Science Blog: School drug tests don’t work, but ‘positive climate’ might:

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Information Week: Surveillance: Fast, Cheap, And Out Of Control by Thomas Claburn:

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The First Circuit’s cell phone search incident case (Wurie) is being conferenced in SCOTUS again on January 17th. It was conferenced once before. (SCOTUSBlog here) Two conferences is highly indicative of a cert grant.

Look for a cert grant either January 17th about noon or Monday at 10 am ET.

Officers got permission to open a suspicious package from the sender and found marijuana. They took it to defendant’s house for a knock-and-talk, and got no answer. Defendant’s landlord unlocked and opened the door for the officers, and that entry violated the Fourth Amendment. Once inside, they claimed they could smell marijuana and claimed that as an exigent circumstance, but that was too late. Hall v. Commonwealth, 2014 Ky. App. LEXIS 6 (January 10, 2014). [Note: The question of landlords having no power to consent was settled 65 years ago. The more important question here should be: Why did the prosecutor even file this case? Slept through criminal procedure class? Apparently the judge did, too. I get it that the police maybe didn’t know, considering the minimal, almost nonexistent legal training on search and seizure they get, but that doesn’t excuse any of the law school and system trained legal professionals.]

Cooking heroin in the front seat of a car in a high crime area and then fleeing is reasonable suspicion. State v. Grefer, 2014-Ohio-51, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 46 (2d Dist. January 10, 2014).*

The first justification offered by the officers was concededly a mistake of law, and defendant did not violate a city ordinance. However, another justification was that defendant left his engine running with the car unattended. That justified the stop. United States v. Williams, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163241 (W.D. Mo. October 11, 2013).*

The lessee of an apartment has the ability to consent to its search as to all common areas he goes into. Nothing was shown to have been stored in a bag. People v. Plumley, 2013 NY Slip Op 7624, 111 A.D.3d 1418, 975 N.Y.S.2d 309 (4th Dept. 2013).*

The officers had at least arguable reasonable suspicion that the plaintiffs and decedent were going to commit a burglary in an area known for burglaries of vacant houses. They stopped and approached the three with their guns drawn, and the decedent wouldn’t take his hands from his pocket and pulled a gun which resulted in a gun battle where he and the two officers were shot. There was enough reasonable suspicion one of them was armed for qualified immunity. Clark v. City of Atlanta, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 23061 (11th Cir. November 15, 2013).* [I know it’s tempting to say that the proof is in the pudding, but reasonable suspicion has to be based on what they knew not what happened, but plaintiffs weren’t in a good position here. A man died and both cops got shot, one potentially by the other. Bad facts and bad law and all that.]

Taking plaintiff’s facts as true at the pleading stage, a throwdown for a misdemeanor theft arrest resulting in a dislocated shoulder was excessive, and qualified immunity denied. Long v. Fulmer, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 23093 (10th Cir. November 15, 2013).*

The Hill: Obama legacy on line with NSA by Julian Hattem:

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Baltimore Sun: Maryland lawmakers to take up anti-spying measures by Erin Cox:

Bipartisan effort aims to limit police tracking with drones, cellphones.

WaPo: Remembering an earlier time when a theft unmasked government surveillance by Betty Medsger:

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The state auto insurance database was not shown to be sufficiently reliable on which to base an arrest for driving on no insurance, and the case is remanded for factfinding on the degree of reliability. Willoughby v. Commonwealth, 2014 Ky. App. LEXIS 5 (January 10, 2014)*:

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Defendant’s challenge to the drug dog under Florida v. Harris was not sufficient to make the use of the dog violate the Fourth Amendment. He had no expert or other testimony, and he just relied on parts of the cross-examination of the officer that didn’t really question much of anything. State v. Buck, 2014 Ida. App. LEXIS 3 (January 10, 2014):

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Defendant’s consent was valid because officers had PC for a search warrant, despite “the bungled manner in which St. Laurent secured the Defendant’s [consent and] signature on the consent-to-search form.” United States v. Hinkley, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3210 (D. Me. January 10, 2014):

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Reasonable suspicion is not required to pick up a package on the shipper’s conveyor belt just to look at it, but it is required to detain it. Here, the detention for a dog sniff required RS under the state constitution, but it was present. The court declines to follow federal precedent. State v. Eichers, 840 N.W.2d 210 (Minn. App. 2013):

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Defendant was arrested for DUI from a pedestrian accident. A search of his car produced receipts used in an identity theft prosecution. Seizure of the receipts was not lawful either as inventory or through the independent source doctrine, which required pure speculation to be applied. State v. Green, 177 Wn. App. 332, 312 P.3d 669 (2013), prior appeal State v. Green, 162 Wn. App. 1069, 2011 Wash. App. LEXIS 1887 (2011):

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The officer had reasonable suspicion to stop defendants’ vehicle, and he patted them down finding nothing. The search of the bag in the backseat was unlawful because it was without probable cause. People v. Baksh, 2014 NY Slip Op 112, 2014 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 112 (2d Dept. January 8, 2014):

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“The Court finds that Defendant has not met his burden and is not entitled to a Franks hearing. As an initial matter, Defendant does not point to specific portions of the affidavit that he claims to be false. However, Defendant does take issue with certain statements in the affidavit, which the Court will discuss.” United States v. Pentz, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72640 (D. Utah May 21, 2013).*

The officer here had plenty of reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in drug dealing based on experience and a four-year snitch. He saw a hand labeled package at FedEx that strongly suggested to him based on experience that it contained drugs. United States v. Beverly, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72634 (W.D. Ky. April 15, 2013).*

Defendant was taken down in an illegal arrest, and then the gun on him was found. This is not a situation where there is a new crime before the arrest. There was no reasonable suspicion for the initial patdown. United States v. Evans, 947 F. Supp. 2d 895 (E.D. Tenn. May 22, 2013).*

The court finds credible the testimony of the officers that defendant consented to an entry and search of his apartment. United States v. Paulino, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71978 (S.D. N.Y. May 21, 2013).*

The body armor and gun in defendant’s car was lawfully seized because the stop was with probable cause defendant was speeding, driving on the wrong side of the road, running a red light, and evading an officer trying to stop him. United States v. Bogle, 717 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 2013).*

“[T]he detection of the odor of a methamphetamine cook by officers trained or experienced with the odor, coupled with the activity of the occupant in actively hiding or destroying materials and the fact that most of the windows of the trailer were covered, all of which was observed before the entry, would provide sufficient probable cause for the search warrant. See United States v. Shuck, 713 F.3d 563 (10th Cir. 2013), a case with remarkably similar facts.” United States v. Richardson, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75946 (N.D. W.Va. May 30, 2013).*

Defendant’s IAC claim on failure to object to a probation search of his car failed because the “record also suggests the search was premised upon Strother’s consent.” State v. Strother, 2013 Iowa App. LEXIS 561 (May 30, 2013).*

Defendant’s Franks challenge to the officer’s claim in the search warrant about the agent using his cell phone during the surveillance fails. The evidence at the hearing shows that defendant failed in his burden of proof. Even if he used the cell phone during surveillance, so what? The same is the outcome of the other objections: Even if the defendant’s allegations could be proved, they aren’t material to the outcome. United States v. Morales-Castro, 947 F. Supp. 2d 166 (D. P.R. 2013).*

The search warrant was not unconstitutionally overbroad so as to require suppression. The overbroad parts here were severable. State v. Higgs, 177 Wn. App. 414, 311 P.3d 1266 (2013):

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