S.D.Ill.: Exigency still applied to entry into house day after a shooting where a possible victim unaccounted for

The day after a shootout, the police find another possible location for gunfire and enter the house under the emergency exception. The entry is reasonable because one person was unaccounted for and it was possible that person was inside. Observations inside made it into a search warrant application. United States v. Paulette, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101167 (S.D.Ill. August 3, 2015):

The Court finds that the officers’ initial entry into the home was reasonable. At the time the officers entered Paulette’s home, they knew that a shootout had occurred in the area the night before. There were bullet holes in a car and a home that were adjacent to Paulette’s back yard. There were also bullet holes in a car parked in Paulette’s driveway near the back door. There were a number of spent casings on the ground, at least four on the back steps, and four more on the back porch. And there was blood–enough blood that a reasonable officer could suspect that someone had been shot –and the trail of blood appeared to go up the back steps and into the back door of the house (see Government’s Exhibits 6-11). Neither of the known victims reported to police that they were at 2208 St. Clair Avenue after being shot. These circumstances, taken together, made it reasonable for an officer to believe, at the time of the search, that a third person had been injured in the shootout the night before and may be in the house and in need of immediate aid.16 See United States v. Schmidt, 700 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding officer was permitted to enter yard to look for wounded victims when gunshots were fired two and a half hours earlier, bullet holes were in the car adjacent to the yard and the duplex itself, and a trail of nine spent casings was on the ground nearby); United States v. Janis, 387 F.3d 682, 688 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding warrantless entry into home was justified when officers knew handgun had been discharged and injured someone, officers were told gun was still in the house, and officers observed puddle of blood in driveway of the house and trail of blood leading to door of house).

Paulette argues that the passage of time rendered the officers’ belief unreasonable. In particular, Paulette point out that by the time of the search, over eleven hours had passed since police received the report of gunfire in the area, and thus any potential emergency situation had dissipated. But the prime exigency in this case was the potential for a wounded occupant, not whether the occupant was armed and might shoot at the police or other persons. If a victim in the house had been wounded in the shootout the night before, “that victim would not have become any less wounded after [eleven] hours had passed; to the contrary, he would need immediate aid.” United States v. Schmidt, 700 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir. 2012). “It would not have made sense for an officer to wait for a warrant when a shooting victim could have been dying in the [house].” Id.

Paulette also points out that the police did not know for certain that the shell casings and blood were from the shootout the night before; he argues they could have been from some other incident given the high crime rate in East St. Louis. That may be house in spite of the window treatment. But the Court need not make a credibility determination regarding Detective Coleman’s testimony because the Court finds that the evidence outside the house was sufficient to establish that exigent circumstances existed regardless of what the Detective may or may not have seen through the window.