CA10: Rule 41(g) motion for return of property cannot be used as a substitute for a motion to suppress

A motion for return of property under Rule 41(g) cannot be used as a substitute for a motion to suppress. And, nothing in the record suggests the search of his computer for child pornography was illegal. United States v. Penry, 515 Fed. Appx. 784 (10th Cir. 2013):

With respect to whether such property was illegally seized, the district court declined to make a determination on the merits, holding Mr. Penry could not collaterally challenge the circumstances surrounding the search and seizure through a post-conviction Rule 41(g) motion. We agree and have found no legal precedent stating otherwise. We also agree with the district court that Mr. Penry failed to show he is entitled to bring a collateral attack on his conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In addition, no prior ruling or anything in the record suggests the search and seizure at issue were illegal. Because nothing indicates illegal seizure of Mr. Penry’s property and he soundly lacks the legal innocence required for its return, he fails to show he is entitled to the return of his laptop computer and hard drive. As such, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying that portion of Mr. Penry’s motion relating to this property, thereby giving quiet title to the government.

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