Nexus and searching the homes of alleged drug dealers: Two different outcomes

In two cases decided on the same day, two district courts, one in the Fifth Circuit and one in the Third, came to seemingly opposite conclusions on whether drug dealers would have evidence in their homes sufficient to satisfy the nexus requirement of the Fourth Amendment.

S.D.Tex.: “Based on this authority, particularly in light of the warnings expressed in Broussard and Payne, the Court concludes that no reasonable agent could rely on the warrant issued in this case because the affidavit in support was “bare bones” with respect to the nexus between the objects sought and the place to be searched. An agent who relied on the warrant would have to believe that agents, in every single drug-trafficking case, could search a suspect’s home merely because they have probable cause to believe that the suspect has engaged in drug trafficking. ‘If that were so, there would be no reason to distinguish search warrants from arrest warrants’ in the large class of drug-trafficking cases. See Freeman, 685 F.2d at 949 (quoting United States v. Lucarz, 430 F.2d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1970)). That is patently unreasonable. Because the information before the magistrate judge was so lacking in probable cause that no agent could reasonably rely upon the warrant when conducting a search, it necessarily follows that the warrant did not issue upon probable cause.” United States v. Solorio-Hernandez, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72904 (S.D.Tex. June 5, 2015).

E.D.Pa.: “The Third Circuit has long recognized that ‘[i]n the case of drug dealers … evidence of involvement in the drug trade is likely to be found where the dealers reside.’ Whitner, 219 F.3d at 297; see also Stearn, 597 F.3d at 558. Thus, when the crime under investigation is drug distribution, an issuing judge may infer that a suspected drug dealer is storing evidence of his drug crimes in his residence if three preliminary premises are met: (1) that the person suspected of drug dealing is actually a drug dealer; (2) that the place to be searched is possessed by, or the domicile of, the dealer; and (3) that the home contains contraband linking it to the dealer’s activities. Stearn, 597 F.3d at 559 (citing Burton, 288 F.3d at 104).” This standard was satisfied here. United States v. Herrera, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72860 (E.D.Pa. June 5, 2015).