CA11: Unarmed, compliant, and nonresisting arrestee shot in the back while lying on the ground was excessive force and violates clearly established law

Unarmed, compliant, and nonresisting arrestee shot in the back while lying on the ground was excessive force and violates clearly established law. Denial of qualified immunity denied. The officer’s subjective belief that force was necessary doesn’t carry any weight when it’s objectively unreasonable. Perez v. Suszczynski, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 407 (11th Cir. Jan. 12, 2016):

First, Suszczynski had no probable cause to believe Arango committed any crime at all, “let alone a serious crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm,” or that he was a threat. See id. at 1281-82. The call to which the officers responded pertained to two women fighting, and Arango was simply one of the bystanders in the parking lot, who went to the ground when told to do so by the arriving officers. The Estate’s witnesses testified that, at the time of the shooting, Arango was subdued, compliant, and on the ground. See Hadley, 526 F.3d at 1330 (“[G]ratuitous use of force when a criminal suspect is not resisting arrest constitutes excessive force.”).

Second, there is no indication that Arango actively resisted or attempted to flee. See Lee, 284 F.3d at 1197-98. Witnesses for the Estate testified that Arango was on his stomach with his arms restrained. Crediting their account, as we must, Suszczynski could not have reasonably believed he had to shoot Arango to prevent his escape. Third, it is undisputed that Suszczynski gave no warning before using deadly force. See Morton, 707 F.3d at 1282. Accordingly, on this record, a reasonable jury could find Suszczynski’s use of force “unnecessary and disproportionate,” and thus excessive. See Lee, 284 F.3d at 1198.

In response, Suszczynski asserts that his use of deadly force was constitutionally permissible because he believed deadly force was warranted under the circumstances. For instance, according to Suszczynski, his belief that his life or his fellow deputy’s life was in danger is an undisputed fact that demonstrates his actions were reasonable. However, this argument misunderstands the relevant standard. We must engage in an objective inquiry to determine the reasonableness of an officer’s actions in an excessive force case: “the question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” See Graham, 490 U.S. at 397, 109 S. Ct. at 1872. Accepting Suszczynski’s argument would require us to eschew this longstanding rule and determine “reasonableness” based on his subjective beliefs.3 Suszczynski’s beliefs about his life or Hannigan’s life being in danger are just that—his beliefs. They are not “facts and circumstances” that we may rely on to objectively determine the reasonableness of his actions. Cf. id. Moreover, the reasonable officer standard does not mean we give the challenged officer’s self-serving testimony more weight, and Suszczynski’s “good intentions” cannot “make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional.” See id.