CA5: Silence when your son is consenting for you is implicit consent

Silence during defendant’s son’s disclosure of where guns were when he was asked was implicit consent, and it was voluntary. United States v. Martinez, 410 Fed. Appx. 759 (5th Cir. 2011) (unpublished):

Consent to a search can be implied from silence or failure to object if it follows a police officer’s explicit or implicit request for consent. See United States v. Jaras, 86 F.3d 383, 390 (5th Cir. 1996). Here, an officer implicitly requested consent to search the safe. When an officer asks an individual where a gun is located, while at the same time repeatedly stating that his goal is to seize the weapon as evidence, that is logically considered an implicit request for consent to search for and recover the weapon. Given that Martinez was implicitly asked to consent to a search, it was not clearly erroneous for the court to conclude that Martinez’s decision to remain silent following his specific identification of the location of the firearms, as well as his son’s offer to retrieve the firearms, constituted implicit consent to the subsequent search.

Officers were watching a car suspected for being involved in drug sales. Officers moved in toward the car, and they saw furtive movements in the car like hiding weapons. When the officers got to the car, they ordered the occupants out, and the butt of a gun was in plain view. It was validly seized. Aliu v. State, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 32 (Tex. App. – Dallas January 4, 2011).*

Getting hung up on whether the government search exceeded the private search, the Fifth Circuit finally concludes that the defendant had a severely reduced expectation of privacy in a box that was left with another that he told her to get rid of. She instead delivered it to the police. The search of the box was reasonable. United States v. Oliver, 630 F.3d 397 (5th Cir. 2011).* See Orin Kerr on Volokh Conspiracy for a dissection of the private search issue.

Defendant’s admission during a parole visit that the pills on the table were prescription drugs that were not his did not limit the parole officers from searching further. People v Walker, 2011 NY Slip Op 47, 80 A.D.3d 793, 914 N.Y.S.2d 364, 980 N.E.2d 937 (3d Dept. 2011).*

This entry was posted in Uncategorized. Bookmark the permalink.

Comments are closed.