N.D.Iowa: Bank robbers in borrowed car had no standing to challenge search where owner gave no specific permission

Officers had reasonable suspicion to stop a gray Ford Taurus that was suspected of being involved in a bank robbery. Four men in a pick up truck saw the suspected robbers in gray hooded sweatshirts run from the bank and jump in the car. They drove around the block and followed, calling 911 and telling 911 where they were. One of the robbers was described as an African-American man. When the car was finally stopped by police, a woman was driving and there were no passengers. The police were about to “cut her loose” thinking that maybe that Taurus wasn’t involved after all, but it was going in the right direction. Somebody said to look in the trunk. They told her to “pop the trunk,” and inside were two men in grey hooded sweatshirts with money spilling out of the pockets. Despite the woman driver, the officers clearly had reasonable suspicion. The court doubts standing to challenge the stop, but, based on the government’s concession, “all occupants of the subject vehicle have standing to challenge the legality of the vehicle stop, despite the fact that two of them were hiding in the trunk.” Instead, the government focused on standing to challenge opening the trunk, finding that the owner of the car hadn’t given permission to any of the people in it to be in possession. Therefore, they lacked standing. Alternatively, the search of the trunk was found to be by consent. The government conceded there wasn’t probable cause for a search of the car under the automobile exception. [They shouldn’t have because probable cause likely would have been found.]. United States v. Monden, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99838 (N.D.Iowa July 29, 2016):

It cannot be fairly said that the gray Taurus in this case was stolen. It is clear, however, that none of the Defendants had the consent of the car’s owner to drive or possess it. Monden argues, however, that because he received permission from Rivers to drive the car, he had a reasonable expectation of privacy, even as he was hiding in the trunk. I find the argument unconvincing.

After considering the totality of the circumstances and the authority set forth above, I do not believe Defendants had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the trunk of the gray Ford Taurus. None of Defendants had the owner’s consent to drive or possess the vehicle and, in fact, possession of the car by anyone other than Franklin’s husband violated her directions. While it appears Monden may have used the vehicle on some prior occasions, he did not use it routinely, he did not use it with Franklin’s knowledge, and he did not have keys to the vehicle. At most, Monden had “only casual possession of the car, and no direct authority from the owner to use it.” Sanchez, 943 F.2d at 113. The fact that Rivers gave Monden permission to use the car is unavailing. Gomez, 16 F.3d at 256 (finding Gomez did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, despite being told by a third-party that the owner had given permission).

There is no evidence Monden or the other Defendants had a subjective expectation of privacy in the vehicle. Even if Monden subjectively believed he had a right of privacy to the trunk of the car, such subjective expectation is not objectively reasonable. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148-49 (mere passengers “simply would not normally have a legitimate expectation of privacy” in the trunk of an automobile). Because Defendants did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle, they lack standing to challenge the legality of the trunk search. Defendants’ motions to suppress should be denied on that basis.