CA11: PC for window tint violation enough for stop; immaterial the police usually ignore it

The fact the Sheriff’s Office “did not ordinarily issue citations for window tint violations is immaterial” if there was, in fact, probable cause to believe there was a window tint violation. United States v. Parker, 512 Fed. Appx. 991 (11th Cir. 2013)*:

Moreover, Parker misconstrues Whren by asserting that the district court should have assessed the reasonableness of Joyce’s actions in order to determine if the probable cause requirement was met. Whren specifically states that while every Fourth Amendment case involves a reasonableness determination based on a balancing of relevant factors, absent rare exceptions, “the result of that balancing is not in doubt where the search or seizure is based upon probable cause.” 517 U.S. at 817. None of the exceptions are applicable to Parker’s case, since the search could not be described as extraordinary, or unusually harmful to his privacy or physical interests. Id. The fact that the Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office did not ordinarily issue citations for window tint violations is immaterial. As noted by the district court, the only relevant inquiry is whether the officer’s conduct was objectively reasonable, regardless of his subjective intent or motives. See id. at 813-14 (whether the officer’s conduct deviated materially from usual police practices, so that a reasonable officer under similar circumstances would not have made the stop, is a subjective consideration).

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