S.D.Tex.: Pretrial GPS ankle monitor info may be given to police

Defendant was on a GPS ankle monitor by consent. Pretrial services may disclose the information derived from that to the police. United States v. Clay, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121599 (S.D. Tex. May 6, 2013):

The specific question before the Court appears to be an issue of first impression in this Circuit or possibly in any federal court in the Country: whether a defendant who voluntarily consents to GPS monitoring as a condition of pre-trial release can prohibit Pretrial Services from disclosing data from the GPS to a police department for investigative purposes. Under the facts of this case, the Court is of the opinion that the data may be disclosed to the authorities.

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The Court is of the opinion that the specific manner of the GPS monitoring of the defendant in this case does not constitute a warrantless search of his home in violation of the Fourth Amendment. As noted, the GPS system consists of a beacon and an ankle monitor. The beacon is located at the defendant’s house. However, the tracking system is designed to monitor the defendant’s movement only when it extends beyond 80 feet of the beacon. Therefore, when the defendant’s movement exceeds the 80-foot limit of the beacon, the GPS device is activated and Pretrial Services receives an electronic notice that signals, “beacon leave.” When the defendant returns to or enters the 80-foot range, Pretrial Services receives an electronic notice that signals, “beacon enter.” Based on this system of monitoring, it is clear that the beacon and ankle monitor do not record the defendant’s activities or locations when the defendant is inside his house or within the 80 foot range of the beacon. In other words, the defendant must leave his residence and travel outside the beacon’s field for the beacon to transmit a signal. Therefore, since the GPS monitoring is triggered only when the defendant is outside his house, there was no warrantless search of his home in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Disclosure is also proper because the requested information from the GPS monitoring could have been verified and/or obtained visually without the tracker and, therefore, there is no violation of the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy. In other words, in this case, the police could have legally followed the defendant to his residence and maintained visual surveillance, without the aid of the tracker, to confirm that he entered at a certain time and did not leave until a certain time. Therefore, the Court finds that this case is analogous to United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 103 S. Ct. 1081, 75 L. Ed. 2d 55 (1983). In Knotts, the police, with the consent of the seller, installed a beeper in a can of chloroform and monitored the beeper after delivery of the can to a buyer. By “monitoring the progress” of the car carrying the chloroform, the police were able to trace the can of chloroform from its place of purchase to the defendant’s cabin. The defendant challenged the use of the beeper as a violation of the Fourth Amendment, but the Supreme Court rejected his argument, finding that since the movements of the car and the arrival of the can containing the beeper could have been observed with the naked eye, there was no Fourth Amendment violation. See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 280-285.

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