Defendant was on a GPS ankle monitor by consent. Pretrial services may disclose the information derived from that to the police. United States v. Clay, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121599 (S.D. Tex. May 6, 2013):

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Questions to the defendant about whether there is a gun within reach are not subject to Miranda under Quarles. United States v. Hickman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25247 (M.D. Fla. January 24, 2013), adopted 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25249 (M.D. Fla. February 25, 2013).*

“Rapid and furtive movements” and a failure to comply with orders was reasonable suspicion for a frisk. United States v. Reyes, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25164 (S.D. Tex. February 25, 2013).*

The Fourth Amendment IAC claim for failure to argue an issue in the trial court fails because the issue really was adequately raised and rejected. Hyatt v. United States, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25213 (N.D. Ala. January 30, 2013),* adopted 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24417 (N.D. Ala. February 22, 2013), prior appeal United States v. Hyatt, 383 Fed. Appx. 900 (11th Cir. 2010).*

The specific argument against the search that the taint was not purged was not raised in the district court, so it is waived except for plain error review, which it’s not. United States v. Guzman-Velasquez, 515 Fed. Appx. 286 (5th Cir. 2013).*

Baltimore Sun: A farewell to privacy by Alexander E. Hooke:

In the name of ever-increasing security, we are giving up an essential component of democracy

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Houston Chronicle: Computer Science Professor Explains How Phone Call Metadata Can Be More Revealing Than Content by Michael Kelley:

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WaPo: Ruth Bader Ginsberg on the offensive by Ruth Marcus

Omission of information about the bias or credibility of an informant can be material for Franks purposes, but it wasn’t here because of corroboration. United States v. Liew, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121397 (N.D. Cal. August 26, 2013):

In certain circumstances, evidence regarding the potential bias of a witness could be material to the question of whether probable cause exists. See, e.g., United States v. Meling, 47 F.3d 1546, 1554-55 (9th Cir. 1995) (but finding omissions about allegedly impure motives not material); United States v. Lefkowitz, 618 F.2d 1313, 1317 (9th Cir. 1980) (but finding that omission of identity of witness, defendant’s estranged ex-wife, not material). Even if the information about Mr. Wong’s allegedly impure motives had been included in the Affidavit, the Court finds it would not have undermined his credibility so completely that the Court would have to disregard the information he provided in its entirety.

The government’s use of a stingray device with a tracking warrant to locate defendant’s aircard was not unreasonable. United States v. Rigmaiden, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65633 (D. Ariz. May 8, 2013), motion to reconsider denied 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121886 (D. Ariz. August 27, 2013):

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In a probation search, the government must first have probable cause to believe the home is the defendant’s, a fact not in dispute in this case. This search was based on a CI saying that defendant was involved in a homicide, but the CI’s track record and information was clearly lacking. A shotgun was found at defendant’s house. A California probation search, however, can be suspicionless, so the gun was not suppressed after all. United States v. King, 672 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2012), amended August 27, 2013 with a dissenting opinion on denial of rehearing en banc.

Where defendant’s father signed a consent to search form, his mother’s refusal to sign because she disagreed with the search was not binding on the police. Brunetti v. Comm’r of Corr., 134 Conn. App. 160, 37 A.3d 811 (2012).*

A “road closed” sign is a traffic control device, and disobeying it justified a stop. State v. Morrissey, 19 Neb. App. 590, 2012 Neb. App. LEXIS 52 (March 13, 2012).*

A warrant was being sought, and the officers waiting for the warrant reasonably figured that their cover had been blown and it was time to secure the premises before the warrant arrived. The seizure of the house and protective sweep 22 minutes before the warrant arrived wasn’t unreasonable. United States v. Figueroa-Cruz, 914 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (N.D. Ala. 2012):

Unlike the officers entry into the apartment of Santa [United States v. Santa, 236 F.3d 662 (11th Cir. 2000)] agents at the Skyline Drive house had every reason to believe that the occupants of the house would soon be alerted to the presence of the agents. Stephens ordered an entry to “secure the scene.” That stated purpose alone does not alter the fact that the entry was not authorized by a warrant. ” Any warrantless entry based on exigent circumstances must, of course, be supported by a genuine exigency.” Kentucky v. King, __ U.S. __, __, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1862, __ L.Ed.2d __, __ (2011) citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 406, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006). Stephens stated purpose, however is relevant to the inquiry into whether he “created” exigency as they Eleventh Circuit found was the case in Santa. “A warrantless search is allowed,[], where both probable cause and exigent circumstances exist.” United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d at 1510 . Exigent circumstances exist “where the inevitable delay incident to obtaining a warrant must give way to an urgent need for immediate action.” United States v. Morales, 868 F.2d 1562, 1575 (11th Cir.1989). Here there was a warrantless entry and protective sweep of the house. Assuming without deciding that agents seized the drugs and money once they were seen on the counter the Supreme Court has clearly approved the warrantless seizure of property to maintain the status quo while a warrant is obtained where they would or did hold a warrantless search to be invalid. Rowlings [sic] v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979); United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 90 S.Ct. 1029, 25 L.Ed.2d 282 (1970). In the present case Stephens did not commence the actual search until warrant had been obtained. (Tr.7/19/12 p.39)

The agents watching the Skyline Drive location had reasonable grounds to believe that whoever was in the house would soon be alerted that some form of investigation was on going. With such knowledge the individuals may have been able to flee without detection because agents had only a limited view of the scene. The Eleventh Circuit has long expressed acceptance of the fact that the possibility of destruction of evidence is acute in narcotics cases. Tobin, 923 F.2d at 1511 (This Court has held that the need to invoke the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement is “particularly compelling in narcotics cases” because narcotics can be so quickly destroyed. United States v. Young, 909 F.2d 442, 446 (11th Cir.1990)). Because both probable cause and exigent circumstances existed at the time of the warrantless seizure of the evidence which was in plain view following that entry was consistent with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Suppression is due to be denied.

