N.D.Ga.: [For the 10,000th time,] the standard of review of PC is whether there is a “substantial basis” for finding PC, not whether there actually is

“‘[T]he task of a reviewing court is not to conduct a de novo determination of probable cause, but only to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the magistrate judge’s decision to issue the warrant.’ United States v. Bushay, … (citing Massachusetts v. Upton, …). As a result, ‘[c]ourts reviewing the legitimacy of search warrants should not interpret supporting affidavits in a hypertechnical manner; rather, a realistic and commonsense approach should be employed so as to encourage recourse to the warrant process and to promote the high level of deference traditionally given to magistrates in their probable cause determinations.” United States v. Miller … (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 236-37, and United States v. Ventresca, …). [¶] With these principles in mind, I readily conclude that Judge Salinas had a ‘substantial basis’ for concluding that probable cause existed to believe that evidence of violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1591 [child sex trafficking] would be found on the cell phone seized from Obie at his arrest.” United States v. Obie, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 217128 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 6, 2019),* adopted, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216350 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 17, 2019).*

Same: United States v. Giddens, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 217676 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 18, 2019).*

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