LA2: Surveillance video of scene of encounter contradicts officer, so trial court erred in believing him

Trial court’s ruling denying motion to suppress was erroneously denied. While the trial court has the credibility call and great deference in making findings of fact at a suppression hearing, the surveillance video of the area of defendant’s detention at the suppression hearing clearly contradicted the officer’s testimony about where and how things happened, and it showed that the motion to suppress should have been granted. State v. Thompson, 58 So. 3d 994 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2011):

At this point in the investigation, the routine investigatory stop transitioned into an illegal detention. Based on the evidence, the trial court should have determined that the “reasonable and articulable suspicion,” which would have otherwise justified an investigatory stop, was based on Agent Parker’s testimony that clearly contradicted the surveillance tape. Pairing this determination with the fact that Agent Parker further investigated the defendant when he should have released him from the detention, the trial court should have ruled that the initial detention was illegal.

Because of the defendant’s illegal detention, we cannot agree with the trial court’s erroneous conclusion that the subsequent consent was freely and voluntarily obtained. As noted above, consent obtained after an illegal detention is only valid if it was the product of free will and not the result of exploitation of the previous illegality. Agent Parker’s testimony that the defendant was not free to leave at the time he provided all the incriminating information and was not given his driver’s license until the consent to search forms were signed supports a finding that the consent was not sufficiently attenuated from the arguably illegal detention so as to be a product of a free will. The record is absent of any indication that Agent Parker expressed to the defendant that he had the option of not giving consent to search the vehicle.

Questioning of passenger for 60-90 seconds did not unreasonably extend the stop of defendant’s vehicle. State v. Whitlow, 250 P.3d 24 (Ore. App. 2011).*

The officer had PC to believe that defendant was DUI when he hit a car stopped at a light and caused injury, justifying a blood draw. The record supports the conclusion defendant consented to the blood draw. Setzer v. State, 54 So. 3d 226 (Miss. 2011).*

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