A 911 dispatcher radioed the police department and stated to an officer that defendant had guns in the house and was threatening to commit suicide, hurt himself and others. As the police approached the residence, defendant exited the home talking on a cellphone. An officer secured defendant and frisked him for weapons. The government had a legitimate interest in conducting a search of a residence. The first thing the officer observed on a table was marijuana that appeared to be packaged for sale along with other drug paraphernalia. The trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress the evidence, because there was sufficient evidence of exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless entry. The officers acted within their discretion because entry into the home was necessary to secure the safety of themselves, the paramedics, and other people possibly inside the home. Drug evidence was found. “‘The right of the police to enter and investigate in an emergency without accompanying intent to either search or arrest is inherent in the very nature of their duties as peace officers. ***.’ United States v. Barone (C.C.A.2), 330 F.2d 543, at 545.” State v. Bethel, 2011 Ohio 3020, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 2550 (5th Dist. June 13, 2011). [This one bothers me because people can make this stuff up and call the police. The defendant was talking on a cell phone when he came out of the house. Where was the reasonable suspicion? I don’t see it. This is all too convenient. This is just wrong.]

Defendant and his wife signed a parole agreement that they were subject to warrantless searches. The police received a report defendant was growing marijuana in his basement, so the parole officer could search. State v. Bays, 2011 Ohio 3021, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 2551 (5th Dist. June 13, 2011).*

Blog of the Legal Times: State, Federal Wiretap Applications Up 34%:

Law enforcement officers are listening. More than ever.

State and local authorities received more than 3,100 wiretap approvals from judges last year, an increase of 34% above the number of authorizations the previous year, according to a report released today.

Federal judges, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts report said, approved 1,207 wiretaps, and 1,987 were authorized by state judges. Historical data reveal applications are rarely turned down. Only one application was denied in 2010.

Defendant’s disclaiming ownership of an airplane that DHS was questioning the pilot named Pinto about that Pinto claimed was his airplane was a waiver of a reasonable expectation of privacy in the airplane. The same rules of standing that apply to cars apply to airplanes. United States v. Ambriz-Valenzuela, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68706 (D. Kan. June 28, 2011).*

The court credits the Marshals’ testimony about defendant’s consent. Defendant has no criminal history, but she is a sophisticated person with a doctoral degree in nursing and knew what she was doing. United States v. Snellgrove, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68837 (S.D. Tex. June 27, 2011).*

There was probable cause for the search warrant in this case based on CI information that was independently corroborated by the police. United States v. Underwood, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68632 (W.D. Mo. June 7, 2011).*

How hard is it to get a warrant to place a GPS device on a vehicle and then later to search a cell phone? Not too. United States v. Macias-Perez, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68305 (N.D. Iowa June 24, 2011).*

Officers conducted a controlled delivery of a FedEx package with drugs. At the house, the person signing for the package said that he was not the recipient, but he’d sign for it. To the officers, then, that meant that the intended recipient was still there. They conducted a protective sweep for the other person, finding no one. They asked for consent, and it was refused. They secured the premises for a search warrant. The protective sweep that revealed a gun that was not seized until after the warrant arrived was valid. United States v. Wolfe, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68235 (E.D. Tenn. June 2, 2011).*

The audio of defendant’s traffic stop was hard to hear, and it did not show that defendant consented or not consented. Thus, the court credits the officer’s testimony that the defendant consented. United States v. Griffin, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143280 (N.D. Ga. September 7, 2010).*

Did Pa. Police Officer’s Text Messages Violate Wiretap Act? by Gina Passarella in The Legal Intelligencer, June 29, 2011:

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has granted allocatur in two cases related to whether a police officer violates the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act by pretending to be an accomplice and communicating directly with a suspect via text message.

The court granted the appeals in Commonwealth v. Cruttenden and Commonwealth v. Lanier June 16. A panel of the Superior Court ruled in June 2009 that it was “constrained” to uphold a trial court’s grant of Jeffrey S. Cruttenden and Stephen Lanier’s motion to suppress evidence in the criminal cases against them.

