CA6: Social workers governed by 4A; SW needed to remove children without exigent circumstances

Social workers were not entitled to absolute immunity in a 1983 case because when they removed children from their home, they were acting in a police capacity rather than as legal advocates. They were not entitled to qualified immunity because incidents that occurred weeks before the children were removed could not establish exigent circumstances. The law was clearly established that Fourth Amendment warrant requirements applied to the removal of children from their home by social workers, and no reasonable social worker could have concluded that the law permitted her to remove a child without notice or a pre-deprivation hearing where there was no emergency. Kovacic v. Cuyahoga County Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 724 F.3d 687 (6th Cir. 2013):

“[A] social worker, like other state officers, is governed by the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.” Andrews v. Hickman Cnty., 700 F.3d 845, 859 (6th Cir. 2012). “This would simply mean that social workers would have to obtain consent, have sufficient grounds to believe that exigent circumstances exist, or qualify under another recognized exception to the warrant requirement before engaging in warrantless entries and searches of homes.” Id. at 859-60. Here, the social workers did not have a warrant to remove the children from their home. They argue that they complied with the Fourth Amendment nonetheless due to exigent circumstances.

“Exigent circumstances arise when an emergency situation demands immediate police action that excuses the need for a warrant,” including “the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury.” Johnson v. City of Memphis, 617 F.3d 864, 868 (6th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Preventing imminent or ongoing physical abuse within a home qualifies as an exigent circumstance.” Schreiber v. Moe, 596 F.3d 323, 330 (6th Cir. 2010). “[T]he cases finding exigent circumstances uniformly cite the need for prompt action by government personnel, and conclude that delay to secure a warrant would be unacceptable under the circumstances.” United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1517 (6th Cir. 1996). In addition to providing an exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment, exigent circumstances may alter the notice and hearing requirements typically required under the Fourteenth Amendment in child-removal cases. Doe v. Staples, 706 F.2d 985, 990 (6th Cir. 1983) (explaining that due process requires, among other things, that “[t]he parents be given notice prior to the removal of the child (at the time of the removal when exigent circumstances exist or promptly thereafter) stating the reasons for the removal”).