MD: What was a reasonable time for detention in one case doesn’t control another

Every case is fact dependent, and what is a reasonable length of time for a highway detention on the totality cannot usefully be determined by simple comparison to other cases. McCree v. State, 2013 Md. App. LEXIS 128 (September 24, 2013):

Third, and in any event, it is well-established in Maryland that the reasonableness of a stop’s duration cannot be determined solely based on “the running of the clock,” Mason, 173 Md. App. at 423, nor will we in any but exceptional circumstances-circumstances not present in this case-“determine that a stop was unreasonable due to the length of time over which it occurred.” Byndloss v. State, 391 Md. 462, 485 (2006); see United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985) (there are no “rigid time limitations on traffic stops”); Jackson v. State, 190 Md. App. 497, 512 (2010) (“the reasonableness of any particular traffic stop detention must be assessed on a case-by-case basis and not by doing a ‘swatch comparison’ with other traffic stop cases”); Charity v. State, 132 Md. App. 598, 617 (2000) (“the focus will not be on the length of time an average traffic stop should ordinarily take. …”). Instead, we focus on whether the purposes of the stop had been fulfilled at the time of the K-9 alert, and if not, whether the officer was diligently pursuing those purposes at that time. See, e.g., Byndloss, 391 Md. at 483, 492 (length of detention reasonable where K-9 alert occurred prior to fulfillment of stop’s purposes and where officer pursued said purposes with “sufficient diligence”).

Here, Trooper Cummings had not, at the time of the K-9 alert, accomplished all of the actions required by what he had learned as a result of the stop-i.e., he had not finished issuing either the repair order or the traffic citation. Further, our review of the record leaves us satisfied that, prior to Lenya’s alert, Trooper Cummings pursued these objectives with sufficient diligence such that the initial, valid stop remained ongoing at the time of the alert. Indeed, other than his assertion that Trooper Cummings took longer than fifteen minutes to complete the stop, McCree provides us with no reason as to how or why Trooper Cummings failed to act diligently in his efforts. The circuit court did not err in denying the motion to suppress.