The “movable area of control” for search incident goes where the defendant goes

Defendant was arrested in an apartment building because there were arrest warrants out on him. The defendant asked to be able to go back to his apartment to lock the door and refrigerate his beer, and the officer let him, following him in. The officer could look in the area where the defendant went in his apartment and even into the refrigerator for safety’s sake under Washington v. Chrisman. State v. White, 2007 Ohio 7143, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 6246 (10th Dist. December 31, 2007):

[*P12] Ordinarily, the arrest of a person outside of his residence does not justify a warrantless entry into and search of the residence itself. Chimel v. California (1969), 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685. However, a police officer may accompany an arrestee into his residence to monitor his movements. Washington v. Chrisman (1982), 455 U.S. 1, 6, 102 S.Ct. 812, 70 L.Ed.2d 778 (a police officer has “a right to remain literally at [an arrestee’s] elbow at all times; nothing in the Fourth Amendment is to the contrary”). Applying this rule of law, the United States Supreme Court held that a police officer could accompany an arrestee into his dormitory room so that the arrestee could obtain his identification. A number of courts have since applied the rule articulated in Chrisman to a variety of contexts. See United States v. Harness (C.A.6, 2006), 453 F.3d 752, 756 (officers lawfully entered the arrestee’s house with him so that he could retrieve certain personal items and turn off the stove); United States v. DeBuse (C.A.8, 2002), 289 F.3d 1072, 1074-1075 (officers were constitutionally permitted to escort the arrestee into his house after he asked to get his shoes, socks, keys, and wallet); United States v. Berkowitz (C.A.7, 1991), 927 F.2d 1376, 1389 (officers could follow the arrestee into his office so that he could obtain his keys).

[*P13] Here, Officer McGaw escorted defendant into his apartment so that he could lock his door and refrigerate his beer. At that time, Officer McGaw had arrested defendant, and thus, he had every right to follow defendant into the apartment. Furthermore, contrary to defendant’s argument, Officer McGaw did not need defendant’s consent to enter the apartment. “[An] officer’s authority to monitor a suspect does not depend upon the suspect’s consent; a suspect under arrest has no right to wander off on his own.” Berkowitz, 1389.

[*P14] Defendant next argues that even if Officer McGaw could enter his apartment, the officer could not lawfully search his refrigerator. Because Officer McGaw’s search of the refrigerator was conducted incident to defendant’s arrest, we disagree.

Defendant lacked standing to challenge the search of a car somebody else owned, so his counsel was not ineffective for not challenging that search. State v. Kitcey, 2007 Ohio 7124, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 6227 (11th Dist. December 31, 2007).*

The fact that defendant was in the hospital and in pain did not mean that he could not validly consent. State v. Hatfield, 2007 Ohio 7130, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 6243 (11th Dist. December 31, 2007).*

Defendant’s stop was not unreasonably lengthened by officer, and he could order the defendant out of the car when it was stopped. Drug paraphernalia fell from defendant’s lap. The motion to suppress should not have been granted. State v. Landers, 2007 Ohio 7146, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 6253 (10th Dist. December 31, 2007).*