D.Me.: Fire scene search does not depend just on threat to people

Clifford and Tyler on fire scene searches do not distinguish between protection of people and property. Here, a blood trail was also seen. United States v. Infante, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1131 (D. Me. January 3, 2011):

Defense counsel distinguished Finnigin on grounds that, in that case, there had been a visible fire and, therefore, evidence of an ongoing process, whereas, in this case, there was none. He reasoned that whereas, in Finnigin, the existence of an ongoing process justified firefighters in entering the suspect’s house to ensure that the process (the fire) had been extinguished, in this case, firefighters only speculated, in the face of a lack of objective evidence, that any such process had transpired or was continuing to transpire in the defendant’s house.

The defendant construes First Circuit caselaw too narrowly in arguing that the emergency doctrine in no circumstance encompasses threats to property. The First Circuit itself has clarified that its list of examples of exigent circumstances “is not an exclusive compendium[.]” United States v. Martins, 413 F.3d 139, 146-47 (1st Cir. 2005). It has recognized that, pursuant to the emergency doctrine, “the police, in an emergency situation, may enter a residence without a warrant if they reasonably believe that swift action is required to safeguard life or prevent serious harm.” Id. (emphasis added). Other United States circuit courts of appeals have expressly recognized that, pursuant to the emergency doctrine, the prevention of destruction to property can justify warrantless entry of a residence. See, e.g., Hunsberger v. Wood, 570 F.3d 546, 555 (4th Cir. 2009) (emergency-doctrine inquiry is whether circumstances known to officer “would create an objectively reasonable belief that an emergency existed that required immediate entry to render assistance or prevent harm to persons or property within”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Sheik-Abdi v. McClellan, 37 F.3d 1240, 1244 (7th Cir. 1994) (same). See also, e.g., United States v. Lawlor, 324 F. Supp.2d 81, 86 (D. Me. 2004) (“[W]hen policemen, firemen or other public officers are confronted with evidence which would lead a prudent and reasonable official to see a need to protect life or property, they are authorized to act on that information, even if ultimately found erroneous.”) (citation and internal punctuation omitted).

More importantly, the Supreme Court has recognized that, with respect to the firefighting function in particular, the need to enter a burning building and to remain for a reasonable period of time thereafter to determine the cause of the blaze on its face presents an exigency of sufficient proportions to justify warrantless entry. See, e.g., Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 293 (1984) (“A burning building of course creates an exigency that justifies a warrantless entry by fire officials to fight the blaze. Moreover, in Tyler we held that once in the building, officials need no warrant to remain for a reasonable time to investigate the cause of the blaze after it has been extinguished. … The aftermath of a fire often presents exigencies that will not tolerate the delay necessary to obtain a warrant or to secure the owner’s consent to inspect fire-damaged premises. Because determining the cause and origin of a fire serves a compelling public interest, the warrant requirement does not apply in such cases.”) (citation, footnotes, and internal quotation marks omitted). In so holding, the Court did not deem it necessary to parse whether the danger posed was to persons, property, or both.

Of course, in this case, as defense counsel repeatedly emphasized, the defendant’s house was not ablaze. Indeed, firefighters found no indicia whatsoever of an explosion or fire. Nonetheless, I conclude that the government has met its burden of demonstrating that there was “a reasonable basis, … approximating probable cause, both to believe in the existence of [an] emergency and to associate that emergency with the area or place to be searched.” Beaudoin, 362 F.3d at 66 (footnote omitted).