W.D.Ky.: SW for premises permits search of any vehicle parked on the property

The search warrant for the house in this case permitted a search of any vehicles on the premises, not just those belonging to the owner of the residence. In any event, the good faith exception applies. United States v. Keeling, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88086 (W.D. Ky. June 8, 2017):

Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit has held, albeit in unpublished cases, that when a warrant “specifically include[s] in its scope any vehicles present on the premises,” officers may indeed search any vehicle, not just “vehicles belonging to the owner of the residence to be searched.” United States v. Thompson, 91 F.3d 145 [published in full-text format at 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 22287], 1996 WL 428418, at *3 (6th Cir. July 30, 1996) (unpublished table decision). See also United States v. Ott, 202 F.3d 270 [published in full-text format at 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 500], 2000 WL 32035, at *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 6, 2000) (unpublished table decision); United States v. Hendricks, 888 F.2d 128, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 16168, 1989 WL 125653, at *1 (6th Cir. 1989) (unpublished table decision). Dictum in its published cases suggests the same. See United States v. Smith, 510 F.3d 641, 649 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Had the search warrant been executed a few hours earlier, the Pontiac would have easily fallen within the ambit of the warrant, which permitted the search of 1484 Albert and all vehicles on the premises.”); see also United States v. Smith, 386 F.3d 753, 763 (6th Cir. 2004).

Here, the above-cited cases counsel that, while admittedly not a model of clarity, the search warrant issued for Grubb’s property was sufficiently particular to encompass law enforcement’s search of Keeling’s truck on July 29. And even if the warrant did not satisfy the particularity requirement, the good-faith exception would still permit the gun seized from the truck to be admitted against Keeling. …