CA5: Whether an entry is no-knock is based on reasonable suspicion

Whether an entry is no-knock is based on reasonable suspicion. Here it was defendant being armed during the drug transactions that led to the search warrant. United States v. Rodriguez, 548 Fed. Appx. 230 (5th Cir. 2013):

The district court did not err in finding that the officers had reasonable suspicion to justify a no-knock entry. The Fourth Amendment requires that officers seeking to execute a warrant must knock and announce their identity and purpose before attempting forcible entry of a dwelling. See, e.g., Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934-36 (1995); Bishop v. Arcuri, 674 F.3d 456, 461 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934). This knock-and-announce requirement is not a rigid rule, but is tempered by “countervailing law enforcement interests.” Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 387 (1997) (quoting Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934). “In order to justify a ‘no-knock’ entry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence.” Id. at 394. The reasonableness of an officer’s decision “must be evaluated as of the time [he] entered the [dwelling].” Id. at 395. “This showing is not high,” id. at 394, and “this court has not required officers to demonstrate ‘particularized knowledge’ … to justify a no-knock entry,” Linbrugger v. Abercia, 363 F.3d 537, 542 (5th Cir. 2004). “Whether specific facts give rise to reasonable suspicion is a question of law that we review de novo.” Jimenez v. Wood Cnty., Tex., 621 F.3d 372, 379 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

The district court found that, based on the undercover officer having previously seen a handgun in Rodriguez’s waistband when he purchased cocaine from him, the officers had “a reasonable suspicion that the residents of the home had access to firearms, likely possessed narcotics, and that knocking and announcing would possibly subject them to undue peril.” Rodriguez argues that the district court erred because he did not have a criminal history suggesting violence and because his physical handicap (a prosthetic leg) would make it “improbable that heavily-armed federal agents would be afraid of him.”