The court’s decision in Cruttenden has already resulted in the upholding of other suppression rulings, including in the case of Commonwealth v. Rosa. In that case, the Superior Court held this year that a narcotics detective violated Pennsylvania’s Wiretap Act by using two cell phones to receive calls intended for the phones’ owners and to set up defendants’ subsequent arrests on drug charges. A phone seized by the police rang frequently, and the detective answered it. Impersonating the owner of the cell phone, the detective made arrangements to meet the caller for a drug transaction. The detective met the caller and arrested him.

Copyright 2011, April 22, 2011 by James Margulies:

China? Just China? If GPS is wide open, so is your GPS enabled cellphone, and everybody, and I mean EVERYBODY, is being tracked. Scared of the government? You bet. I was never paranoid until cert was granted in Jones because I no longer have any confidence in the Supreme Court. At this rate, the damn 2012 election will be irrelevant to the future of the Constitution because we may already be doomed.

The government’s computer search here was in 2003, and the officers copied 11 computer hard drives at the scene without taking the computers. If anything, this was less intrusive than seizing the computers and searching them. Also, defendants complained about the delay in searching the information, but they never moved for return of the information. The Tamura [United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1982)] rational applies, not CDT [United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 579 F.3d 989, 1006-07 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)]. United States v. Ganias, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67806 (D. Conn. June 24, 2011):

In sum, government agents seized the computer data pursuant to a valid warrant. They used a means less intrusive to the individual whose possessions were seized than other means they were authorized to use, by making mirror images of the computer hard drives rather than seizing and holding the computers themselves. The forensic examination of the computers by the computer specialists was conducted within the limitations imposed by the warrant, and the case agents viewed only data that had been extracted accordingly. A copy of the evidence was preserved in the form in which it was taken. The defendant never moved for destruction or return of the data, which could have led to the seized pertinent data being preserved by other means. Finally, when other leads led the government to expand its investigation, the agents obtained the 2006 Warrant, which authorized them to search the computer data in their possession that they were not authorized to view under the 2003 Warrant. Cf. United States v. Riley 906 F.2d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Having found the rental agreement [for a storage locker in a search pursuant to a warrant of the defendant’s home], the agents did not proceed lawlessly to search the locker; they presented their evidence to a magistrate who justifiably found probable cause to believe that a search of the locker would uncover evidence of drug trafficking.”).

The difficulty of segregating and searching computer data that is pertinent to an investigation and can be legitimately searched by the government from nonpertinent data stored with it is a proper concern. Here however, where the searches and seizures were authorized by a magistrate judge, where government agents scrupulously avoided reviewing files that they were not entitled to review, and where the defendant had an alternative remedy pursuant to Rule 41(g) to avoid the complained of injury, i.e. that the government held his data for too long without returning or destroying it, the defendant has not shown that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated.

CNN.com: TSA stands by officers after pat-down of elderly woman in Florida:

The Transportation Security Administration stood by its security officers Sunday after a Florida woman complained that her cancer-stricken, 95-year-old mother was patted down and forced to remove her adult diaper while going through security.

Reports of the incident took hold in social media, with scores of comments on the topic and reposts appearing hourly on Twitter Sunday afternoon.

The TSA released a statement Sunday defending its agents’ actions at the Northwest Florida Regional Airport.

Defendant was seen driving a distinctive yellow Monte Carlo known to belong to a PCP dealer. He stopped at a residence known for sale of PCP. Then he drove to another house and stopped for a half hour and drank a beer in the front yard. He drove off to a third location, and he pulled to the curb but failed to signal. The officer pulled up next to him as he got out of the car, and he denied getting out of the car he was driving, saying that he got out the car the yellow car was parked behind. The officer stopped him for drinking in public. [Great idea for a stop.] A gun was seen in plain view in the car, and his denial of being in the car was abandonment. United States v. Randolph, 628 F.3d 1022 (8th Cir. 2011).*

No clear error in the finding of consent. United States v. Lopez-Casas, 407 Fed. Appx. 72 (8th Cir. 2011) (unpublished)* (literally one sentence on this issue in an Anders brief).

