CA4: Provision in order of protection for def to surrender firearms was subject to consent and GFE

Defendant came to the sheriff’s office and was served with an order of protection. He then consented to a search of his house in response to the provision in the order of protection: “Respondent shall surrender any and all firearms and ammunition possessed or owned by the Respondent to the law enforcement officer serving this Order.” It turned out some of the guns were stolen and one had a defaced serial number and another was a sawed-off shotgun. Alternatively, a neutral and detached magistrate issued the order to surrender the guns, and the police could rely in good faith on that finding of cause and the order under the good faith exception. United States v. Spurlock, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 5246 (4th Cir. March 22, 2016):

Thus,”when the police act with an objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct is lawful, or when their conduct involves only simple, isolated negligence, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force, and exclusion cannot pay its way.” Davis, 131 S.Ct. at 2427-28 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Our analysis of this good-faith exception is “objective,” and “is confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal in light of all of the circumstances.” Herring, 555 U.S. at 145 (internal quotation marks omitted). Importantly, “[o]ur precedent makes it clear that application of the good-faith inquiry is not limited to the specific circumstances addressed by the Supreme Court.” Stephens, 764 F.3d at 336. We are permitted to advance directly to the question of good faith without first determining if the underlying search or seizure was illegal. United States v. Legg, 18 F.3d 240, 243 (4th Cir. 1994)

Here, even assuming the seizure of the two guns was illegal, their exclusion serves no deterrent effect because a reasonably well-trained officer would not have known of the seizure’s illegality. The EPO was a valid court order issued by a neutral magistrate upon a showing that J.W. had “proven” domestic abuse by clear and convincing evidence. (J.A. 51). The EPO further provided that Spurlock “shall surrender any and all firearms and ammunition possessed or owned … to the law enforcement officer serving” the EPO in order to “enforce the provisions of W. Va. Code Chapter 48, Article 27.” (J.A. 52). Foster was following the dictates of this valid court order when he asked Spurlock if the latter had firearms at his house. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 925-26 (good-faith exception applies when police reasonably rely on a warrant later held invalid); Herring, 555 U.S. at 146-48 (good-faith exception applies where police reasonably rely on information in a database maintained by police employees). In particular, like a search warrant, the EPO “provides the detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, which is a more reliable safeguard against improper searches than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 913-14 (internal quotation marks omitted).