D.Md.: A cell phone found on a drug dealer is virtually per se probable cause there is evidence to be found on it; it’s a “tool of the trade”

A cell phone found on a drug dealer is virtually per se probable cause there is evidence to be found on it. Thus, there was PC for a warrant and nexus to the crime. United States v. Fisher, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52573 (D.Md. April 22, 2015):

Defendant first challenges whether there was sufficient probable cause for the issuance of a warrant. In assessing probable cause, this Court must afford great deference to the initial judicial officer’s determination. United States v. Henry, 673 F.3d 285, 289-90 (4th Cir. 2012). This Court reviews the known facts and circumstances and determines whether, based upon a common sense determination, there is a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found. See, e.g., United States v. Wellman, 663 F.3d 224, 228 (4th Cir. 2011). The affidavits supporting both warrants set forth the facts surrounding the arrest of Mr. Fisher, as well as the discovery of nearly $1,000 in cash and twenty-five individually-packaged bags of a substance that was later identified as heroin. Def.’s Mot. to Suppress Exs. 1A, 2A. The affiant, Agent Mills, also explained that, through his law enforcement training, knowledge, and experience with the drug trade, drug traffickers often communicate about their business through cell phones. Id. As this Court explained in United States v. Herevia, RDB-13-639, 2014 WL 4784321, *8 (D. Md. Sept. 23, 2014), sufficient probable cause exists to search a cell phone that was recovered from a car in which drugs were also found. See also United States v. Eiland, CRIM. 04-379(RCL), 2006 WL 516743, *12 (D.D.C. March 2, 2006). Moreover, the Defendant has provided no specific case law (other than citations for basic and generic principles) to support his position. In light of the totality of the circumstances and the case law in support, this Court finds that there was probable cause to support the issuance of the warrants.

Second, Defendant contends that the warrant applications demonstrate no nexus between his alleged criminal conduct and the cell phones. Some nexus must exist between a defendant’s criminal activities and the item to be searched, but that nexus may be shown by “the nature of the item and the normal inferences of where one would likely keep such evidence.” United States v. Anderson, 851 F.2d 727, 729 (4th Cir. 1988). Cell phones, however, are acknowledged tools of drug-traffickers. See United States v. Gibson, 547 F. App’x 174, 185 n.1 (4th Cir. 2013) (Davis, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (recognizing the frequent use of cell phones in the drug trade); United States v. Slater, 971 F.2d 626, 637 (10th Cir. 1992) (explaining that a cellular phone is “a recognized tool of the trade in drug dealing”). Given the facts presented in the affidavits, especially the presence of twenty-five individually-packaged heroin bags, a sufficient nexus between Defendant’s alleged criminal conduct and the cell phones existed. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Cell Phones and Derivative Evidence (ECF No. 40) is DENIED.