CA8: Post-Rodriguez, criminal history is still a relevant inquiry during a traffic stop as RS develops

Post-Rodriguez, criminal history is still a relevant inquiry during a traffic stop as reasonable suspicion develops. United States v. Moua, 24-2774 (8th Cir. Aug. 1, 2025) (2-1):

While Moua spent a total of 45 minutes by the side of the road, “there is no per se time limit on all traffic stops.” United States v. Riley, 684 F.3d 758, 765 (8th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). An officer need only act diligently to pursue the mission of the stop. United States v. Rederick, 65 F.4th 961, 967 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 241 (2023). An officer’s mission may evolve during the stop, as when the officer develops “reasonable suspicion of drug-related activity during the routine traffic-stop tasks.” Id. Likewise, “[a]n officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop … do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.” Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009).

Here, Deputy Hansen’s suspicions evolved during the stop. As he spoke to Moua, Deputy Hansen observed additional signs of impairment: persistently dilated pupils, evidence of teeth grinding consistent with drug abuse, and slurred speech. At the same time, he noticed hallmarks of drug trafficking, such as the cellophane in Moua’s make-up case. Relying on his training and experience, Deputy Hansen made a decision to investigate further. Our precedent allows law enforcement to pursue those leads by asking Moua to submit to field sobriety tests and by exploring her prior convictions. See United States v. Rivera, 570 F.3d 1009, 1013 (8th Cir. 2009) (concluding questions about a person’s criminal history “are permissible incidents of a routine traffic stop”). In addition, Moua consented to prolonging the stop because “[w]hen a motorist gives consent to search his vehicle, he necessarily consents to an extension of the traffic stop.” Id.

Because Deputy Hansen had reasonable suspicion to stop Moua’s vehicle and the stop was not unreasonably prolonged, the district court did not err when it denied Moua’s motion to suppress.

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