was the belief that “it is reasonable for a police officer to expect the arrestee to use any weapons he may have and to attempt to destroy any incriminating evidence then in his possession. Id. at 295. Applying that rationale, the Court concluded that the police were justified in performing a “very limited search necessary to preserve the highly evanescent evidence they found under his fingernails.” Id.

Likewise, the GSR test in this case was constitutional. Simmons does not contest the lawfulness of his arrest, and, given that concession, the GSR test, a “very limited search,” was appropriate as a search incident to arrest. In the alternative, exigent circumstances also justify the search because Simmons was requesting to use the bathroom and both parties agree that washing his hands could have removed any gun-shot residue. The district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress.

Defendant was driving a truck that the trucking officer estimated was over 10,000 lbs and thus subject to regulation. He pulled the truck over, and defendant had a suspended license. The stop was valid as an administrative stop because the commercial trucking industry is heavily regulated under Burger for safety of trucks. Commonwealth v. Leboeuf, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 45, 934 N.E.2d 1285 (2010).

“Accordingly, pursuant to the ‘well-settled principle … that the scope of a warrant authorizing the search of a particularly described premises, includes automobiles owned or controlled by the owner thereof, which are found on the premises,’ Commonwealth v. Signorine, 404 Mass. 400, 403, 535 N.E.2d 601 (1989), the police were authorized to search the defendant’s Honda. The evidence that resulted was properly admitted.” Commonwealth v. Fernandez, 458 Mass. 137, 934 N.E.2d 810 (2010).*

The state did not show that a court order for DNA swabbing, a search, was issued with probable cause, and the probable cause for arrest is not necessarily probable cause to believe that evidence will be found in a search. The DNA swab was suppressed. State v. Garcia-Salado, 240 P.3d 13 (Wash. 2010):

While a cheek swab for DNA is a search and requires a warrant absent the existence of an exception, the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 may be satisfied by a court order. Normally, a warrant in Washington State is issued under CrR 2.3, but neither the state constitution nor federal constitution limits warrants to only those issued under CrR 2.3. A court order may function as a warrant as long as it meets constitutional requirements. E.g., United States v. Mendez-Jimenez, 709 F.2d 1300, 1302 (9th Cir. 1983). In the case of a search that intrudes into the body, such an order must meet both the requirements of a warrant and the additional requirements announced in Schmerber. Therefore, to support a search that intrudes into the body, a CrR 4.7(b)(2)(vi) order must be entered by a neutral and detached magistrate, must describe the place to be searched and items to be seized, must be supported by probable cause based on oath or affirmation, and there must be a clear indication that the desired evidence will be found, the method of intrusion must be reasonable, and the intrusion must be performed in a reasonable manner.

Other than the deputy prosecutor’s assertions, it is unclear what information was brought to the attention of the trial court. The State urges us to consider the certification of probable cause in support of Garcia-Salgado’s arrest, but the record does not establish that the trial judge ever read the certification. Ideally, the CrR 4.7(b)(2)(vi) order itself would reference the evidence relied upon for the probable cause determination, but the order is silent, and nothing in the transcript of the record reveals what information was before the trial court when it entered the CrR 4.7(b)(2)(vi) order. Because we do not know what the trial court considered, we cannot say that probable cause supported the order. Accordingly, we cannot find that the warrant requirement has been satisfied. It is the State’s burden to establish that an exception to the warrant requirement has been met. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d at 250. The State has not established an exception in this case. Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand.

Defendant was indicted and wanted in Tennessee, and he was seen in Bowie County, Texas. He was a known drug dealer. The officer put all he knew about the defendant in the search warrant request and included that in his experience drug dealers keep drugs and guns. The affidavit was not bare bones, and the question of probable cause is not even addressed because of the lack of a “novel question” of PC. The defendant then consented to a search of off-site storage buildings. United States v. Fields, 380 Fed. Appx. 400 (5th Cir. 2010) (unpublished)*:

“This court reviews conclusions of law regarding the sufficiency of a warrant de novo. Our review involves a two-step process, whereby we must first determine whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies. Only if a novel legal question is presented or the good-faith exception does not apply must we then ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.” Whether (1) knowledge of where a drug-dealer resides plus (2) an officer’s experience that such people hide drugs in their homes can support reliance on a warrant is not a novel question in this Circuit, so we engage only in the good-faith analysis.

. . .

