Defendant ran a law firm indicted for immigration fraud in presenting over 200 false asylum applications falsely alleging persecution. The indictment was a detailed “speaking” indictment that set out the scheme. The USMJ issuing a search warrant for the law firm’s records could rely on the indictment, too. The question is nexus: Does the indictment shows probable cause to believe a crime occurred, but does it also show nexus to the place to be searched? Here it did. But, there’s more: the remainder of the affidavit clearly shows probable cause, too. The search warrant authorized seizure of virtually every record in the law firm, but it was supported by the affidavit, so the search was not overbroad. United States v. Liu, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3520 (S.D. N.Y. January 10, 2014).

There was probable cause for defendant’s stop for a traffic offense, and there was reasonable suspicion for stopping her for interstate transportation of a minor for sex. Defendant then consented to a search of the car, and evidence of prostitution was found. United States v. Hernandez, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183203 (N.D. Ga. August 12, 2013),* adopted 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3479 (N.D. Ga. January 13, 2014).*

ABAJ: Man to get $1.6M for humiliating 3-enema ordeal after traffic stop by Martha Neil:

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Techcrunch: Silent Circle & Geeksphone Join Forces To Build Blackphone: A Pro-Privacy Android-Based Smartphone by Natasha Lomas:

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WaPo: Case could challenge warrantless surveillance by Ellen Nakashima:

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Defendant abandoned his house that was being condemned by the city for being in severe disrepair. The door was off, and it was falling apart. When the city came to tear it down, they removed what was of any use inside and gave it away and destroyed the rest. The process took months. They found child pornography in the house. State v. Ledford, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 20 (January 13, 2014):

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NYT: Obama to Place Some Restraints on Surveillance by Peter Baker and Charlie Savage:

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“Anything is possible” Dept.: NYT: N.S.A. Devises Radio Pathway Into Computers by David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker:

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Defendant was a passenger in a car stopped and searched and a gun came from the console. Defendant disavowed any connection to the gun in the motion to suppress, so he has no standing to challenge the gun. The owner’s denial of consent does not create any additional legally cognizable expectation of privacy. United States v. Smith, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183466 (M.D. Ala. December 18, 2013):

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The defense argued during a suppression motion that the officers coerced the signature of defendant’s wife on the consent form, and put on testimony to that effect which the government never rebutted. After the motion to suppress was granted, the government filed a motion to reconsider, and it does not get “another bite at the apple” to put on witnesses. The government failed in its burden of showing that consent was voluntary the first time, and it should have done it then. United States v. Foster, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4569 (M.D. La. January 8, 2014).

A state judge issued a warrant to track defendant’s cell phone, and it was issued with probable cause. United States v. Rodriguez, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3589 (D. Or. January 10, 2014).*

The government shouldn’t have filed its response to the motion to suppress under seal, and it is unsealed. A motion to seal should be filed first. Defendant’s Franks challenge is rejected. The fact the CI would be motivated by money and therefore should not be believed is not a Franks issue. Defendant was a gambler with the money he skimmed in a tax evasion scheme, and failing to include his winnings in the affidavit for search warrant isn’t material or reckless. There was probable cause. United States v. Suliman, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4446 (D. Nev. January 13, 2014).*

Defendant was accused of stealing a laptop bag from a bait car in St. Louis MO, and he fled into East St. Louis, IL with officers in pursuit. He was stopped and searched there. Illinois and Missouri both apply the conflict of laws rule that the law of the place of the search applies, and here it is the same. The hot pursuit was valid, as was the search in Illinois when defendant was stopped. State v. Williams, 409 S.W.3d 428 (Mo. App. 2013).

A federally licensed firearms dealer was burglarized, and defendant sold one of the guns stolen during the burglary. ATF got a search warrant for his house for firearms, and located more. While they were there, it was apparent defendant was a suspect in home invasion robberies, so ATF applied for an additional search warrant for evidence of that. The supplemental search warrant showed probable cause and nexus and was validly issued. United States v. Scott, 531 Fed. Appx. 283 (4th Cir. 2013).*

Both defendants disavowed ownership of a cell phone found in a vehicle during a traffic stop, so the officer put it in his pocket. Later, a call came in and it was answered. The cell phone was abandoned property when it was searched. United States v. Gaona-Gomez, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89517 (S.D. Tex. June 26, 2013).*

While a person with a borrowed car can show standing, defendant didn’t even attempt to meet his burden on it. United States v. Ewing, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113951 (D. Kan. August 13, 2013).* See also United States v. O’Hara, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114201 (D. Nev. May 20, 2013) (essentially the same).