In this fraudulent prescription case, defendant had no standing in his pharmacy records. The state did not raise this issue in the trial court, which the court said it could, and the defendant sought a remand which the court declined [maybe only because the issue was clear to the court]. Society will not recognize an expectation of privacy in a fraudulent prescription. Hendley v. State, 58 So. 3d 296 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).*

The trial court’s conclusion that defendant consented to a blood draw is supported by the evidence. The nurse who made the draw testified that she would not have drawn blood without some consent; it was not in writing, but it didn’t have to be. Setzer v. State, 2011 Miss. LEXIS 102 (February 17, 2011).*

Defendant was stopped for a traffic offense, and an affidavit was sought for a search warrant for his BAC level. The affidavit as a whole showed probable cause, granting the deference search warrants are entitled to. Hughes v. State, 334 S.W.3d 379 (Tex. App. — Amarillo 2011).*

Defendant’s girlfriend who had lived with him for two months had apparent authority to consent to a search. Her being found practically naked and beaten outside the apartment suggested she was connected to the apartment. The fact she was not on the lease meant nothing as to apparent authority. Ferguson v. State, 58 So. 3d 360 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011):

. . . In this case, Ferrell told the officers that she had been living with appellant for two months. Certainly, her presence outside the apartment practically naked and beaten would indicate to the officers that she had some connection to the premises. Unlike [United States v.] McGee, the appellant did not deprive her of her key, and even though she did not have a key prior to entry, the officer confirmed that a key to the apartment was in her purse. Like McGee, Ferrell was trying to move out of the apartment, when appellant stopped her by pushing her out of the house without either her clothes or her purse. Certainly, if appellant wanted to deprive Ferrell of her access and right to come into the apartment, he would have thrown all of her property out of the apartment.

Appellant relies on the fact that the property manager of the apartment complex told the officer that he could not use a key to admit Ferrell to the apartment, because she was not on the lease. From this, he posits that the officers did not have a reasonable belief that she had the authority to consent. He mixes, however, the concepts of actual authority and apparent authority. The fact that Ferrell was not on the lease is not dispositive of her claim of actual authority. Under the unusual circumstances of this case, where neither appellant nor Ferrell was on the lease as a tenant, the lease has little bearing on whether Ferrell had actual authority to consent.

Defendant was presented with an arrest warrant for guns and a state court order to produce all firearms in his possession as a condition of bond which he declined to answer. After three tries, without answering any of the questions about what was going on, defendant provided the guns and talked, and this could not be shown by the government to be voluntary by the preponderance of the evidence. Moreover, his statements at the same time were not voluntary either. United States v. Swanson, 635 F.3d 995 (7th Cir. 2011).*

Twenty-five people walking on a road near a beach in the Virgin Islands soaking wet and carrying bags was reasonable suspicion they entered the country illegally. The VIPD acted as expeditiously as possible in the detention and calling INS officers to the scene. United States v. Cherubin, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21897, 53 V.I. 783 (D. V.I. March 8, 2010).*

Merely asking questions of a passenger in a car after detention of the driver does not imply wrongdoing or an additional detention of the passenger. The passenger validly consented. State v. Jones, 241 Ore. App. 597, 250 P.3d 452 (2011)*:

Defendant argues that, by virtue of asking him if he had drugs or weapons, Jensen was implicitly accusing defendant of criminal activity. However, without a “show of authority that restrict[ed] [defendant’s] freedom of movement,” “the content of [Jensen’s] question[ ] did not cause defendant to be seized.” Ashbaugh, 349 Or at 317 (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original). There is no such “show of authority,” as the Supreme Court has implicitly construed that term in Ashbaugh, on this record. Jensen was the sole officer talking to defendant; Berne was still in his patrol car preparing the driver’s citation, and a third officer was standing some distance away with the driver. There were no weapons drawn, and Jensen testified that he spoke with defendant in the same tone he used when answering counsels’ questions at the motion hearing. We conclude that, under Ashbaugh, Jensen did not “intentionally and significantly” interfere with defendant’s liberty or freedom of movement and, also under that case, we must conclude that a reasonable person in defendant’s situation would not have believed Jensen had done so.

