The Terry stop of defendant’s car was lawful, but seeing a bullet in plain view did not create probable cause to believe that there was a gun in the car [there was] without a carry permit or in possession of a felon. People v. Colyar, 407 Ill. App. 3d 294, 346 Ill. Dec. 921, 941 N.E.2d 479 (2010):

Here, we agree with the circuit court that more was required to justify the search of the defendant’s vehicle after the officers observed a bullet in plain-view, which precipitated the officers’ action. Upon observing the bullet, the officers immediately removed the occupants from the vehicle, secured each in front of the Honda by handcuffing them, and placed each in custody without determining whether the bullet observed by the officers was in fact evidence of a crime. While the circuit court focused on the absence of any inquiry concerning whether the defendant or any of the passengers possessed a FOID card, it could just as well have stated that had the officers inquired whether any of the occupants was a convicted felon, probable cause would have existed for an arrest. As the State correctly points out, the absence of a valid FOID card makes possession of ammunition “a Class A misdemeanor” and a convicted felon cannot “be in possession of a valid FOID card.” It is also telling that the State does not identify the crime believed to have been committed or about to be committed by the defendant before the search ensued. Rather, the State appears to assert that the search was justified based on a crime the officers had no information had been committed: “the police officers would have inevitably discovered the gun as a search incident to defendant’s arrest for possession of ammunition without a valid FOID card.”

We agree with the circuit court. Probable cause to believe that a weapon was present in the defendant’s car did not exist based on the information the officers had at the time of the search of the defendant’s car. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the record fails to support that an exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement applies to justify the search of the defendant’s car.

Trial court’s ruling denying motion to suppress was erroneously denied. While the trial court has the credibility call and great deference in making findings of fact at a suppression hearing, the surveillance video of the area of defendant’s detention at the suppression hearing clearly contradicted the officer’s testimony about where and how things happened, and it showed that the motion to suppress should have been granted. State v. Thompson, 58 So. 3d 994 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2011):

At this point in the investigation, the routine investigatory stop transitioned into an illegal detention. Based on the evidence, the trial court should have determined that the “reasonable and articulable suspicion,” which would have otherwise justified an investigatory stop, was based on Agent Parker’s testimony that clearly contradicted the surveillance tape. Pairing this determination with the fact that Agent Parker further investigated the defendant when he should have released him from the detention, the trial court should have ruled that the initial detention was illegal.

Because of the defendant’s illegal detention, we cannot agree with the trial court’s erroneous conclusion that the subsequent consent was freely and voluntarily obtained. As noted above, consent obtained after an illegal detention is only valid if it was the product of free will and not the result of exploitation of the previous illegality. Agent Parker’s testimony that the defendant was not free to leave at the time he provided all the incriminating information and was not given his driver’s license until the consent to search forms were signed supports a finding that the consent was not sufficiently attenuated from the arguably illegal detention so as to be a product of a free will. The record is absent of any indication that Agent Parker expressed to the defendant that he had the option of not giving consent to search the vehicle.

Questioning of passenger for 60-90 seconds did not unreasonably extend the stop of defendant’s vehicle. State v. Whitlow, 250 P.3d 24 (Ore. App. 2011).*

The officer had PC to believe that defendant was DUI when he hit a car stopped at a light and caused injury, justifying a blood draw. The record supports the conclusion defendant consented to the blood draw. Setzer v. State, 54 So. 3d 226 (Miss. 2011).*

Defendant abandoned his jacket in flight from the police into a bar. The jacket was found away from him. In the jacket was a gun, and the jacket was treated as abandoned. United States v. Jones, 406 Fed. Appx. 953, 2011 FED App. 0040N (6th Cir. 2011).*

The application for a search warrant based on a dog alert does not have to detail the dog’s training to show probable cause. Nevertheless, the officers smelled marijuana before that anyway. United States v. McDowell, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3866 (D. Kan. January 14, 2011).*

Defendant argued that he consented only to a search of his vehicle and not his person. The officer testified that he usually asked for consent to both but did not specifically remember. Here, the question is moot because the officer also had reason to frisk defendant and found the gun. United States v. Lecraft, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3753 (E.D. N.C. January 14, 2011).*

Victim’s representatives were reasonably permitted to participate in the search so they could identify what belonged to them so it could be seized. United States v. Chinasa, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6849 (E.D. Va. January 25, 2011).*

