NYT: Obama Calls for Overhaul of N.S.A.’s Phone Data Collection Program by Mark Landler and Peter Bakerjan:

[It’s a lofty speech. Can he deliver? Can Congress deliver? I personally don’t think Congress cares.]

Continue reading →

Politico: How Technology Killed the Future by Douglas Rushoff:

Continue reading →

Officers were in defendant’s house investigating a burglary and found a methamphetamine lab. It was reasonable to call for other officers who entered without a warrant because the lab was exigency. United States v. Sill, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183580 (D. Nev. July 22, 2013), adopted 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5797 (D. Nev. January 15, 2014).*

Defendant did not have a search condition on supervised release, but he did have an Internet prohibition. When his PO found his computer connected to the Internet, there was a violation, so seizure of the computer and then its search was appropriate. United States v. Berger, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5653 (W.D. Ark. January 8, 2014),* adopted 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5654 (W.D. Ark. January 16, 2014).*

Appellate defense counsel wasn’t ineffective for not arguing that trial counsel should have filed a motion to reconsider a denial of a motion to suppress clothing where the clothing wasn’t used against defendant at trial. Oliver v. United States, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183624 (N.D. Tex. October 4, 2013).*

The officer seriously downplayed the seriousness of defendant’s being a felon in possession of a firearm to the point the USMJ concluded that the consent was mere acquiesce to a claim of authority to search, and the USDJ adopts it. Defendant was told he wouldn’t be arrested, and his having a gun was “not a real big deal,” and there would be virtually no consequences if he turned the gun over. It was a real big deal because it’s a 10 year felony under federal law and a 4 year felony under state law. United States v. Hattaway, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5040 (D. S.D. January 10, 2014), R&R 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183689 (D.S.D. July 18, 2013). Consider this:

Continue reading →

AOL: AAA Urges Better Protection For Drivers’ Privacy Rights | Motor club wants stricter handling of driving data [including OnStar] by Pete Bigelow:

Ford VP: “We know everyone who breaks the law. We know when you are doing it. We have GPS in your car, so we know what you’re doing.”

Continue reading →

Politico: Public remains ‘all over the map’ on NSA tactics by Darren Samuelsohn:

Continue reading →

US News & World Report: North Dakota Man Sentenced to Jail In Controversial Drone-Arrest Case by Jason Koelber:

Continue reading →

The Gothamist: How The NYPD’s Use Of Civil Forfeiture Robs Innocent New Yorkers by Max Rivlin-Nadler:

Continue reading →

Politico: NSA scandal bad for business by Cameron F. Kerry:

Continue reading →

Politico: Dianne Feinstein spots drone inches from face by Kathryn A. Wolfe:

Continue reading →

NPR: Retailers May Use Video Cameras To Track Shoppers:

Continue reading →

HuffPo: Police Allegedly Beat Pearl Pearson For Disobeying Orders He Could Not Hear by David Lohr:

Continue reading →

Defendant’s failure to object to the officer stating “we’re going to have to take the firearms” was not implicit consent. That was a statement they were taking property. State v. Jepson, 2012 Ore. App. LEXIS 1525 (December 19, 2012).

Defendant’s vehicle was already stopped when the officer came up to it and asked him out. When he got out, the officer saw drugs in plain view. The vehicle was not stopped by the officer, and that did not implicate the Fourth Amendment. Plain view supported the seizure. State v. Morales, 125 So. 3d 1141 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2012).*

Only a judge of a court of record can issue search warrants in Ohio, and the state showed that the judge’s appointment for a three month term by the Chief Justice was regular, so the search warrant was not suppressed. State v. Nurse, 2012 Ohio 6000, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 5172 (9th Dist. December 19, 2012).*

Use of the Wyoming Tool Kit on a peer-to-peer look at defendant’s computer was not an unreasonable search. “Likewise, Defendant in the present case did not have a Fourth Amendment right to privacy in the contents of his computer, which he made available to the world by way of a peer-to-peer file-sharing network.” An administrative subpoena for his Internet subscriber information was not unreasonable, either. State v. Aston, 125 So. 3d 1148 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2013).*

“The evidence shows that Defendant was an adult, understood the officers’ questions, was familiar with the police investigation process, and was not under the influence of any drugs or alcohol at the time his consent was given. Although he was seated in the police cruiser, he had only been detained while Officer Hanson completed tasks authorized by the initial stop. Because the stop to that point was not unconstitutionally prolonged, and Defendant consented to the encounter, the Court need not determine whether Officer Hanson had reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop.” United States v. Ramirez, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127416 (D. Neb. August 2, 2013),* adopted 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127419 (D. Neb. September 6, 2013).*

