CA4: Establishing reliability of the CI

The informant’s information gave probable cause. Thus, “With probable cause, the police could search the shoebox under the automobile exception.” United States v. Gondres-Medrano, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 20283 (4th Cir. July 8, 2021). As to establishing the reliability of informant hearsay:

After Gates, the Court has emphasized the corroborating aspects of an anonymous tip as establishing the anonymous informant’s reliability. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1990). Standing alone, an anonymous tipster’s veracity or reliability is “by hypothesis largely unknown, and unknowable.” Id. (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 237). But where a tipster is shown to be right about some details, he is probably right about other alleged facts, including the alleged criminal activity, justifying reliance on the anonymous tip. Id. at 331-32. For example, in White, an anonymous call reported that Vanessa White would be leaving a particular apartment at a particular time in a brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken right taillight to go to a particular motel. Id. at 327. The tip also recounted that she would have a brown case with an ounce of cocaine. Id. At the indicated time, police saw a woman with nothing in her hands leave the apartment and get in the described station wagon. Id. After she began on the path to the hotel, police stopped the car and found marijuana in a case inside. Id. Relying on the corroboration of the tip’s predictive aspects, the Court found there was good reason to believe the caller was honest, well informed, and reliable. Id. at 332; cf. United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 325 (4th Cir. 2004).

Similarly, corroboration can confirm the reliability of an informant who is known (rather than anonymous) but whose credibility is unknown to the officer. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 579-84, 91 S. Ct. 2075, 29 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1971); United States v. White, 549 F.3d 946, 952 (4th Cir. 2008). Some corroboration is still required with no track record of reliability. But since a known informant exposes himself to possible criminal prosecution or other consequences for giving false information, his reliability is enhanced and less corroboration is required as compared to an anonymous informant.

But corroborating details of an informant’s tip is not the only way to establish the informant’s reliability. See Miller, 925 F.2d at 698-99 (explaining that corroboration need not come from independent investigation). Just as the veracity of the anonymous tip made up for the tipster’s total lack of reliability or accountability in Gates, so too can other factors compensate for deficiencies. In considering the reliability of a known informant, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the import of an informant’s track record of providing reliable information. See, e.g., McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 303-04, 87 S. Ct. 1056, 18 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1967) (finding “no doubt” that probable cause existed based on information provided by an informant with a record of providing “information concerning narcotics ’20 or 25 times'” which had led to arrests and convictions). This is because the informant’s track record provides verification and corroboration that his future tips will likewise be reliable. See Draper, 358 U.S. at 313 (finding probable cause based on an informant when the officer “had always found the information given [by the informant] to be accurate and reliable”); Husty, 282 U.S. at 700 (relying on an informant who was “well acquainted” with the officer and who had given “similar information” to the officer before, “which had always been found to be reliable”); see also Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270, 120 S. Ct. 1375, 146 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2000) (finding no reasonable suspicion based on a vague anonymous tip and contrasting that with “a known informant whose reputation can be assessed and who can be held responsible if her allegations turn out to be fabricated”). Indeed, corroboration can come from “showing the trustworthiness of the informant, such as a history of providing accurate (corroborated) information.” United States v. Long, 774 F.3d 653, 659 (10th Cir. 2014). So “probable cause can be based solely on information from a reliable, credible informant.” Id. at 660; see also United States v. Searcy, 664 F.3d 1119, 1123-24 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that an informant with a track record is less likely to be biased against a target since they have provided information against multiple targets).