M.D.Ala.: Motion to withdraw plea for IAC denied; it wasn’t, and this is just a “change of heart”

The court denies defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea for IAC because defense counsel allegedly overlooked a valid motion to suppress, seriously complicated now by the fact it was third party consent of the codefendant. “It is most apparent to the court that Bradford’s challenge to his attorney’s representation is nothing more than a mere after-the-fact change of heart about his guilty plea. He has not come forward with anything (factually or legally) that he did not know before he entered his plea. Based on the government’s representations and Bradford’s responses and actions throughout this litigation, the court concludes that his attorney’s decision not to file motions to suppress was not unreasonable.” United States v. Bradford, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18092 (M.D.Ala. Feb. 16, 2016).

Defendant’s general denial of consent was not credited when compared to the officers’ specific testimony about consent. United States v. Hodge, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18020 (S.D.Ga. Jan. 19, 2016),* adopted 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17661 (S.D. Ga., Feb. 12, 2016).*

Plaintiff’s pro se § 1983 complaint that police came to his door to talk to him about a murder investigation doesn’t state a Fourth or Fifth Amendment claim. As to the claim his VA records were viewed, that fails to state a constitutional claim. Olson v. Carmack, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 2962 (10th Cir. Feb. 19, 2016).*

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