The court credits that defendant consented to a search of both his car and his person. While the report says just the car, it was both. United States v. Lecraft, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140273 (E.D. N.C. October 7, 2010).*

There was probable cause to arrest plaintiff for disorderly conduct, so judgment for the defendants. Wheeler v. Newell, 407 Fed. Appx. 889, 2011 FED App. 0050N (6th Cir. 2011) (unpublished).*

Hearsay was admissible at the suppression hearing for the officer to testify to what he had heard from other officers to show that he had reason for defendant’s stop. United States v. Santos, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6672 (D. Haw. January 21, 2011).*

Defendant was under investigation for possession of and acquiring child pornography. He arrived at SFO from Frankfurt, Germany, and his laptop was seized for search, and he admitted having child pornography on his computer. The seizure of his laptop and cell phone at Customs was valid as a border search. United States v. Kyle, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6791 (N.D. Cal. January 19, 2011).*

Defendant was stopped for not signaling. Five officers showed up. He was arrested and handcuffed and then one officer searched the vehicle console without any justification. The search incident was invalid under Gant, and it could not be justified by the government’s strained theory of his being involved in a conspiracy, too. United States v. Holland, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5261 (S.D. Tex. January 20, 2011)*:

The government’s primary argument, however, is not that the defendants could have accessed the vehicle but that it was reasonable for Oppermann to believe the vehicle contained evidence of the offense of arrest. Oppermann testified, however, that the only offense for which he had probable cause for the traffic stop was the traffic violation — changing lanes without signaling — and that Oppermann did not expect to find any evidence of the traffic violation when he searched the console. Relying on Devenpeck v. Alford, 125 S. Ct. 588 (2004), the government argues that the relevant “offense of arrest” for this inquiry is conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance, the crime for which the defendants were later indicted, instead of the traffic violation, and that the search is justified because Oppermann was searching for evidence of the drug-conspiracy offense.

Officers had an arrest warrant for a third person who they knew was not at his own home and was reasonably believed to have been at defendant’s for a week. Thus, the entry on that arrest warrant was valid. United States v. Zavala, 408 Fed. Appx. 319 (11th Cir. 2011) (unpublished).*

Defendant’s claims that appellate counsel did not chose better arguments for appeal of his search issue would not have succeeded, so no IAC. United States v. Murphy, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5293 (W.D. Va. January 20, 2011).*

The radio traffic between the on-the-scene officer and his supervisor showed that defendant was committing no crime and there was no reasonable belief that defendant was in possession of a gun. United States v. Martin, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8281 (E.D. Mich. January 28, 2011).*

The officer had cause for stopping defendant. 911 received a shooting call describing an African-American male with braids and a blue or black hoodie. Arriving five minutes later, the officer saw one man matching that description. United States v. Varner, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140542 (D. Minn. December 21, 2010).*

Defendant was stopped for a traffic offense and was nervous and had engaged in furtive movements in the car. He had a drug record, too. This justified the officer asking for consent to search for drugs, which defendant gave. Kelly v. State, 331 S.W.3d 541 (Tex. App. – Houston (14th Dist.) 2011).*

The CI predicted certain behavior from the defendant and another, and officers watched and saw that behavior. That was reasonable suspicion for the stop. United States v. Juarez, 408 Fed. Appx. 183 (10th Cir. 2011) (unpublished).*

The First Circuit held that the renter of a large building who allowed others to live somewhat communally had a reasonable expectation of privacy [as they all would] in what would otherwise be common area. Is it an apartment house or a rooming house? If the latter, there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas. This was the latter. United States v. Werra, 638 F.3d 326 (1st Cir. 2011):

Thus, we agree with the district court that, unlike the typical expectation-of-privacy inquiry, which focuses solely on the particular location in which the evidence the defendant seeks to suppress was found, see, e.g., United States v. Bucci, 582 F.3d 108, 116 (1st Cir. 2009) (front of home, as viewed by video camera); Rheault, 561 F.3d at 59 (third-floor landing of the front stairway); United States v. Meada, 408 F.3d 14, 22 (1st Cir. 2005) (gun case), we must conduct a broader examination of Werra’s and the other tenants’ living arrangements throughout 63 Menlo Street. If they lived separately — like apartment dwellers — they could not claim the common areas of the house, including the foyer, as their private space vis-a-vis outsiders. However, if they did not live in individualized “residences” within the house — and were thus more like the occupants of a single-family home — their right to privacy vis-a-vis outsiders would begin at 63 Menlo Street’s front door. Under the latter scenario, the officers would have violated Werra’s reasonable expectation of privacy by forcibly entering the house. We thus also agree with the district court that the relevant considerations for our inquiry include whether the building contains “recognizably separate living units,” the residents’ right to exclude others from parts of the building, the number of residents, and the “formal legal relationship” among them. Werra, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68790, 2008 WL 4280035, at *4-5. Other facts that shed light on how the tenants viewed the dwelling, including the tenants’ customary use of various spaces within the premises, also are pertinent in evaluating their subjective expectation of privacy.

