CA6: Warrant to seize necessarily includes power to search; here a computer

A warrant for child pornography on defendant’s computer was based on probable cause from a report from a user who saw it. The warrant was to “seize,” and that included “search.” United States v. Evers, 669 F.3d 645, 2012 FED App. 0042P (6th Cir. 2012):

The federal courts are in agreement that a warrant authorizing the seizure of a defendant’s home computer equipment and digital media for a subsequent off-site electronic search is not unreasonable or overbroad, as long as the probable-cause showing in the warrant application and affidavit demonstrate a “sufficient chance of finding some needles in the computer haystack.” Upham, 168 F.3d at 535; see also United States v. Grimmett, 439 F.3d 1263, 1268-70 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that a warrant for the search of “any and all” computer hardware and software for child pornography authorized both the seizure and subsequent search of the defendant’s computer files); Guest, 255 F.3d at 335 (“Because of the technical difficulties of conducting a computer search in a suspect’s home, the seizure of the computers, including their content, was reasonable in [this] case[] to allow police to locate the offending files.”); Upham, 168 F.3d at 535 (“As a practical matter, the seizure and subsequent off-premises search of the computer … was about the narrowest definable search and seizure reasonably likely to obtain the images [of the child pornography sought].”).

Moreover, a second warrant to search a properly seized computer is not necessary “where the evidence obtained in the search did not exceed the probable cause articulated in the original warrant.” Richards, 659 F.3d at 539 n.10 (citing United States v. Gregoire, 638 F.3d 962, 967-68 (8th Cir. 2011); Grimmett, 439 F.3d at 1268-69; Upham, 168 F.3d at 535; and United States v. Simpson, 152 F.3d 1241, 1248 (10th Cir. 1998)). This is in keeping with the general principle that “even evidence not described in a search warrant may be seized if it is reasonably related to the offense which formed the basis for the search warrant.” United States v. Wright, 343 F.3d 849, 863 (6th Cir. 2003) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Henson, 848 F.2d 1374, 1383 (6th Cir. 1988) (“A search does not become invalid merely because some items not covered by a warrant are seized.”).