D.N.J.: Social workers’ inspection entry governed by Fourth Amendment; Wyman distinguished

Social service workers’ entry for inspection into plaintiffs’ home was governed by the Fourth Amendment and could not be justified by Wyman v. James. Bostrom v. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121445 (D. N.J. August 26, 2013):

After reviewing the Wyman decision and subsequent case law, the Defendants’ argument is unpersuasive and the Court concludes that the inspection of the Bostrom home conducted by Defendants is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

Since the Wyman decision was issued, it has not been applied in the context of a home inspection by social service workers investigating allegations of child abuse in this Circuit. The Third Circuit, in Good v. Dauphin County Social Services for Children and Youth, 891 F.2d 1087 (3d Cir. 1989), held that a home inspection conducted by a case worker and police officer investigating child abuse allegations was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The District of New Jersey likewise found that the Fourth Amendment applied in analyzing whether a caseworker’s entry into a home was reasonable when investigating allegations of child abuse. Coleman v. State of New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services, 246 F. Supp. 2d 384, 391 (2003)(J. Irenas). Consequently, Wyman has not been extended to apply to a caseworker’s home investigation pertaining to suspected child abuse. These investigations have been recognized in the Third Circuit as government searches and subject to the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment.

Furthermore, the facts of this case are distinguishable from Wyman. Here, the Defendants’ purpose in visiting the home was purely investigative. The proffered justification for the entry was to protect children who may be in danger from their parents. The search of the home was not in any way related the receipt of public funds or public assistance. The social workers were accompanied here by two police officers employed by DYFS. Finally, if Plaintiffs refused entry into the home, the investigation still would have taken place. Whether Defendants would have forced entry into the home, contacted the state police for assistance or sought an ex parte order from the court, the investigation would have occurred. Unlike the home visit in Wyman which would not have occurred if beneficiaries refused entry, here, Plaintiffs’ refusal did not mean that no search would take place. Accordingly, Wyman is distinguishable from this case and Defendants’ investigation of Plaintiffs’ home was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

Finally, Defendants’ search in this case, unlike Wyman, was not reasonable per se. While there is a strong public interest in protecting the welfare of dependent children, this does not give social workers carte blanche to conduct an invasive home search that does not comply with the Fourth Amendment. Here, as distinct from Wyman, the Plaintiffs were not receiving public funds; there was no advance written notice of the search; the investigation was conducted at 1:00 AM (well outside normal business hours); the Plaintiffs’ home and children were inspected; and the caseworkers were accompanied by armed, uniformed Human Services Police Officers.

Therefore, the Fourth Amendment applies and the Defendants’ reliance on Wyman is unpersuasive in the present circumstances.