. . .

In sum, based on the facts of record, we conclude that Werra has met his burden to show that he possessed a subjective expectation of privacy in the foyer of 63 Menlo Street — or, more specifically, that he believed the entire house, and not just the third floor, served as his home and, hence, that he could prevent the entry of anyone whom he and his housemates wished to keep out. We further conclude that, on this record, Werra’s expectation of privacy was reasonable. A resident of a single-family structure who shares living arrangements as did the tenants of 63 Menlo Street could reasonably expect that his right to privacy begins at the front door. See Titus, 707 So. 2d at 708 (holding that, “just like private homeowners, rooming house residents have an actual expectation of privacy in the common areas of the rooming house” and that “given the sanctity of the home, society is prepared to recognize that expectation as reasonable”).

Officers executing an eviction order on defendant who was ordered out of the property two weeks earlier conducted a protective sweep before removing him and found drugs and guns. He had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises, summarizing cases from several circuits. “But given that Curlin had notice that his continued occupancy had been adjudged to be unlawful, we have no difficulty concluding that he lacked any objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises. Thus, no illegal search occurred requiring the suppression of the gun evidence.” United States v. Curlin, 638 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 2011).

Defendant was stopped for not dimming his lights. The officer asserted that furtive movements in the car justified a search, but that did not occur for a long time after that and after defendant had gotten out of the car and gotten back into it. Therefore, the officer’s testimony on the need for a protective search of the car is not credited. Motion to suppress granted. United States v. McCraney, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43722 (N.D. Ohio April 22, 2011).*

The fact that defense counsel did not challenge defendant’s consent is not determinative to his 2255 because the vehicle could have been searched on probable cause. United States v. German, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43613 (W.D. La. April 19, 2011)*; United States v. Smith, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43612 (W.D. La. April 19, 2011).*

Domestic Spy Agency? 5 Outrageous Examples of FBI Intimidation and Entrapment // In the 10 years since the Sept. 11th attacks, the FBI has expanded its powers, transforming into a massive domestic spying agency by Kevin Gosztola:

In 2010, the FISA court approved all 1,506 requests by the FBI to electronically monitor suspects. They were also generous with granting “national security letters,” which allow the FBI to force credit card companies, financial institutions, and internet service providers to give confidential records about customers’ subscriber information, phone number, email addresses and the websites they’ve visited. The FBI got permission to spy on 14,000 people in this way.

Do they really think there are 14,000 terrorists living in the US?

That’s just the beginning.

Now, the FBI is claiming the authority to exercise more surveillance powers, which include undocumented database searches, lie detector tests, trash searches, surveillance squads, investigations of public officials, scholars and journalists and rules that would provide more freedom for agents and informants to not disclose participation in organizations that are targets of FBI surveillance.

Apparently the difference between the KGB and the FBI is that the FBI has to go through a judicial rubberstamp and the KGB didn’t have to bother with the extra paperwork of the national security letters.

Defendant, a suspect in a robbery, was stopped for a seat belt violation. Once out of the vehicle, he ignored several requests to remove his hands from his pockets. When he finally did, he tossed a gun magazine over to a fence. The command to remove his hands from his pockets was lawful. United States v. Bell, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70307 (D. V.I. June 30, 2011):

Here, the variation on that theme is that Defendant was already outside of the car when he was instructed to remove his hands from his pocket and show them to police. Nonetheless, the logic of Moorefield [United States v. Moorefield, 111 F.3d 10, 12 (3d Cir. 1997)] and Wilson [Maryland. v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414 (1997) (“We therefore hold that an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to get out of the car pending completion of the stop.”)] applies. The Court reads those cases as standing for the proposition that a traffic stop presents a uniquely dangerous situation to police which justifies minor incursions into the personal liberty of the occupants of stopped vehicles that might not otherwise be appropriate outside the traffic stop context. Just like the vehicles in Wilson and Moorefield could have contained weapons that their passenger’s unseen hands could access, Defendant’s pockets could also have contained accessible weapons. In other words, an officer executing a traffic stop is entitled to not only remove the vehicle’s occupants, but also make sure that they do not have anything dangerous in their hands. The minimal intrusion on Defendant’s liberty of having to remove his hands from his pocket after stepping out of the car is substantially outweighed by officer protection. Accordingly, the command to Defendant to remove his hands from his pocket was lawful.

