If you’re riding a bus and drugs are found on one, are all subject to search. The answer can’t be yes, but it is here:
Defendant was a passenger on a Greyhound bus on I-80. The bus crossed the centerline more than once so an officer decided to stop it. While checking the paperwork, a drug dog arrived and sniffed around the luggage compartment, and the dog alerted. Some passengers had gotten off the bus to smoke while they waited, which the officer thought odd. Consent to search the bus was sought, but the driver said that Greyhound itself had to agree to that. On the bus, consent to search some bags led to finding firearms, particularly an AR-15 type pistol. A bag in the overhead went unclaimed, and that produced marijuana. “In total, the traffic stop lasted around one hour and led to the recovery of over one hundred grams of narcotics, about fifteen pounds of marijuana, four handguns, and some ‘wanted individuals.’” The dog alert to the luggage compartment gave probable cause to search all the luggage under the automobile exception. Also of note: Greyhound buses are relatively highly regulated. Dunem v. State, 2025 Ind. App. LEXIS 73 (Mar. 14, 2025):
P21 Although Dunem accepts Bosco’s alert gave police probable cause to search the bus’s luggage compartment, he asserts probable cause did not extend to the passenger compartment of the bus, and particularly his duffle bag. His view is too narrow. Absent a successful challenge to a drug-detection dog’s reliability, a dog’s “alert” provides police with probable cause to believe a vehicle contains illicit drugs. Hobbs, 933 N.E.2d at 1286; Ramsey v. State, 222 N.E.3d 1038, 1045 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (“A dog sniff of the exterior of the vehicle indicating the presence of illicit substances provides probable cause for a warrantless search of the interior of the vehicle under the automobile exception.”), trans. denied. So, a “dog alert creates general probable cause to search a vehicle; it does not implicate the precision of a surgeon working with scalpel in hand.” United States v. Rosborough, 366 F.3d 1145, 1153 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding a canine alert toward the passenger area of a vehicle provided probable cause to search the vehicle’s trunk as well). Armed with probable cause to believe the bus contained illegal drugs based on Bosco’s alert, police could lawfully search every part of the bus and its contents that may conceal the object of the search, including the duffle bag. See Ross, 456 U.S. at 825.
P22 Yet Dunem highlights he was a passenger on a commercial bus, not the driver or passenger of a personal automobile. In his eyes, this fact makes a critical difference to our constitutional analysis. But “[w]ith few exceptions, the courts have not hesitated to apply the vehicle exception to vehicles other than automobiles.” Carney, 471 U.S. at 393 n.2. To determine whether the automobile exception applies under these circumstances, we revisit its justifications, both of which “come into play” here. Collins, 584 U.S. at 592.
P23 To refresh, the automobile exception is based on a vehicle’s ready mobility and its occupants’ lesser expectations of privacy. See Myers, 839 N.E.2d at 1150. Here, the bus was readily mobile; Dunem does not contend otherwise. That leaves Dunem’s privacy interests. As explained in Haughton, cars “trave[l] public thoroughfares, seldom serv[e] as … the repository of personal effects, are subjected to police stop and examination to enforce pervasive governmental controls … and, finally, are exposed to traffic accidents that may render all their contents open to public scrutiny,” hence, the “reduced expectation of privacy” tied to property transported in cars. 526 U.S. at 303 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
P24 So, too, regarding a bus. A commercial bus, like any other vehicle in transit on public roads and highways, is subject to a plethora of government regulation and control. See Carney, 471 U.S. at 392 (describing the regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on public highways as “pervasive”). Plus, a passenger on a commercial bus is subject to observation by bus personnel and fellow travelers—most, if not all, of whom are strangers. This is not to say a bus passenger surrenders all privacy interests once they step aboard. They do not. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338-39 (2000) (holding a bus passenger maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in an opaque bag he placed in an overhead bin, even though he knew it could be handled or moved by employees or other passengers). But a passenger’s privacy expectations are “ordinarily weak” and “considerably diminished.” Haughton, 526 U.S. at 306, 304. And when balanced against the governmental interest in thwarting the risk that evidence or contraband will be permanently lost while a warrant is obtained, the competing interests often militate in favor of law enforcement needs.
P25 All this to say, the automobile exception’s justifications also apply here. The search of the duffle bag was therefore reasonable and justified under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
Update: techdirt: Indiana Court: Finding Drugs On One Person Means Everyone On A Bus Can Be Searched by Tim Cushing (“A whole new level of constitutional wtf-ness has emerged from the Indiana state Appeals Court. Here’s how John Wesley Hall sums it up on FourthAmendment.com: “If you’re riding a bus and drugs are found on one, are all subject to search. The answer can’t be yes, but it is here.” Exactly. The answer cannot be ‘yes.’ That’s insanity. Especially considering the facts of this case, which begin with Deputy Wade Wallace of the LaPorte County Sheriff’s Office pulling over a bus because of an alleged traffic violation.”)
