CA6: False suppression hearing testimony earns defendant obstruction enhancement under § 3C1.1

Defendant’s false testimony about his consent to search being at the point of a gun led to an obstruction of justice enhancement under USSG § 3C1.1 even though the court relied on the automobile exception to sustain the search. United States v. Payton, 516 Fed. Appx. 553 (6th Cir. 2013):

Finally, Payton contends that his testimony was not material because it could not have had an effect on the outcome of the suppression hearing, asserting that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement allowed the officer’s search of the trunk regardless of whether his consent to the search was voluntary. The commentary to USSG § 3C1.1 provides: “‘Material’ evidence, fact, statement, or information, as used in this section, means evidence, fact, statement, or information that, if believed, would tend to influence or affect the issue under determination.” USSG § 3C1.1, cmt. n.6. In support of his motion to suppress, Payton argued that he allowed the search of the trunk because he was coerced or threatened; therefore, Payton placed the voluntariness of his consent at issue. Payton’s testimony that he decided to open the trunk “[w]hen [the officer] pulled that gun out” was clearly relevant to the consent issue and thus material, regardless of whether there was an alternative ground for denying the motion to suppress. See United States v. Smaw, 993 F.2d 902, 904, 301 U.S. App. D.C. 240 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“The word material in this context means relevant—not outcome determinative.”).