Seatbelt violation justified stop, and an invalid international drivers license justified continuing the stop and getting defendant out of the vehicle. A dog alert justified a search of the vehicle. United States v. Reyes-Gomez, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126711 (E.D. Ky. August 12, 2013).*

Defendant ignored police commands and was walking away from them when he was told to put his hands up. Instead, he reached into his waistband and tossed the gun he had. Even if the prior search of his backpack was illegal, that was an intervening act and he wasn’t seized when he threw the gun. United States v. McClendon, 713 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 2013).*

The stop was based in part on information from a CI, traveling in tandem and following too close, and that was reasonable suspicion which led to a plain view of heroin. United States v. Espino-Urvan, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58470 (S.D. N.Y. April 23, 2013).*

The claim that plaintiff’s children were not allowed to attend his federal criminal trial except with state DHS workers is not a constitutional claim, including a Fourth Amendment claim. Santos v. Sec’y of D.H.S., 532 Fed. Appx. 29 (3d Cir. 2013).*

Defendant’s search at CBP at ATL was a border search, and the cocaine found in his suitcase was lawfully seized. United States v. Wallace, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58319 (N.D. Ga. March 21, 2013).*

Furtive movements after a stop cannot be used to justify the stop. There was reasonable suspicion for the stop from observable factors, the CIs, and they were corroborated some. United States v. Serrano, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95175 (E.D. Pa. July 8, 2013).*

Defendant was stopped on the Baltimore-Washington Parkway, based on information they had. When the officer talked to the driver he asked if the officer had “anything illegal” and he nodded. A patdown revealed it in the groin area, and the officer undid his belt to get it out of his underwear. This wasn’t classified as a strip search, but it was nearly one on a busy highway. Nevertheless, it wasn’t unreasonable. Also, a state officer is not barred under the Fourth Amendment from stopping somebody on a highway that’s in federal jurisdiction, but the feds were somewhat involved and condoned it. United States v. Madriz, 532 Fed. Appx. 353 (4th Cir. 2013).*

The motion to suppress is denied after oral argument but without a hearing. The defendants’ concessions about the case are enough for the police to have been justified in their actions in stopping and detaining defendants. United States v. Drabo, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95036 (E.D. Mich. July 9, 2013).*

A motion to suppress a warrantless search of a semi is denied with the court shifting the burden of proof to the defendant on consent. “On this record, defendant has not shown that the Court should suppress evidence seized as a result of the vehicle stop and search. See United States v. Moore, 22 F.3d 241, 243 (10th Cir. 1994) (proponent of motion to suppress bears burden of proof).” United States v. Vasquez, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105615 (D. Kan. July 29, 2013).* [From Moore: “The proponent of a motion to suppress bears the burden of proof. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 130-31 n.1, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387, 99 S. Ct. 421 (1978); United States v. Carr, 939 F.2d 1442, 1446 (10th Cir. 1991).” Both of these cases say the defendant has the burden on standing, not the motion to suppress. This qualifies as the most obtuse decision of the summer. Burden of proof on motions to suppress are discussed in great detail in § 60.45 of the coming 5th ed. of the Treatise due out in mid-October. Also, FYI §§ 62.5-62.20 is a detailed look at standards of review for appeal.]

Officers had probable cause that defendant was involved in a series of armed robberies with others. When another one occurred with the same MO and description and the description of a car, the car was found a block from defendant’s house. Defendant’s actions and dress described by others were enough to arrest him for the robberies. United States v. Henderson, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106390 (E.D. Wis. June 18, 2013).*

Summary judgment was properly granted in this 1983 case because the jailers’ use of force against the plaintiff was reasonable in response to his attacking the guard. Ellington v. Cortes, 532 Fed. Appx. 53 (3d Cir. 2013).*

NYT: Obama’s Path From Critic to Overseer of Spying by Peter Bakerjan:

Continue reading →

NYT: U.S. to Expand Rules Limiting Use of Profiling by Federal Agents by Matt Apuzzo:

Continue reading →

A black Lexus was stopped in at 115th and Lenox in Harlem. While the driver was outside the car talking to the police, defendant came up, and the driver reached in the car and handed him a black bag, and defendant walked away. Defendant’s stop was without reasonable suspicion of any wrongdoing, and the motion to suppress should have been granted. He had the right to walk away from the police because there was no justification for the stop, and defendant’s conduct was neither suspicious nor was it flight because the police had no suspicion about the bag. People v. Major, 2014 NY Slip Op 00197, 2014 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 191 (1st Dept. January 14, 2014):

Continue reading →