Whether consent was properly given wasn’t addressed in the District Court, so it is not properly before the appellate court. United States v. Fields, 515 Fed. Appx. 363 (6th Cir. 2013).*

Exigent circumstances were presented by defendant’s alleged use of a laser pointer on an aircraft. The government did not have to produce expert testimony on the effects of laser pointers on pilots to show exigency. [There’s a federal law against it for a reason, and it’s not a speculative reason.] United States v. Smith, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22100 (D. Neb. February 19, 2013).*

When the owner of a vehicle has a license revoked, and that is determined from reading the LPN, the officer has an objective basis for stopping the car and does not have to ascertain that the owner is actually driving first. State v. Hicks, 2013 NMCA 056, 300 P.3d 1183 (2013).*

On summary judgment, assessment of a drug tax is likely subject to the exclusionary rule, too, for the illegal search of claimant’s vehicle. In re Tax Appeal of Burch, 2013 Kan. LEXIS 81 (February 22, 2013).*

The district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s complaint that police officers entered his house without exigent circumstances and broke into his bathroom to disarm him. Brown v. Calicchio, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 3842 (11th Cir. February 25, 2013).*

Plaintiff’s civil case against officers for allegedly using false information to have a search warrant issued was properly dismissed without comment for the reasons given by the district court. Shepherd v. Sheldon, 515 Fed. Appx. 560 (6th Cir. 2013).*

Officers came to defendant’s house to do a knock-and-talk and found the unmistakable smell of a meth lab but nobody home. One stayed and the others left to get a search warrant. Defendant and her brother came home, and they were stopped from entering, which was lawful. After 25 minutes, she consented to a search of her house, and it was voluntary on the totality. Durham v. State, 320 Ga. App. 81, 739 S.E.2d 389 (2013).*

Defendants were stopped for driving too close when suspected of driving in tandem on I-40 in Texas. The defense offered two expert witnesses (an accident reconstructionist and police instructor) that the cars were not too close based on the video. The USMJ determined that the video was not conclusive and credited the officer’s testimony, and that was sufficient for appeal. After the computer checks came back clean, the officer handed back the paperwork, and defendant consented to a search. The officer didn’t find anything but noticed that the car appeared to have been altered by various toolmarks. Defendant consented to a further consent search at the local DPS office, and cocaine was found. The consents were valid. United States v. Wallstrum, 515 Fed. Appx. 343 (5th Cir. 2013).*

Defendant’s stop was based on his failing to signal a lane change that could have affected other traffic nearby. What does affected other traffic mean? After analyzing the facts and law, “Officer Valdez’s vague testimony fails to satisfy the Government’s burden of proving that the officer had an objectively reasonable suspicion that Defendant violated the turn signal law when he switched from the right lane to the left lane.” United States v. Burciaga, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157005 (D. N.M. May 2, 2011).*

For a parole search, reasonable suspicion, at least for a parole officer, was shown by the new PO’s review of defendant’s file that showed multiple prior violations for: moving without permission, three hot UAs, not paying supervision fee for previous seven months, and being on parole for drugs and guns. “The Field Operations Manual states, inter alia, that a positive drug test is sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion.” Any ulterior motive is irrelevant. United States v. Robinson, 515 Fed. Appx. 790 (11th Cir. 2013).

The affidavit for a search warrant directed at a “pill mill” was “a close question” which means the warrant was good under the regular standard of review or the good faith exception. Just the first and last sentences of one long paragraph says it all, with the discussion of the affidavit in the middle omitted: “Whether the issuing magistrate reasonably determined that there was probable cause to search all of Dr. Roos’s Kentucky patient files is a close question. … But even if it were, the suppression would not be warranted because the good-faith exception for searches conducted pursuant to warrants applies.” United States v. Roos, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37787 (E.D. Ky. March 18, 2013),* R&R 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41856 (E.D. Ky. January 24, 2013).*

A motion for return of property under Rule 41(g) cannot be used as a substitute for a motion to suppress. And, nothing in the record suggests the search of his computer for child pornography was illegal. United States v. Penry, 515 Fed. Appx. 784 (10th Cir. 2013):

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ABAJ.com: Predictive policing may help bag burglars—but it may also be a constitutional problem by Leslie A. Gordon:

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The Hill: US requested data on at least 20,000 Facebook users by Brendan Sasso:

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SFGate: S.F. cops will wear cameras to record searches by Jaxon Van Derbeken:

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WaPo: Here’s how phone metadata can reveal your affairs, abortions, and other secrets by Anthony Lee

Officers responding to a 911 hang-up call where it could be heard there was a fight, found an “agitated, angry, and uncooperative” man “with blood on his hands.” He talked about the fight in his house, but he refused entry into the house. The officers could go in under the emergency exception. C.L.L. v. State, 115 So. 3d 1114 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013):

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Detaining a student at school to shame him into confessing to something violated the Fourth Amendment, and it was well established in this state at the time this happened. Hunt v. State, 69 A.3d 360 (Del. 2013):

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