E.D.Pa.: “Computers” in a child porn SW included “cell phones”

Officers had a child pornography search warrant that included “computers.” Because cell phones are virtually computers, the search warrant included the cell phone. Yes, it could have been more specific, but this was still specific enough. United States v. Horton, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104072 (E.D. Pa. July 25, 2013):

Furthermore, the rationale justifying the scope of the requested search supports the conclusion that the warrant covered Horton’s cell phone. Although the warrant application focused primarily on the need to search Horton’s computer, which was used to upload a pornographic movie file, it stated that a computer search, to be comprehensive, must also include a search of other devices. In his affidavit, Lt. Peifer stated that “searching and seizing information from computers often requires investigators to seize all electronic storage devices” where the inculpatory files accessed from the computer may be permanently stored. 2/2/12 Warrant App. at 6. Forms of computer storage devices include hard drives, CD-ROMs, flash drives, and other media external to a computer. See id.

A cell phone, such as Horton’s, is similarly capable of storing large amounts of computer data downloaded from the Internet or originally downloaded on and transferred from a computer. As the Tenth Circuit has observed, “[t]he memory cards, available in some cell phones can, like flash drives, hold vast amounts of information, including image and data files.” United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1090 n.13 (10th Cir. 2009); see also Wurie, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 9937, 2013 WL 2129119, at *6 (noting that “[t]he storage capacity of today’s cell phones is immense”). Thus, the warrant application’s reasoning and request applies equally to Horton’s cell phone as an external electronic storage device. Indeed, although not the focus of the parties’ arguments, the warrant also authorized the seizure of such “peripheral storage devices.”

Of course, the warrant could have more clearly articulated that it covered cell phones by separately identifying them as items to be searched for and seized. That was the tack taken by the officer seeking a warrant in United States v. Karrer, a non-precedential Third Circuit opinion. In Karrer, the officer sought a warrant to search “hardware, including, but not limited to, any equipment which can collect, analyze, create, display, convert, store, conceal, or transmit electronic, magnetic, optical or similar computer impulses or data,” language that mirrors the present warrant, and “[a]ny cellular phones[ or] smart phones.” 460 F. App’x 157, 159 (3d Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted; first alteration in the original). The fact that the warrant in this case could have been written like the warrant in Karrer, separately listing computer-like “equipment” and cell phones as items to be seized, does not mean, however, that the present warrant failed to authorize the search and seizure of a cell phone. The language of the warrant used to seize Horton’s cell phone, though less clear, sufficiently permitted that seizure.