SCOTUS: Strickland’s deference to counsel’s decisions applies to appellate counsel [didn’t we all assume that anyway? Not CA6]

The Strickland “doubly deferential” standard of trial counsel’s failure to challenge a search issue because it would not prevail applies to appellate counsel, too. Woods v. Etherton, 15-723 (U.S. April 4, 2016):

Etherton’s underlying complaint is that his appellate lawyer’s ineffectiveness meant he had “no prior opportunity to cross-examine the anonymous tipster.” Brief in Opposition 11. But it would not be objectively unreasonable for a fairminded judge to conclude—especially in light of the deference afforded trial counsel under Strickland—that the failure to raise such a claim was not due to incompetence but because the facts in the tip were uncontested and in any event consistent with Etherton’s defense. See Harrington, 562 U. S., at 105 (“Even under de novo review, the standard for judging counsel’s representation is a most deferential one.”). A fairminded jurist could similarly conclude, again deferring under Strickland, that appellate counsel was not incompetent in drawing the same conclusion. And to reach the final point at issue before the Sixth Circuit, a fairminded jurist—
applying the deference due the state court under AEDPA—could certainly conclude that the court was not objectively unreasonable in deciding that appellate counsel was not incompetent under Strickland, when she determined that trial counsel was not incompetent under Strickland.

Given AEDPA, both Etherton’s appellate counsel and the state habeas court were to be afforded the benefit of the doubt. Burt, supra, at ___. Because the Sixth Circuit failed on both counts, we grant the petition for certiorari and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.