HuffPo: The Damaging Three Words of the Declaration of Independence by Alison Owings, author, “Indian Voices: Listening to Native Americans”:

Eventually, however, we get to “domestic Insurrections amongst us,” and here it comes, the phrase that distresses me so much after spending close to a decade meeting, and listening to, Native Americans, that I can barely stand to read it, nor type it.

“… the merciless Indian Savages.”

Say what? From the elegantly-quotable Jefferson? Yes. “… the merciless Indian Savages, whose known Rule of Warfare, is an undistinguished Destruction, of all Ages, Sexes and Conditions.”

While Native Americans celebrate this 4th of July weekend, probably with hotdogs and fireworks, and possibly a powwow (as far as I know, the day has not attained the level of dislike or dismissal in Indian country that there is towards Columbus Day), I wonder whether we might all read the Declaration of Independence out loud, consider what that three word phrase wrought, not to mention the words about “undistinguished Destruction.” Destruction of who by whom? Native people, among others, may ask.

Merely touching defendant to direct him back into a bar where he already agreed to go was not a separate seizure. It was as much communicative as anything. United States v. Jackson, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69811 (E.D. Pa. June 27, 2011):

At the suppression hearing, Agents Cole and Logan testified they briefly placed their hands on defendant to guide him to the back of the bar. Defendant had already voluntarily consented to accompany the agents to that location. At no point during the walk to the rear did defendant attempt to flee or change course so that the agents attempted to restrain him. The agents’ touching defendant’s person reasonably can be seen as an attempt to communicate with him in a noisy environment where verbal communication was difficult. Their touching did not amount to “a laying on of hands or application of physical force to restrain movement.” California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991). Since defendant had consented to accompany the agents to the back of the bar, there was no need for them to restrict his movement. The agents’ touching defendant briefly to guide him to a specific area of the bar where he had already agreed to converse with them could not reasonably suggest to defendant that his consensual interaction with the agents was suddenly compulsory. See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984) (“While most citizens will respond to a police request, the fact that people do so, and do so without being told they are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the response.”).

Because defendant was not seized at the time he stated he had a firearm on his person, evidence of that statement, the firearm and the drugs recovered from his person pursuant to his arrest are admissible. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (the permissible scope of a search incident to arrest includes “the arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate control’ – construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.”).

The trial court suppressed the stop for lack of probable cause. The state argued on appeal that the standard should have been reasonable suspicion. Even applying that standard, the stop was unjustified and the trial court’s order is affirmed. State v. Ward, 2011 Ohio 3183, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 2721 (7th Dist. June 16, 2011).*

In an arson case, defendant did not have standing to challenge the search of the vehicle in which he was a passenger. Regardless, the police had a valid search warrant for the vehicle for evidence of the crime. State v. Collins, 2011 Ohio 3241, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 2738 (8th Dist. June 30, 2011).*

Defendant stopped by a lone police officer who was outside the car standing on the street was asked for consent to search, and the trial court’s findings of voluntariness of consent are supported by the evidence. State v. Fowler, 2011 Ohio 3156, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 2665 (10th Dist. June 28, 2011).*

L. Rush Atkinson, The Bilateral Fourth Amendment and the Duties of Law-Abiding Persons, Georgetown Law Journal (forthcoming). The author is a Sixth Circuit Law Clerk shortly going to work for DOJ.

SSRN Abstract:

The Fourth Amendment protects the innocent only from “unreasonable” searches. In lieu of the limited nature of this constitutional safeguard, law abiders consistently take precautions to avoid government searches. This Article considers why constitutional jurisprudence limits the protection of the innocent to “unreasonable” searches, thereby forcing them to alter their behavior. The most satisfying answer derives from an often overlooked fact: Searches of innocent persons are often “bilateral accidents,” meaning that both the innocent suspect and the police can affect the likelihood of an erroneous search occurring. In bilateral conditions, a reasonableness rule induces both the searcher and searched to take optimal care to avoid mistaken searches, while other rules embodied in constitutional protections — like that within the Takings Clause — cannot.

