CA2: Sanctions not justified for destruction of video of stop

Defendant’s stop and frisk were based on reasonable suspicion. Alternatively, it was based on consent. The destruction of the video of the stop wasn’t shown to justify sanctions. United States v. Lopez, 553 Fed. Appx. 10 (2d Cir. 2014):

B. The Request for Sanctions

Lopez also argues that the district court erred in denying his request for sanctions. Lopez contends that the government intentionally destroyed video and audio recordings of the traffic stop. These recordings were allegedly made on equipment belonging to Trooper Kevin Dowe, the second trooper to arrive on the scene.

In response, the government contends that Lopez waived his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his request for sanctions, as Lopez’s plea agreement does not expressly reserve the right to appeal this denial. Lopez argues that the plea agreement is ambiguous and that his request for sanctions should be considered part of his motion to suppress. We need not address the waiver argument, however, as we conclude that Lopez’s appeal fails on the merits.

We review a district court’s denial of a motion for sanctions for abuse of discretion. United States v. Seltzer, 227 F.3d 36, 39 (2d Cir. 2000). “A district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990)).

To prevail on a motion for sanctions for the loss or destruction of evidence, a defendant must show that (1) the government acted in bad faith by destroying the evidence, see Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57 (1988); (2) the evidence possessed an “exculpatory value that was apparent before it was destroyed,” California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984); and (3) the defendant was “unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means,” id.

The district court found that “the evidence at issue would not have any exculpatory value because the audio and video evidence provided by the primary officer’s recording was clear.” United States v. Lopez, No. 3:11-CR-139-WWE, 2012 WL 3231014, at *3 (D. Conn. Aug. 6, 2012). Furthermore, the district court found that, even if a second set of recordings did exist, they would be inferior in quality in comparison to Trooper Pirog’s recordings. Id.

Here, Lopez not only had access to Trooper Pirog’s recordings but the opportunity to question Trooper Dowe at the suppression hearing. Lopez therefore cannot show that he was “unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lopez’s request for sanctions.