Traffic stop by a police officer with his own drug dog led to an immediate and valid sniff. United States v. Aguirre, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112738 (D. Idaho August 7, 2013).*

How Amtrak handles a Passenger Named Record (“PNR”) in giving it to the DEA for the DEA to open an investigation into whether the passenger is a drug courier is not a Fourth Amendment issue. It’s Amtrak’s business record, and there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in it. United States v. Jackson, 381 F.3d 984, 989-90 (10th Cir. 2004). United States v. McKenzie, 532 Fed. Appx. 793 (10th Cir. 2013).*

Defendant was seen stopped in the roadway in a business district at night, so the officer made a U-turn to see what was going on. The lights were used to make the U-turn and were on for safety purposes. When the officer approached defendant, he was already stopped; the officer did not stop him. Then it was apparent defendant was under the influence. The detention then was reasonable. People v. Colquitt, 2013 IL App (1st) 121138, 996 N.E.2d 297 (2013).*

Where the 2255 IAC search claim was essentially the same as the direct appeal, the 2255 was properly denied. and a COA was denied. United States v. Coleman, 532 Fed. Appx. 812 (10th Cir. 2013).*

WaPo: Morning Links by Radley Balko:

• Springfield, Missouri plans to enlist National Guard troops (pdf) to help enforce drug prohibition.

The search warrant had a 180 day computer search time limit that was violated. The government concedes suppression. United States v. Swenson, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3286 (D. Idaho January 8, 2014).

Defendant was sort of separated from his wife, but he spent about half the time there in the last month. “Defendant’s status is perhaps most accurately characterized as straddling the line between co-occupant and an overnight guest. At the very least, he was lawfully in the apartment as an overnight guest on the night in question. In light of the above body of Fourth Amendment precedent, I find that Defendant therefore had a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.” On the question of consent, the court credits the officers. “I find the testimony of Ms. Bradley-Alcorn to be almost wholly incredible. In order to credit her version of events, I would have to accept a level of situational awareness on the part of the officers that borders on prescience.” United States v. Alcorn, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3918 (W.D. Va. January 13, 2014).*

Defendant stopped because he was casing a check cashing store like he was going to rob it. He was separated from his backpack. Later in the backpack police found a gun and gloves. The search of the backpack could not be sustained under search incident because he couldn’t reach it. The government’s inventory rationale fails because the policy creates a “reverse-Catch 22” that it would be searched without probable cause but couldn’t be searched with probable cause. Instead, the court relies on the fact that police could search the backpack because he was in custody and going to the police station, and that was for officer safety. “In our view, when a valid arrest has been made in a public place, which requires that the arrested person be transported from the scene, police may search any luggage that the person has in his possession at the time of the arrest, and which must accompany him to the police station, prior to transporting it.” United States v. Matthews, 532 Fed. Appx. 211 (3d Cir. 2013):

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Defendant was lawfully subjected to a patdown. The area was not high crime, but defendant was stopped in the middle of the night with a child in the car, both in their pajamas, the snow never cleared from the windshield. When he got out of the car, he put his hands up, although the officer hadn’t even spoken yet. “Clary explained in his seven years of law enforcement experience, nobody has ever put their hands in the air after being stopped for a mere traffic violation.” United States v. Banks, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174881 (D. S.D. December 11, 2013).*

Street side trash pulls were constitutional. United States v. McGuire, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174657 (D. S.D. December 10, 2013).*

The officer had probable cause to stop plaintiff for speeding because of the reading of the radar gun, and that led to probable cause to arrest him for OWI. Jones v. City of Elkhart, 737 F.3d 1107 (7th Cir. 2013).*

Defendant was arrested for having two false DLs, and the officers conducted a search of the car. The district court found it a valid inventory and did not decide search incident. On appeal, the court of appeals found search incident dispositive based on the record it had. It was reasonable for the officer to conclude there would be other evidence of the false IDs in the car. United States v. Mensah, 737 F.3d 789 (1st Cir. 2013):

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A typo on the date the affidavit was signed (June 1) v. the warrant date (July 1) was curable at the suppression hearing. State v. Spradling, 413 S.W.3d 670 (Mo. App. 2013).

A dog alert on a car is probable cause to search the car. State v. Lloyd, 129 Nev. Adv. Rep. 79, 2013 Nev. LEXIS 91 (October 31, 2013).*

WaPo: NSA phone-data program hasn’t prevented attacks, group says By Ellen Nakashima:

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