Since Utah’s search and seizure provision is not interpreted as narrowly as the Fourth Amendment, a federal claim over the same act is not collateral estoppel to a state constitutional claim. Jensen v. Cunningham, 2011 UT 17, 679 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 250 P.3d 465 (2011):

[*P49] Without an analysis of the independent protections afforded by our state constitution, the state district court dismissed the Jensens’ state law claims because a federal court found that the undisputed material facts did not give rise to a federal constitutional violation. This was error. Because the state and federal standards for determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to damages for a constitutional violation are different, a federal court determination that the material undisputed facts do not give rise to a federal constitutional violation does not preclude a state court from deciding whether those same facts will give rise to a state constitutional violation. Therefore, the state district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants solely on the basis of collateral estoppel was in error.

An officer responding to a robbery call where the robber fled on foot stopped a nearby vehicle for speeding which emerged from nearby the scene of the robbery. On stopping the car, the passenger fit the description of the robber, and that gave reasonable suspicion to get the passenger out. The stop of the car was also with reasonable suspicion because of its proximity to the robbery and appearing from nearby so soon after the robbery. United States v. Robinson, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32472 (E.D. Tenn. February 4, 2011).*

Kentucky v. King, 179 L. Ed. 2d 865, decided today: police created exigency might violate the Fourth Amendment, but knocking on the door during a lawful investigation is not a police created exigency. So, a knock and talk is not a police created exigency even if the police have nothing. Watch for states to reject this on state constitutional grounds.

SCOTUSBlog is here.

The syllabus:

Police officers in Lexington, Kentucky, followed a suspected drug dealer to an apartment complex. They smelled marijuana outside an apartment door, knocked loudly, and announced their presence. As soon as the officers began knocking, they heard noises coming from the apartment; the officers believed that these noises were consistent with the destruction of evidence. The officers announced their intent to enter the apartment, kicked in the door, and found respondent and others. They saw drugs in plain view during a protective sweep of the apartment and found additional evidence during a subsequent search. The Circuit Court denied respondent’s motion to suppress the evidence, holding that exigent circumstances—the need to prevent destruction of evidence—justified the warrantless entry. Respondent entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed. The court assumed that exigent circumstances existed, but it nonetheless invalidated the search. The exigent circumstances rule did not apply, the court held, because the police should have foreseen that their conduct would prompt the occupants to attempt to destroy evidence.

Held:

1. The exigent circumstances rule applies when the police do not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 5–16.
(a) The Fourth Amendment expressly imposes two requirements: All searches and seizures must be reasonable; and a warrant may not be issued unless probable cause is properly established and the scope of the authorized search is set out with particularity. Although “‘searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable,’” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 403, this presumption may be overcome when “ ‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 394. One such exigency is the need “to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.” Brigham City, supra, at 403. Pp. 5–6.
(b) Under the “police-created exigency” doctrine, which lower courts have developed as an exception to the exigent circumstances rule, exigent circumstances do not justify a warrantless search when the exigency was “created” or “manufactured” by the conduct of the police. The lower courts have not agreed, however, on the test for determining when police impermissibly create an exigency. Pp. 7–8.
(c) The proper test follows from the principle that permits warrantless searches: warrantless searches are allowed when the circumstances make it reasonable, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, to dispense with the warrant requirement. Thus, a warrantless entry based on exigent circumstances is reasonable when the police did not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct violating the Fourth Amendment. A similar approach has been taken in other cases involving warrantless searches. For example, officers may seize evidence in plain view if they have not violated the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the spot from which the observation of the evidence is made, see Horton v. California, 496 U. S. 128, 136–140; and they may seek consent-based encounters if they are lawfully present in the place where the consensual encounter occurs, see INS v. Delgado, 466 U. S. 210, 217, n. 5. Pp. 8–10.
(d) Some courts, including the Kentucky Supreme Court, have imposed additional requirements—asking whether officers “‘deliberately created the exigent circumstances with the bad faith intent to avoid the warrant requirement,’” 302 S.W.3d 649, 656 (case below); reasoning that police may not rely on an exigency if “‘it was reasonably foreseeable that [their] investigative tactics … would create the exigent circumstances,’” ibid.; faulting officers for knocking on a door when they had sufficient evidence to seek a warrant but did not do so; and finding that officers created or manufactured an exigency when their investigation was contrary to standard or good law enforcement practices. Such requirements are unsound and are thus rejected. Pp. 10–14.
(e) Respondent contends that an exigency is impermissibly created when officers engage in conduct that would cause a reasonable person to believe that entry was imminent and inevitable, but that approach is also flawed. The ability of officers to respond to an exigency cannot turn on such subtleties as the officers’ tone of voice in announcing their presence and the forcefulness of their knocks. A forceful knock may be necessary to alert the occupants that someone is at the door, and unless officers identify themselves loudly enough, occupants may not know who is at their doorstep. Respondent’s test would make it extremely difficult for officers to know how loudly they may announce their presence or how forcefully they may knock with-out running afoul of the police-created exigency rule. And in most cases, it would be nearly impossible for a court to determine whether that threshold had been passed. Pp. 14–15.

2. Assuming that an exigency existed here, there is no evidence that the officers either violated the Fourth Amendment or threatened to do so prior to the point when they entered the apartment. Pp. 16–19.
(a) Any question about whether an exigency existed here is better addressed by the Kentucky Supreme Court on remand. P. 17.
(b) Assuming an exigency did exist, the officers’ conduct—banging on the door and announcing their presence—was entirely consistent with the Fourth Amendment. Respondent has pointed to no evidence supporting his argument that the officers made any sort of “demand” to enter the apartment, much less a demand that amounts to a threat to violate the Fourth Amendment. If there is contradictory evidence that has not been brought to this Court’s attention, the state court may elect to address that matter on remand. Finally, the record makes clear that the officers’ announcement that they were going to enter the apartment was made after the exigency arose. Pp. 17–19.
302 S. W. 3d 649, reversed and remanded.

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, THOMAS, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. GINSBURG, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

Defendant was not arrested until after the search, so the search incident doctrine cannot apply. Instead, the automobile exception had to be considered, and there was no showing of exigency or that a telephonic warrant could not have been sought, so the search is suppressed. State v. Shannon, 419 N.J. Super. 235, 16 A.3d 1071 (2011):

Here, there was no indication that the Asbury Park police officers did not have sufficient time to obtain a telephonic warrant pursuant to Rule 3:5-3(b). It was not late at night, the stop was in a residential area, and four police officers were initially present at the scene with defendant, who was alone. Raisin indicated that no one had approached the vehicle during the stop. Furthermore, there was no testimony elicited at the suppression hearing that suggested that the police officers or potential evidence in the car were in danger. Defendant was cooperative and had stepped away from the passenger compartment of the vehicle. In the companion case to Pena-Flores, State v. Fuller, 198 N.J. 6, 14 (2009), the Court found that because the stop took place in broad daylight, and sufficient police officers were at the scene and not in danger, “[t]here was simply no urgent, immediate need for the officers to conduct a full search of the automobile.” Id. at 32. Here, the circumstances were similar as the police were in no danger, and a telephonic warrant could have been sought expeditiously. [¶] Accordingly, we reverse the order denying defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence. In light of our decision regarding the motion to suppress the evidence, it is not necessary to consider defendant’s remaining arguments.