By assigning costs for erroneous-but-reasonable searches to the innocent, the Fourth Amendment functions as an important regulatory device, channeling law abiders away from activity that unintentionally masks others’ criminal enterprises. Thus, the Amendment regulates the very people that it protects from governmental intrusions. This Article refers to this duality as the “bilateral Fourth Amendment,” and argues the Amendment’s incentives for the innocent are best understood as a duty for law-abiding people to act reasonably.

At the same time, identifying the “bilateral” nature of searches should influence the legal rules dictating what evidence police may use as grounds to search a suspect. Because the innocent alter their behavior based on which activities the government deems “suspicious,” rules about cause and suspicion cannot singly turn on evidence’s probative value; they must also account for the socially beneficial activity that is reduced by labeling behavior “suspicious.”

An officer patrolling a low-rent housing project saw a man asleep on the porch in the early morning hours, and that was highly unusual. She approached just to see what was going on, and there was a handgun on the floor between his feet. She called for backup, and then retrieved the gun. After handcuffing him, she asked for ID and he said go get it, indicating his pocket. In the pocket was the ID and drugs. The search was legal. United States v. Williams, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2977 (S.D. Ga. January 12, 2011)*:

Firearms lying unattended in plain view on the porch of a public housing unit and in close proximity to a public sidewalk present a clear threat not only to the approaching officer but also to the community generally, for any passerby — including a small child — could easily retrieve the loaded weapon. The opportunity for great mischief was readily apparent to Officer Stephens, who knew that many small children lived in Yamacraw Village. The Supreme Court has recognized that law enforcement officers are not only permitted, but expected, to exercise “community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.” Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968) (“Encounters are initiated by the police for a wide variety of purposes, some of which are wholly unrelated to a desire to prosecute for crime.”). Here, the obvious danger to community welfare posed by a pistol lying unattended and exposed to public view in a public housing complex justified the exercise of just such a caretaking function. Thus, Officer Stephens did not offend the Fourth Amendment by stepping onto the porch to secure the weapon.

A pawn shop operator was contacted about having stolen property in pawn, and the police arrived to talk about it. The officers were shown the property in a back room, and they did not violate the Fourth Amendment by seizing the property in plain view. PPS, Inc. v. Faulkner County, 630 F.3d 1098 (8th Cir. 2011).*

Defendant’s stop was with probable cause of a lane change, and reasonable suspicion quickly developed and only five minutes elapsed before defendant’s cocaine was found. United States v. Corley, 408 Fed. Appx. 245 (11th Cir. 2011) (unpublished).*

as expected (odds of cert grant 3-2 as of May 5th).

From ScotusBlog:

Title: United States v. Jones
Docket: 10-1259
Issue(s): 1) Whether the warrantless use of a tracking device on petitioner’s vehicle to monitor its movements on public streets violated the Fourth Amendment.
2) Whether the government violated the respondent’s Fourth Amendment rights by installing the tracking device without a valid warrant and without his consent.

Update: This will clearly be the biggest case of the 2011-12 Term, and the biggest privacy case since 1967’s Katz. GPS planting is so easy and inexpensive now, it may be far more prevalent than we really know. How many times has the defense never been apprised?

My concern is that most of the Justices are too mid-Twentieth Century for my Fourth Amendment sensibilities. Scalia showed some spark in Kyllo, from which Kennedy dissented. But that was the home, and that is a huge difference. In fact, some of the Justices are too Nineteenth Century for me. The oral argument in Quon was a semi-eyeopener as to how little they know about basic modern technology. The law clerks are young and tech-savvy enough to carry the day, but they can’t ask the questions at oral argument. Hopefully they can keep the opinions this case will produce on the straight and narrow. The D.C. Cir.’s opinion is so strong on the one hand that one would think it would carry the day in SCOTUS, but a Court as hostile to individual liberty as this one makes the “Nixon Court” look liberal.

