E.D.Ky.: Wrong address on search warrant doesn’t void it because there was no “reasonable probability” the wrong place was searched

Wrong address on search warrant doesn’t void it because there was no “reasonable probability” the wrong place was searched. United States v. King, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98047 (E.D. Ky. July 15, 2013)f (R&R 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101842 (E.D.Ky. May 30, 2013)):

The administrative error of placing an incorrect address on the search warrant is glaring, especially when the listed address is several miles away from the proper location. [R. 119 at 9.] However, precedent holds that such a mistake does not categorically invalidate a warrant. [Id. at 12 (citing United States v. Pelayo-Landero, 285 F.3d 491, 496 (6th Cir. 2002)).] Rather, a two-step inquiry is then required, as the R&R explains. [R. 119 at 12.] King contests the second step in this analysis: “whether there is any reasonable probability that another premises might be mistakenly searched.” There is no reasonable probability of that happening.

The fact favoring King’s position is that the address was wrong. The warrant stated that the residence to be searched was 215 Gabbard Road, Annville, Kentucky, while the proper address is 1600 Hellard Road, Annville, Kentucky. [R. 119 at 9.] In opposition to that fact stands a mountain of evidence. First, the warrant explains in painstaking detail the directions one should follow to find 1600 Hellard Road. [R. 119 at 8 (describing driving distances to the tenth of a mile).] Second, the actual residence—a single-wide mobile home—is described in similar detail. [Id.] The mobile home has red colored trim and red and green colored trim on the right side of the residence; there is a “built-on wooden structure attached to the backside of the residence”; and a wooden roof protects a dirt floor that serves as a porch, which is also attached to the home. [Id.] It is highly unlikely that the residence at 215 Gabbard Road would look similar—even if it was also a mobile home. [Id.] Third, a carport that housed a “blue Chevy pickup displaying Kentucky License Plate #097-LGS” was included in the description. [Id.] And perhaps most importantly, the law enforcement officer who obtained the warrant and helped conduct the search had previously visited this exact residence to serve King with an outstanding arrest warrant. [Id. at 14, 8; see Pelayo-Landero, 285 F.3d at 497 (finding support for the warrant being specific enough in part because of the executing officer’s previous visit to a residence).]

It is unfortunate that the address was wrong, but as explained in Pelayo-Landero, “courts routinely uphold warrants like the one at issue where one part of the description might be inaccurate but the description has other accurate information to identify the place to be searched with particularity.” Pelayo-Landero, 285 F.3d at 497 (citing United States v. Durk, 149 F.3d 464, 466 (6th Cir. 1998)). “Practical accuracy rather than technical nicety” is the guiding principle in resolving this issue. Id. at 496 (quotation omitted). Under this set of facts, there is no reasonable way the accuracy could be compromised. Accordingly, the Court finds King’s objection meritless.

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