S.D.Tex.: Seizing defendant’s money and cell phone and then spending only three minutes in the back of a police car was not “custody” for Miranda

Seizing defendant’s money and cell phone and then spending only three minutes in the back of a police car was not “custody” for Miranda purposes. United States v. Broca-Martinez, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17077 (S.D.Tex. Feb. 11, 2016)*:

While the Court can give only little weight to the seizure of Mr. Broca-Martinez’s money and cell phone, the fact that he was detained in the backseat of Officer Leal’s squad car constitutes a much more significant restraint on his freedom. Upon learning from Mr. Broca-Martinez that he was not legally in the United States, Officer Leal placed him in the backseat of his squad car and shut the door. Mr. Broca-Martinez sat there for three minutes before Agent Fiorita arrived and initiated questioning. Hr’g Tr. 42:6-10; see also Doc. No. 41 at 1. During this time Mr. Broca-Martinez was clearly not free to leave; in fact, he was not even able to leave because the back doors of the squad car cannot be opened from the inside. Hr’g Tr. 42:6-10. As Agent Fiorita interviewed Mr. Broca-Martinez, he remained seated in the backseat, with the door open and Agent Fiorita standing next to him outside.

The detention of a suspect in the backseat of a police car, for any duration of time, is not something that transpires in the course of a routine traffic stop. Had the circumstances of Mr. Broca-Martinez’s detention been even slightly different, his situation might have crossed over into Miranda custody. However, there are a number of facts that mitigate the severity of the restriction that the detention placed on his liberty. First of all, the length of time that Mr. Broca-Martinez spent in the backseat of Officer Leal’s vehicle was brief: three minutes waiting for Agent Fiorita to arrive and less than five minutes undergoing questioning. Mr. Broca-Martinez was also allowed to exit the vehicle, as he got out from the backseat in order to sign the consent-to-search form. Hr’g Tr. 19:18-24. See United States v. Hampton, No. 3:07-CR-113, 2008 WL 1826059, at *18 (ED. Tenn. Apr. 23, 2008) (the fact that the “defendant exited the patrol car during his conversation with [the law enforcement officer] [is] further evidence of a lack of restraint on [d]efendant’s freedom of movement.”). Moreover, Officer Leal’s reason for further detaining Mr. Broca-Martinez was investigatory. Mr. Broca-Martinez was placed in the back of the patrol car because his statement to Officer Leal that he was in the United States illegally gave Officer Leal reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity other than the traffic offense was afoot and that it would be necessary to hold Mr. Broca-Martinez until HSI agents could arrive and confirm or dispel his suspicion.2 Hr’g Tr. 39:25; id. at 60:1-17. As in Coleman, “the length [of the detention] was extended primarily because reasonable suspicion had arisen regarding a different offense … and not because of any extending questioning.” 610 F. App’x at 353.

This entry was posted in Arrest or entry on arrest. Bookmark the permalink.

Comments are closed.