(Postings were late today because of not enough bandwidth choking off my access. Whether that is a DOS attack or just too many readers remains to be seen. I know this site is not that popular.)
Police had probable cause to search defendant’s tractor-trailer which was locked up and parked behind a locked fence. The vehicle was still mobile enough for the vehicle exception to apply. State v. Anderson, 949 So. 2d 544 (4th Cir. 2007):
Moreover, although the appellant refers to an immobilized tractor-trailer in this case, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the vehicle was not readily mobile. Detective Stovall repeatedly referred to a truck, not a trailer. At one point he did refer to the vehicle as a “tractor-trailer” noting that it had been “backed into this lot.” The fence in front of the lot was not locked and apparently was easily opened in light of the detective’s testimony that the defendant repeatedly entered the lot. Because the vehicle was backed in, it presumably could be pulled out of the lot and driven away. Overall, it appears that, like the truck parked in a driveway in the Labron case, the vehicle was still “readily mobile” even if not parked on a public thoroughfare at the time of the search.
Officers went to a house during a homicide investigation that had occurred nearby and saw what appeared to them to be a recent burglary, which is not merely a property crime [because burglaries happen when people are at home and they become home invasion robberies]. This was an emergency that justified their entry on its own and because of the mere potential it might have been related to the homicide. State v. Lemieux, 726 N.W.2d 783 (Minn. January 18, 2007):
Burglary of a dwelling is not “deemed a purely property offense because *** such an offense always carries with it the possibility of violence and therefore some special risks to human life.” State v. Nunn, 297 N.W.2d 752, 754 (Minn. 1980). Other courts have concluded that police entry is justifiable under the emergency-aid exception where police have reasonable grounds to believe that a burglary is in progress or has recently occurred. See, e.g., United States v. Lenoir, 318 F.3d 725, 730-31 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding warrantless entry where defendant who was carrying two high-powered rifles fled from police into nearby home but had trouble entering the door and police reasonably feared for the safety of the home’s occupants); United States v. Tibolt, 72 F.3d 965, 970-71 (1st Cir. 1995) (upholding warrantless entry on reasonable, though mistaken, belief that residence was the source of security alarm); Murdock v. Stout, 54 F.3d 1437, 1441-42 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding warrantless entry during investigation of suspected burglary, where facts known to police indicated that resident was not responding and circumstances suggested that resident should have been present); Carroll v. State, 335 Md. 723, 646 A.2d 376, 384 (Md. 1994) (upholding warrantless entry based on open door, a broken window pane, and information that the resident was away and not expected to return for a day or two); see generally 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 6.6(a), at 459-61 (4th ed. 2004) (stating that entry is reasonable “to seek possible victims of violence in premises apparently burglarized recently”); Decker, supra at 490 (stating that “[m]ost courts have applied the emergency doctrine in circumstances where police reasonably believe that a burglary is in progress or has recently occurred”).
Furthermore, here the apparently burglarized residence was in close proximity to a brutal and seemingly random homicide. Ultimately, it was determined that the perpetrator entered the residence through the window: the victim’s blood was under the window on the exterior wall of the residence, the victim’s belongings were inside under the window sill, and, in closing arguments, counsel for both parties acknowledged that the perpetrator gained entry through the window. That the officers later learned Lemieux had entered his own abode is of no moment: “what matters is their reasonable belief” that a burglary was in progress or had recently occurred at the time of the entry. In re Sealed Case, 332 U.S. App. D.C. 84, 153 F.3d 759, 765 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
The officers’ search was also limited to the scope of the emergency, sweep-searching the floors for the presence of intruders or injured occupants and departing immediately upon finding the residence unoccupied. And assuming that the officers’ subjective motivations are a relevant state-law consideration, a warrantless search conducted during a criminal investigation does not necessarily preclude application of the emergency-aid exception so long as one of the motives for the warrantless search corresponds to an objectively reasonable emergency. See, e.g., Cervantes, 219 F.3d at 891 (concluding that officer making warrantless entry to locate a methamphetamine lab during criminal investigation was primarily motivated by concern for the safety of the apartment building’s occupants, as evidenced by the officer’s order that the tenants turn off open flames and evacuate the building); see also Decker, supra at 511-16 (discussing subjective-motivation element). Here, the officers’ warrantless entry was primarily motivated by concern of a burglary in progress, as evidenced by the call for backup and entry with firearms drawn.
In conclusion, we hold that the police entry of the residence in close proximity to a brutal and seemingly random homicide was justified under the emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement because the officers had reasonable grounds to believe that a burglary was in progress or had recently occurred, the entry was motivated primarily to look for possible victims, and the scope of the search was limited to the emergency.
The place to be searched, an apartment in a multiunit building, was sufficiently described. “The affidavit described the location with sufficient certainty and designated a specific apartment ‘located in the south building on the south side on the rear near the railroad tracks.’ This description distinguishes the apartment to be searched from all other nearby apartments.” State v. Cotton, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 34 (January 18, 2007).*
