Defendant was stopped because the officer checked the LPN and saw that the female owner’s DL was suspended. Once he saw the driver was a man, the reasonable suspicion for the stop was immediately dispelled. Nevertheless, the court is constrained to conclude, based on state precedent it must follow, that it was appropriate to ask the driver for his driver’s license. He was driving was barred, too. The court analyzes both positions and the case law in support of each. State v. Coleman, 2016 Iowa App. LEXIS 422 (April 27, 2016):
Although we are not at liberty to overrule Jackson, we do recognize some questions about its continuing vitality. In Vance, our supreme court noted the defendant did not raise the issue of the whether the stop continued to be valid upon the officer’s discovery that the driver was, in fact, not the registered owner of the car. Vance, 790 N.W.2d at 783 n.1. The court cited Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983), for the proposition that “the scope of an investigatory stop must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification and last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” Id. Without acknowledging Jackson, the Vance court appeared to view the officer’s authority to ask for the operating license after realizing the driver was not the owner as an open question in Iowa. The court wrote: “A number of jurisdictions have invalidated the further detention or investigation of a suspect after the initial purpose of an investigatory stop has been resolved.” Id. (collecting cases). Ultimately, Vance expressed “no opinion on the merits of this issue” because it was not preserved for appellate review. 790 N.W.2d at 783 n.1.
The majority of jurisdictions that have examined this issue have decided once probable cause or reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop is dispelled, an officer may not continue the detention for any investigation, including asking a motorist for a driver’s license. See, e.g., United States v. Trestyn, 646 F.3d 732, 744 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding request for driver’s license exceeded scope of stop’s underlying justification); United States v. Edgerton, 438 F.3d 1043, 1044 (10th Cir. 2006) (reiterating United States v. McSwain, 29 F.3d 558, 561 (10th Cir. 1994), instructs that trooper, “as a matter of courtesy,” should have explained to defendant the reason for the initial stop and then allowed her to continue on her way without requiring her to produce her license and registration); United States v. Valadez, 267 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding where an officer properly initiated a stop to investigate a motor-vehicle law violation and learned no violation had occurred, the purpose of the investigatory stop was satisfied and any further detention or investigation violated the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Wise, 418 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1107 (S.D. Iowa 2006) (holding deputy illegally detained defendants when he asked driver for identification because his investigation was no longer related to the purpose of the stop); People v. Redinger, 906 P.2d 81, 86 (Colo. 1995) (holding once purpose of initial investigation was satisfied, police conduct in requiring defendant to produce information without either reasonable suspicion or probable cause was unwarranted); State v. Diaz, 850 So. 2d 435, 436 (Fla. 2003) (finding no justification for continuing restraint of motorist and obtaining information from him after no question remained concerning the car’s temporary license plate); Holly v. State, 918 N.E.2d 323 (Ind. 2009) (finding initial detention lawful because officer knew registered owner had suspended license and person driving could not be seen before stop, but once officer determined driver was male, while registered owner was female, officer had no reason to conduct additional inquiry); State v. Diaz-Ruiz, 42 Kan. App. 2d 325, 211 P.3d 836, 844 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009) (ruling “because the trooper’s reasonable suspicion evaporated once he observed that the ladder was secure, the trooper had no reason to detain the defendants to perform the tasks incident to an ordinary traffic stop”); State v. Chatton, 11 Ohio St. 3d 59, 11 Ohio B. 250, 463 N.E.2d 1237, 1238-41 (Ohio 1984) (holding officer who stopped vehicle with no visible license plates had no authority to further detain driver or ask for his driver’s license after officer determined car had valid temporary permit); McGaughey v. State, 2001 OK CR 33, 37 P.3d 130, 140 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001) (holding “an officer who realizes that his stop of a vehicle was mistaken—and who has no other cause for reasonable suspicion of the driver—has no authority to further detain the driver or his vehicle”); State v. Farley, 308 Ore. 91, 775 P.2d 835, 836 (Or. 1989) (holding police had no authority to routinely ask for driver’s license and detain drivers while checking on their status after satisfying initial reason for stop); State v. Hayen, 2008 SD 41, 751 N.W.2d 306, 311 (S.D. 2008) (holding officer’s request for driver’s license and proof of insurance constituted an unconstitutional detention); State v. Morris, 2011 UT 40, 259 P.3d 116, 124 (Utah 2011) (holding that after resolving reason for stop, officer may approach driver only to explain mistake and may not constitutionally ask for identification, registration, or proof of insurance, unless officer develops independent probable cause to extend detention); State v. DeArman, 54 Wn. App. 621, 774 P.2d 1247, 1247-49 (Wash Ct. App. 1989) (holding officer who initially believed vehicle might be disabled because it remained motionless at stop sign for one minute had no authority to detain, question, or seek identification from driver once it became clear that vehicle not disabled).
But other jurisdictions have allowed officers to request a driver’s license even without a continued reason to detain the motorist. See, e.g., State v. Gulick, 2000 ME 170, 759 A.2d 1085, 1088 (Me. 2000) (holding “[a]fter an officer stops a vehicle, he may request verification of the operator’s right to drive, even when the original reason for a stop has disappeared, or evaporated, before the request is made”); Hart v. State, 235 S.W.3d 858, 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (where the initial traffic stop is valid, a license check of the driver, even if conducted after the officer has determined that the motorist is not guilty of the violation for which he or she was originally stopped, is not unreasonable so long as it does not unduly prolong the motorist’s detention); State v. Williams, 2002 WI App 306, 258 Wis. 2d 395, 655 N.W.2d 462, 468 (Wis. 2002) (finding police had authority under state statute to require driver to display license on demand if driver was already stopped for lawful purpose).
Our supreme court’s decision in Jackson aligns with the minority point of view. Jackson’s discussion of the officer’s authority to ask the motorist to display his operator’s license even after he was “exonerated” relies on Iowa Code section 321.174. 315 N.W.2d at 767. Subsection (3) of that statute requires a licensee to have his or her driver’s license in immediate possession at all times when operating a motor vehicle and “to display the same upon demand” of a peace officer, judge, or DOT official. Iowa Code § 321.174(3). Jackson does not specifically address whether it is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for the officer to prolong the detention of the motorist to demand his or her driver’s license. 315 N.W.2d at 767.