Warrant for the premises permitted a search inside a garbage bin that produced a bloody fannypack with the victim’s blood on it. The evidentiary value was immediately apparent. Commonwealth of the N. Mariana Islands v. Pua, 2009 MP 21, 2009 N. Mar. I. LEXIS 21 (December 31, 2009)* (decided under the Commonwealth Constitution).

A photograph of the place to be searched was attached to search warrant which provided the location, and that left no discretion as to the place to be searched. Therefore, the warrant was particular enough. State v. Morrison, 55 So. 3d 856 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2010).*

Defendant who did not let the police into his house in a knock and talk was not seized. He was informed of his options and chose to consent. City of Sheboygan v. Cesar, 2010 WI App 170, 330 Wis. 2d 760, 796 N.W.2d 429 (2010).*

The record supported the finding that defendant’s consent to search his person in a bar was voluntary. Two others had been arrested and were in handcuffs and officers told everybody to stay where they were. Still, it was voluntary. State v. Moran-Soto, 244 P.3d 1261 (Ida. App. November 22, 2010).*

The radio report of a specific battered multicolored vehicle being involved in a shooting justified defendant’s stop. [What were the odds?] United States v. Blair, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124861 (W.D. Mo. November 9, 2010).*

It is better to attach pictures or something to the affidavit for child pornography to show that the officer actually saw it to support the request for a search warrant. The affidavit for this search warrant did not clearly indicate that the officer saw the child pornography images, but the affidavit as a whole indicates that there was child pornography in defendant’s computer, and that was barely enough. United States v. Miknevich, 638 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 2011):

Thus, our review of the affidavit leaves a clear impression: the state magistrate was presented with an affidavit that provided no factual details regarding the substance of the images in question. Although either the actual production of the images, or a sufficiently detailed description of them, satisfies the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement, an insufficiently detailed or conclusory description cannot. See New York v. P.J. Video, 475 U.S. 868, 874, 106 S. Ct. 1610, 89 L. Ed. 2d 871 (1986). We believe, however, that even given the infirmities we highlighted, the affidavit still contained information sufficient to permit a finding of probable cause by the magistrate.

A.

It is clear that a magistrate can determine probable cause without seeing the images and/or viewing the contents of an illicit computer file. The Supreme Court has stated that:

[W]e have never held that a magistrate must personally view allegedly obscene films prior to issuing a warrant authorizing their seizure. On the contrary, we think that a reasonably specific affidavit detailing the content of a film generally provides an adequate basis for the magistrate to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the film is obscene, and whether a warrant authorizing the seizure of the film should issue.

P.J. Video, 475 U.S. at 874. We therefore reject any suggestion that a magistrate must review the contents of the actual files in question, or that a search warrant must include copies of the images giving rise to the request for a warrant. Although magistrates do not have to view these files, the question more pertinent here is whether the investigating officers must do so.

It can be problematic, to say the least, when a warrant application leaves one questioning whether anyone viewed the contents of the file in question. Nothing in the opinion we announce today should be taken as a rejection or relaxation of what we believe continues to be the best procedure for law enforcement officials to follow. It remains the better practice for an applicant seeking a warrant based on images of alleged child pornography to append the images or to provide a description of the images sufficient to enable the magistrate to determine independently whether probable cause exists. See, e.g., United States v. LaFortune, 520 F.3d 50, 56 (1st Cir. 2008). Here, however, the magistrate could have drawn a reasonable inference of the file’s contents based on its highly descriptive name and SHA1 value.

The search warrant for all of a multiple residence building failed because the officers relied on an untested informant that defendant was “in control” of the entire building and then the officers failed to tell the magistrate that there were multiple residences within it. As to “in control,” the affidavit and informant were wholly conclusory under Gates. United States v. Clark, 638 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2011):

