TX2: Suppression hearing judge not free to draw conflicting inferences if PC shows in four corners of affidavit

On the question of probable cause, the fact that conflicting inferences could be drawn does not give the suppression hearing judge the power to determine that those other inferences control. Deference has to be given to the finding of probable cause. State v. Crawford, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 5197 (Tex. App. – Ft. Worth May 21, 2015):

. . . In total, thirteen of the trial court’s twenty-four factual findings regarding the affidavit pointed out what evidence was missing or could have been part of the affidavit. The trial court in making these findings employed a hyper-technical reading of the affidavit that focused on what facts were not included, which is prohibited in a review of a magistrate’s probable-cause determination and fails to accord it the appropriate deference. Duarte, 389 S.W.3d at 354-55. Merely because conflicting inferences could be drawn from the affidavit does not justify a reviewing court’s conclusion that the magistrate did not have a substantial basis upon which to find probable cause. See Stanley v. State, No. 02-10-00342-CR, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 5920, 2011 WL 3211241, at *3-4 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth July 28, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). The inferences the magistrate reasonably could have drawn from the four corners of the affidavit gave her a substantial basis to conclude a blood test had a fair probability or a substantial chance to provide evidence of Crawford’s intoxication. See Munoz, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 9912, 2013 WL 4017622, at *3; Webre, 347 S.W.3d at 385-86, 388; Stanley, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 5920, 2011 WL 3211241, at *4. The trial court erred by concluding otherwise.

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The facts stated in the four corners of Suarez’s affidavit provided a substantial basis upon which the magistrate could have reasonably determined probable cause existed to issue a search warrant. By delineating what was missing from the affidavit and concluding probable cause was not present based on those missing facts, the trial court impermissibly strayed from the deferential, substantial-basis test, which binds reviewing courts. Therefore, the trial court erred by failing to defer to the magistrate’s probable-cause determination, given the probable-cause facts shown in the four corners of the affidavit. The probable cause supporting the search warrant, therefore, allows admission of the blood-test results obtained under the warrant based on the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Accordingly, we sustain the State’s first, second, third, fourth, and seventh points, reverse the trial court’s order granting Crawford’s motion to suppress, and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(d), 43.3. We need not address the State’s two remaining points. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.