CA2: Knotts alone was reason enough to apply Davis good faith to pre-Jones GPS

The existence of Knotts as authority for pre-Jones GPS placement was good enough for application of the Davis good faith exception. Add to that the disarray of the courts, and the Second Circuit hadn’t ruled. United States v. Aguiar, 737 F.3d 251 (2d Cir. 2013):

Our conclusion that the officers here relied in good faith on Knotts in placing the GPS device on Aguiar’s vehicles is reinforced by the fact that several sister circuits reached similar conclusions. See Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216-17 (holding that GPS tracking device used to monitor individual’s movements in his vehicle was not a search, relying on Knotts ); Garcia, 474 F.3d at 997-98 (same); see also, e.g., United States v. Jesus-Nunez, No. 1:10-CR-00017-01, 2010 WL 2991229, at * 5 (M.D. Pa. 2010); United States v. Burton, 698 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1307-08 (N.D. Fla. 2010); United States v. Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 425, 467-68 (N.D.N.Y. 2005). These cases are not binding precedent and thus do not control our analysis under Davis, but do support the conclusion that relying on Knotts was objectively reasonable. See, e.g., Katzin, 732 F.3d at 209 (noting that at the time the GPS device in question was placed, there was a circuit split on the issue of whether the warrantless use of such devices violated the Fourth Amendment).

At bottom, sufficient Supreme Court precedent existed at the time the GPS device was placed for the officers here to reasonably conclude a warrant was not necessary in these circumstances. Plainly, post-Jones, the landscape has changed, and law enforcement will need to change its approach accordingly.