Here, such information was totally lacking on the issue of control. First, the issuing judge was not advised as to the size of the building or the number of residential units it contained, which would have provided an important, if not essential, context for evaluating the probability of the “full control” allegation. Second, nothing in the warrant affidavit advised the issuing judge what the informant meant by “full control.” Indeed, the affidavit did not even disclose whether the informant’s allegation was based on personal observation, a hearsay account, or mere rumor. Third, the affidavit did not provide any descriptive facts consistent with the full control allegation. We do not suggest that any one of these facts was necessary to establish probable cause, see [Gates] at 230, but the Supreme Court has recognized such facts as relevant to a consideration of the totality of circumstances, see id. at 233. We thus conclude that the absence of any such information left the issuing judge with a record from which he could not himself make a determination of control sufficient to support probable cause to search the entire multi-family dwelling. See id. at 239 (reiterating that wholly conclusory statement is inadequate to allow independent determination of probable cause (citing Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933))).

. . .

… Where law and experience thus effectively give rise to a presumption that one person’s home is not in the control of a third party, a conclusory assertion of control by an informant who has been corroborated only in some other respect does not provide a substantial basis for a judicial officer to find it probable that evidence of the third party’s criminality will be found in residences other than his own.

This conclusion is consistent with the view of the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Tambe, 71 N.Y.2d at 503, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 377, which, in upholding probable cause to search multiple premises controlled by a number of confederates for criminal evidence likely to be in the possession of one of them, emphasized that a different rule might apply “where the fruits of the criminal enterprise are probably located in one of a few locations but the nature of the information is such that a search of each of these locations would intrude upon the rights of individuals in no way involved in the criminal activity under investigation.” Id. That is this case. Because the warrant affidavit contained no information as to either the number of residential units within 1015 Fairfield Avenue or where within the building Clark dealt drugs, there was a real possibility that a search of the entire building and all persons in it would intrude upon the rights of persons in no way linked to the suspected criminal activity. In these circumstances, the law demanded more than a conclusory allegation of control by a partially corroborated informant to permit the issuing judge to find probable cause to support the challenged warrant.

Driver of a car rented by another usually has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the car, unless there are extraordinary circumstances. United States v. Kennedy, 638 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2011):

Instead, recognizing that the inquiry must remain “fact-bound,” we concur with the majority of circuits that have considered this factual scenario and conclude that, as a general rule, the driver of a rental car who has been lent the car by the renter, but who is not listed on the rental agreement as an authorized driver, lacks a legitimate expectation of privacy in the car unless there exist extraordinary circumstances suggesting an expectation of privacy. See, e.g., United States v. Seeley, 331 F.3d 471, 472 n.1 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (finding that driver of rental car lacked standing where he was not the renter or authorized driver); United States v. Wellons, 32 F.3d 117, 119 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that unauthorized driver of rental car who had been given permission to drive by co-defendant, an authorized driver, lacked standing); United States v. Roper, 918 F.2d 885, 887-88 (10th Cir. 1990) (defendant lacked standing where car he was driving was rented by co-defendant’s common law wife and he was not listed as additional driver in rental contract); cf. United States v. Smith, 263 F.3d 571, 586 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting that “as a general rule, an unauthorized driver of a rental vehicle does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle” but nevertheless finding that the defendant had standing in light of the “truly unique” facts of that case).

“In this case, when viewing the collective knowledge available to the police, the stop was justified by reasonable suspicion. The same justification that supported the stop supports the temporary seizure of Ross’ cell phone. Police then kept Ross’ phone because he disclaimed ownership, which also defeats his standing to challenge its continued seizure.” United States v. Ross, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36314 (E.D. Ky. April 4, 2011).*

Defendant’s girlfriend was the CI who called the police to say that he was carrying drugs in a bag in his car. When the car was stopped, there was the bag. A dog alert to the car gave probable cause to search. United States v. Ned, 637 F.3d 562 (5th Cir. 2011).*

Police were called to a house because a neighbor thought there was a home invasion. Instead, it was a houseguest leaving, and the police refused to leave the house once it was apparent there was no crime and they allegedly assaulted one of the house owners. A factual dispute about what happened deprives the officers of summary judgment and qualified immunity. Huckaby v. Priest, 636 F.3d 211, 2011 FED App. 0082P (6th Cir. 2011).*