The officers in good faith relied on a warrant to search Fields’s home. Because the warrant allowed the police to search the “premises,” the police could comb-through Fields’s car parked on the property. The district court did not err in allowing fruits of the home and car searches to come in evidence based on the good-faith exception, emphasizing again that we do not pass on whether probable cause existed. (footnotes omitted)

The victim of an assault with a short-barreled shotgun with a pistol grip reported it to the police, along with a picture of the gun, and they got a search warrant for generic firearms and gang-related evidence. Based on what they had probable cause for, the description in the warrant was overbroad without any justification. Millender v. County of Los Angeles, 620 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2010):

We read the Fourth Amendment as requiring “specificity,” which has two aspects, “particularity and breadth.” United States v. SDI Future Health, Inc., 568 F.3d 684, 702 (9th Cir. 2009). “Particularity is the requirement that the warrant must clearly state what is sought. Breadth deals with the requirement that the scope of the warrant be limited by the probable cause on which the warrant is based.” Id. (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated Dec. 10, 1987, 926 F.2d 847, 856-57 (9th Cir. 1991)). In determining whether a warrant’s description is sufficiently specific to meet these Fourth Amendment requirements, we consider the following questions:

(1) whether probable cause exists to seize all items of a particular type described in the warrant; (2) whether the warrant sets out objective standards by which executing officers can differentiate items subject to seizure from those which are not; and (3) whether the government was able to describe the items more particularly in light of the information available to it at the time the warrant was issued.

Spilotro, 800 F.2d at 963 (citations omitted). The first consideration encapsulates the overarching Fourth Amendment principle that police must have probable cause to search for and seize “all the items of a particular type described in the warrant.” In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 926 F.2d at 857; see also SDI Future Health, 568 F.3d at 702-03; VonderAhe v. Howland, 508 F.2d 364, 369-70 (9th Cir. 1974). The second and third factors are relevant to determining whether the warrant satisfies this general rule.

. . .

In short, the deputies had probable cause to search for a single, identified weapon, whether assembled or disassembled. They had no probable cause to search for the broad class of firearms and firearm-related materials described in the warrant. Although we have upheld warrants describing broad classes of items in certain cases, see Storage Spaces, 777 F.2d at 1370; Hillyard, 677 F.2d at 1340, the rationales adopted in those cases are inapplicable here given the information the deputies possessed.

The government showed probable cause for taking defendants’ DNA, so it may proceed by subpoena to get it. People of the Virgin Islands v. Carty, 2010 V.I. LEXIS 59 (August 17, 2010).*

Consent was voluntary under the totality of circumstances. United States v. Johnson, 619 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 2010).*

As a pretrial detainee, plaintiff’s excessive tasering claim is governed by the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Fourth. The Fourth Amendment has temporal limits. “See generally Mitchell W. Karsch, Note, Excessive Force and the Fourth Amendment: When Does Seizure End?, 58 Fordham L. Rev. 823 (1990).” Under the circumstances, this was not excessive nor unreasonable, and he was warned he would be tasered if he didn’t quit acting out. Forrest v. Prine, 620 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2010).*

[posted 9/3; I had early court yesterday]

Officers responded to a 4 a.m. 911 call about a person in the neighborhood, but there was no allegation of criminal activity. When the police showed up, defendant was walking to his car, and he opened the door and threw a bag in the car. He stopped for the officer, and there was no reasonable suspicion for his stop at the time it happened, and the search thereafter was unreasonable. The motion to suppress was erroneously granted. United States v. Johnson, 620 F.3d 685, 2010 FED App. 0292P (6th Cir. 2010)*:

In sum, the totality of the relevant circumstances consisted of contextual factors that would have applied to anyone in the neighborhood; a 911 call that made no specific allegation of criminal activity, provided no predictive information about the suspects, and at most suggested that someone was doing something suspicious in the area; Johnson’s reasonable failure to comply with commands to stop until he had reached the white car; and the fact that Johnson did not flee or otherwise react suspiciously to the officers’ presence, but rather continued along the precise trajectory he was following when the officers arrived. While facts susceptible of innocent explanation may amount to reasonable suspicion when taken together, Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277-78, that oft-cited principle “is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears,” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461 (1971). The facts involved here fall far short of the constitutional standard. In short, the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Johnson.

