S.D.Ohio: Whether Ohio window tint law is unconstitutional or not, that doesn’t make the stop unreasonable

Ohio’s window tint law delegates to administrators to determine the degree of tint. Whether the law is unconstitutional or not, that doesn’t make the stop under the law unreasonable or unconstitutional. United States v. Torbert, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125616 (S.D.Ohio Sept. 15, 2016):

Additionally, even if the Ohio tint law were found to be unconstitutionally vague, this Court does not agree that such a finding would invalidate the propriety of the initial traffic stop. “[T]he decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996). “[T]his probable cause determination, like all probable cause determinations, is fact-dependent and will turn on what the officer knew at the time he made the stop.” United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 391 (6th Cir. 1993) (emphasis in original). Probable cause is not diminished simply because it is later discovered that no violation actually occurred. Id. Thus, as long as the law was in effect at the time of the traffic stop, subsequent invalidation of that law would not undermine the propriety of the traffic stop itself. At most, it would impact the propriety of the resulting violation, which, in this case, would be Defendant Torbert’s window tint citation. However, the Court reiterates that Ohio’s tint law, as set forth in Ohio Admin. Code § 4501-41-3, is sufficiently specific and is therefore valid.

The Court finds that Officer Strunk had sufficient probable cause to believe that Defendants were in violation of an existing and constitutionally valid traffic law (i.e., excessive window tints), thereby permitting him to effectuate a traffic stop in order to issue a citation. Accordingly, the initial traffic stop was not improper.