Remember this passage from Quon, slip op. at 10:

The Court must proceed with care when considering the whole concept of privacy expectations in communications made on electronic equipment owned by a government employer. The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in society has become clear. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 353 (1967). In Katz, the Court relied on its own knowledge and experience to conclude that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth. See id., at 360–361 (Harlan, J., concurring). It is not so clear that courts at present are on so sure a ground. Prudence counsels caution before the facts in the instant case are used to establish far-reaching premises that define the existence, and extent, of privacy expectations enjoyed by employees when using employer-provided communication devices.

I’m not hopeful about the outcome in this case because of SCOTUS’s hierarchy of rights: Corporations over government over persons. And, since most cars come with GPS these days, can the government simply dictate that all vehicle GPS devices communicate with the government via satellite at all times?* Is that where we are headed?** If so, Big Brother can’t be far behind. Kyllo at least would prevent the Telescreen.

Somewhere, George Orwell is cackling.

______

*Credit Chief Justice Lippman on the New York Court of Appeals with that thought in Weaver‘s oral argument in March 2009.
** Is The E-ZPass Box A Trojan Horse For Privacy Invasions?

A 911 dispatcher radioed the police department and stated to an officer that defendant had guns in the house and was threatening to commit suicide, hurt himself and others. As the police approached the residence, defendant exited the home talking on a cellphone. An officer secured defendant and frisked him for weapons. The government had a legitimate interest in conducting a search of a residence. The first thing the officer observed on a table was marijuana that appeared to be packaged for sale along with other drug paraphernalia. The trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress the evidence, because there was sufficient evidence of exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless entry. The officers acted within their discretion because entry into the home was necessary to secure the safety of themselves, the paramedics, and other people possibly inside the home. Drug evidence was found. “‘The right of the police to enter and investigate in an emergency without accompanying intent to either search or arrest is inherent in the very nature of their duties as peace officers. ***.’ United States v. Barone (C.C.A.2), 330 F.2d 543, at 545.” State v. Bethel, 2011 Ohio 3020, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 2550 (5th Dist. June 13, 2011). [This one bothers me because people can make this stuff up and call the police. The defendant was talking on a cell phone when he came out of the house. Where was the reasonable suspicion? I don’t see it. This is all too convenient. This is just wrong.]

Defendant and his wife signed a parole agreement that they were subject to warrantless searches. The police received a report defendant was growing marijuana in his basement, so the parole officer could search. State v. Bays, 2011 Ohio 3021, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 2551 (5th Dist. June 13, 2011).*

Blog of the Legal Times: State, Federal Wiretap Applications Up 34%:

Law enforcement officers are listening. More than ever.

State and local authorities received more than 3,100 wiretap approvals from judges last year, an increase of 34% above the number of authorizations the previous year, according to a report released today.

Federal judges, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts report said, approved 1,207 wiretaps, and 1,987 were authorized by state judges. Historical data reveal applications are rarely turned down. Only one application was denied in 2010.

Defendant’s disclaiming ownership of an airplane that DHS was questioning the pilot named Pinto about that Pinto claimed was his airplane was a waiver of a reasonable expectation of privacy in the airplane. The same rules of standing that apply to cars apply to airplanes. United States v. Ambriz-Valenzuela, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68706 (D. Kan. June 28, 2011).*

The court credits the Marshals’ testimony about defendant’s consent. Defendant has no criminal history, but she is a sophisticated person with a doctoral degree in nursing and knew what she was doing. United States v. Snellgrove, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68837 (S.D. Tex. June 27, 2011).*

There was probable cause for the search warrant in this case based on CI information that was independently corroborated by the police. United States v. Underwood, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68632 (W.D. Mo. June 7, 2011).*

How hard is it to get a warrant to place a GPS device on a vehicle and then later to search a cell phone? Not too. United States v. Macias-Perez, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68305 (N.D. Iowa June 24, 2011).*

Officers conducted a controlled delivery of a FedEx package with drugs. At the house, the person signing for the package said that he was not the recipient, but he’d sign for it. To the officers, then, that meant that the intended recipient was still there. They conducted a protective sweep for the other person, finding no one. They asked for consent, and it was refused. They secured the premises for a search warrant. The protective sweep that revealed a gun that was not seized until after the warrant arrived was valid. United States v. Wolfe, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68235 (E.D. Tenn. June 2, 2011).*

The audio of defendant’s traffic stop was hard to hear, and it did not show that defendant consented or not consented. Thus, the court credits the officer’s testimony that the defendant consented. United States v. Griffin, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143280 (N.D. Ga. September 7, 2010).*