M.D.Fla.: Racial profiling as a reason for a knock-and-talk rejected here, but not foreclosed in egregious cases

Racial profiling as a reason for a knock-and-talk was rejected on the facts, but the court concedes that it could happen in some case with egregious facts. United States v. Horne, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50981 (M.D. Fla. April 17, 2015):

Second, the Court also finds credible Sgt. Wannos’ testimony that he was seeking to investigate potential illegal drug activity that he believed may have occurred at Ms. Horne’s residence. The fact that Sgt. Wannos failed to obtain a search or arrest warrant prior to August 1 does not undermine this stated reason—indeed, if Sgt. Wannos had had probable cause, he would not have needed to conduct a “knock and talk.”

Importantly, even if Sgt. Wannos lacked reasonable suspicion that anyone at the residence was involved in illegal drug or gang-related activities, that is not the test under Eleventh Circuit law—there need only be “legitimate police purposes” for conducting a “knock and talk.” Investigating potential gang-related activity is certainly a legitimate police purpose for conducting a “knock and talk.” And, as the Eleventh Circuit has held, investigating potential illegal drug activity likewise constitutes a legitimate police purpose for conducting a “knock and talk.” See United States v. Williams, 731 F.3d 1222, 1231 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that conducting a “knock and talk” to investigate unspecified narcotics complaints was for “legitimate police purposes”).

In sum, the Court concludes that two separately legitimate police purposes supported the “knock and talk.” Further, it is undisputed that the officers did not conduct the “knock and talk” in connection with a search of the premises, or otherwise approach the residence in a manner unlike that of a private citizen. Nothing prevented Ms. Horne from exercising her right to ignore Sgt. Wannos. See Illinois v. Wardlaw, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000). The “knock and talk” conducted by Sgt. Wannos on the afternoon of August 1, therefore, falls within the “knock and talk” exception to the Fourth Amendment.

The Court agrees with Ms. Horne that, had the “knock and talk” been conducted on the basis of illegitimate purposes, such as harassment or racial profiling, it would be unconstitutional. The evidence, however, fails to establish any such illegitimate purposes. There is no evidence that race was relevant to Sgt. Wannos’ decision to conduct a “knock and talk” upon Ms. Horne’s residence. Rather, the testimony adduced at the hearing establishes only that race is relevant, at most, to identify specific individuals suspected of committing crimes. There is likewise no evidence that the legitimate police purposes for conducting the “knock and talk” offered by Sgt. Wannos are merely pretexts for some secret desire to rummage through Ms. Horne’s residence.

Ms. Horne seeks to suppress the evidence obtained from the subsequent search of her residence only on the basis that it is fruit of the allegedly poisonous “knock and talk.” Because the Court finds that the “knock and talk” was constitutional, the evidence obtained from Ms. Horne’s residence on August 1, 2014 will not be suppressed. It is hereby ORDERED:

1. Defendant Yvette Latisha Horne’s Motion to Suppress (Doc. 17) is DENIED.