CA3: Social guest without belongings on premises for day lacked standing; leaving open standing question for better facts later

Defendant was on the premises of another when the search occurred, but he was a social guest at the moment, and not an overnight guest with stuff there. The case law grants higher standing to an overnight guest. While it might be possible that a mere social guest during the day may have standing in the right case with the right facts, this isn’t the one. United States v. Rose, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 9216 (3d Cir. June 3, 2015):

The rule for which Rose argues is only slightly narrower than the “legitimately on [the] premises” standard that was rejected in Rakas. Perhaps in the future, it may be necessary for us to decide whether Fourth Amendment rights attach somewhere on the spectrum between “overnight guest” and “merely present with the consent of the householder.” We need not do so now, however, because, as ample precedent demonstrates, this case does not present a close call. Rose had no possessory interest in any part of the apartment, United States v. Maddox, 944 F.2d 1223, 1234 (6th Cir. 1991); he did not store any clothing or property at the apartment, cf. United States v. Armenta, 69 F.3d 304, 308-09 (9th Cir. 1995); he had no key to the apartment, cf. United States v. Davis, 932 F.2d 752, 757 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Nabors, 761 F.2d 465, 469 (8th Cir. 1985); he did not have permission to be at the apartment without Grayson’s presence or consent, cf. Davis, 932 F.2d at 757; Nabors, 761 F.2d at 469; he did not receive mail at the apartment, cf. Nabors, 761 F.2d at 469; five other guests had common access to the areas in the apartment occupied by him, cf. United States v. Ruiz, 664 F.3d 833, 839 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. Correa, 653 F.3d 187, 190-91 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Maestas, 639 F.3d 1032, 1039-40 (10th Cir. 2011); he had no ability to and made no effort to exclude others from any part of the apartment, cf. Gray, 491 F.3d at 152; he was a casual acquaintance of Grayson’s, cf. Maddox, 944 F.2d at 1234; and, because no evidence was elicited at the suppression hearing suggesting that Rose had ever even visited Apartment 6 before the search, he was, it seems, an infrequent visitor to the apartment, cf. United States v. Pollard, 215 F.3d 643, 647-48 (6th Cir. 2000); Maddox, 944 F.2d at 1234. On this record, then, the District Court properly found that Rose lacked standing to challenge the search of Grayson’s apartment.