D.Ariz.: I-19 immigration checkpoint stop valid even if stop was based on subjective suspicion of drug smuggling

The I-19 checkpoint south of Tucson is a constitutional immigration checkpoint per the Ninth Circuit. Occasionally vehicles are “flushed” through the checkpoint as vehicles build up. When that happens, that does not change the legal standard of suspicion necessary to stop a vehicle for an immigration check. Also, the fact all the officers working the checkpoint are cross-designated as drug officers does not make the checkpoint unconstitutional, despite the fact that 300-400 drug smuggling cases are made there a year. United States v. Ruiz-Perez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44505 (D. Ariz. March 30, 2012), R&R 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154502 (D. Ariz. October 6, 2011):

Agent Kouris’ subjective belief that Defendant’s vehicle may be smuggling drugs does not affect the analysis of the reasonableness of the stop. Although subjective intent has been considered in evaluating the subjective intrusiveness of a checkpoint stop, the key consideration is the subjective belief of the traveler, not the officer. See e.g. United States v. Hawkins, 249 F.3d 867, 874 (9thCir. 2001) (stating “in some instances, the failure to stop every vehicle could raise concerns over subjective intrusiveness,” but finding no Fourth Amendment violation where Defendant was not treated differently from other drivers and no law-abiding motorist would have been unduly surprised or afraid because of this stop). In fact, the Supreme Court has indicated that some discretion and motive is inherent and permissible in routine checkpoint operations. …

Defendant’s consent was voluntary, with the court evaluating numerous factors. Also, defendant signed a written consent. It was after a protective sweep. United States v. Salgado, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44682 (N.D. Ga. March 12, 2012).*