IA: Officer unreasonably stalled stop to give drug dog time to arrive

The officer here stalled the defendant with conversation that led to no reasonable suspicion in an effort to give the drug dog time to arrive: Suppressed. State v. Hanrahan, 2013 Iowa App. LEXIS 844 (August 7, 2013):

This brings us to the trooper’s conduct after the traffic stop ended. Police cannot “unduly prolong their detention of an individual to secure a drug dog or for any other reason without additional suspicion of wrongdoing that warrants expansion of the stop.” State v. Bergmann, 633 N.W.2d 328, 335 (Iowa 2001). If “the detainees’ responses or actions raise suspicions unrelated to the traffic offense, the officer’s inquiry may be broadened to satisfy those suspicions.” Aderholdt, 545 N.W.2d at 564. Where the purpose of the stop has concluded, the officer must have “reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing” to “expand the scope further.” Bergmann, 633 N.W.2d at 338.

There is no question the purpose of the traffic stop had concluded before the trooper detained Hanrahan pending the arrival of the drug dog. The trooper conceded this fact, stating he “printed off the traffic warning, then had the defendant sign [his] computer, gave the defendant all of his documents back, along with his driver’s license, registration and stuff like that, along with his copy of the warning, and told him to have a safe trip.” The question is whether the trooper had reasonable suspicion to detain Hanrahan and to search his vehicle after the traffic stop ended.

We begin with the substance of the “motorist interview.” The State asserts that the interview furnished reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to support the detention and search because Hanrahan paused before answering questions and seemed deceptive. On our review of the audio recording, we discern nothing untoward in the cadence or tenor of the conversation. If anything, Hanrahan appeared more forthcoming with details than the questions required.

The State also asserts that Hanrahan appeared to redirect the focus of the conversation. It is true that, after the trooper asked about Hanrahan’s family, Hanrahan made a similar inquiry of the trooper. This exchange did not reflect obfuscation but polite repartee between strangers.

The trooper additionally claimed the fact Hanrahan was traveling to California “raised question marks,” because “California is one of the largest marijuana producing places in the U.S.” But, as Hanrahan’s attorney pointed out in searing cross-examination, Hanrahan was not returning from the drug-source state but going to that state. The trooper responded to this cross-examination by stating that he “was expecting [Hanrahan] was driving to California and bringing marijuana back.” This response was inconsistent with the trooper’s initial assertion that he expected to find drugs in the trunk of Hanrahan’s car. In any event, the trooper painted with a broad and unconstitutional brush in suggesting that travelers to or from the State of California must be engaged in drug smuggling. See United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129, 1138 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e do not think that the entire state of California, the most populous state in the union, can properly be deemed a source of illegal narcotics such that mere residency in that state constitutes a factor supporting reasonable suspicion.”).

We conclude the “motorist interview” did not generate reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The trooper conceded as much, stating the conversation only raised a generalized suspicion of criminal activity. See State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197, 204 (Iowa 2004) (stating a “suspicion, curiosity, or hunch” that criminal activity may be occurring does not amount to reasonable suspicion).

Finally: A court that gets that’s what they’re doing.