III. CONCLUSION

In this case, Sergeant Lamb and Officer Parton stopped an individual who turned out to be engaged in criminal conduct. Nonetheless, the Fourth Amendment prevents the government from using the incriminating evidence they recovered. Because the totality of the circumstances did not provide “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting [Johnson] of criminal activity,” Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18, and because “[t]he Fourth Amendment simply does not allow a detention based on an officer’s ‘gut feeling’ that a suspect is up to no good,” United States v. Urrieta, 520 F.3d 569, 575 (6th Cir. 2008), we conclude that Lamb and Parton seized Johnson without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in violation of the Fourth Amendment. If a stop is not justified at its inception, any evidence resulting therefrom must be excluded. See Blair, 524 F.3d at 750. Thus, we REVERSE the district court’s order denying Johnson’s motion to suppress and REMAND the case for further proceedings.

[Bottom line: But for the car, a Cadillac, this could have been the guy tossing newspapers at 4 am.]

The trial court erroneously suppressed the result of a second blood draw at a hospital in a DUI case where there was probable cause to believe defendant was under the influence when driving and the police used a search warrant to obtain the blood sample from the hospital. Commonwealth v. Miller, 2010 PA Super 93, 996 A.2d 508 (2010).*

In a RICO case, the district court’s finding on voluntariness of consent is supported by the evidence, so it is affirmed on appeal. United States v. Wilson, 605 F.3d 985 (D.C. Cir. 2010).*

Officers had an arrest warrant for the defendant, and they had probable cause to believe he was present to justify the entry for him. So, the court does not have to decide which standard should apply. United States v. Block, 378 Fed. Appx. 547, 2010 FED App. 0314N (6th Cir. 2010).*

Petitioner’s 2255 denial does not warrant a COA on any claim, including his Fourth Amendment IAC claim. United States v. Altamirano-Quintero, No. 10-1005, 379 Fed. Appx. 764 (10th Cir. 2010).*

An officer came to defendant’s house on a knock-and-talk to ask about a stolen computer. “Defendant said that he had only two computers, one in the living room and one in his bedroom. After defendant showed the deputies a desktop computer in the living room, Yazzolino asked to see the computer in the bedroom. Defendant consented but asked whether they had a ‘good reason’ for talking to him. Yazzolino replied, ‘I wouldn’t be there if I didn’t.’” Defendant succeeded in being asked for consent serially about various things in his house and consented to all of it. Officers found guns, and he admitted that he was a felon in possession. He contended that he was coerced but he agreed that the officer used “nice words.” He was found to have voluntarily consented, over and over again. State v. Zamora, 237 Ore. App. 514, 240 P.3d 91 (2010).*

When the officer first asked for consent to search defendant’s car, it was denied and he did not have probable cause. Then, defendant’s girlfriend admitted there was marijuana in the car, and that gave probable cause to search it and it was still mobile. State v. Kurokawa-Lasciak, 237 Ore. App. 492, 239 P.3d 1046 (2010).*

Defendant’s travel plans here were indicative of reasonable suspicion on the totality of circumstances [and, it is barely suspicious]. United States v. Berg, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106730 (E.D. Mich. October 6, 2010).*

The record showed that defendant’s furtive movements in the car were reasonable suspicion and the defendant was on probation, so the officer was able to conduct a probation search on that reasonable suspicion. State v. Charlie, 2010 MT 195, 357 Mont. 355, 239 P.3d 934 (2010).*

The defendant was stopped because “he had committed a plethora of traffic violations, which included his operation of the vehicle without insurance.” His furtive movements in the car made the officer direct him out of the car, and she asked him for consent to search his person, which he voluntarily gave. Meth was found. Delijevic v. State, 323 S.W.3d 606 (Tex. App. – Amarillo September 7, 2010).*

Defendant did not dispute the government’s factual assertions in its response to his motion so a hearing is denied. Otherwise, defendant lacked standing, and the search warrant was issued with probable cause and the good faith exception applied. United States v. Barragan, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93530 (W.D. Pa. April 23, 2010), adopted 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93533 (W.D. Pa. August 10, 2010).*

Defendant moved to suppress, but he got no hearing on the motion, and then he did not timely object to testimony about the product of the search. The motion was waived, and it was colorable, although pre-Gant. Ratliff v. State, 320 S.W.3d 857 (Tex. App. – Ft. Worth 2010).*

Defendant was arrested with probable cause where an eyewitness identified him as the offender. United States v. McKnight, 385 Fed. Appx. 547 (6th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

Defendant was arrested with probable cause where an eyewitness identified him as the gunman, and the officers had found the gun. State v. Basil, 202 N.J. 570, 998 A.2d 472 (2010).*