MA: Police brought to a working chop shop by a LoJack alert was exigent circumstance for warrantless entry

A Honda owner’s car was stolen, and it was equipped with LoJack. LoJack directed the police to defendant’s garage, and the police, without a warrant, announced their presence. Inside they could hear power tools and tools dropping when they yelled out “Police.” Coming upon an active chop shop was exigency for a warrantless entry. The proof showed that a car could be dismantled in minutes and serial numbers removed. Commonwealth v. Ramos, 2015 Mass. LEXIS 100 (February 26, 2015):

Exigencies which may justify a procedure without warrant are a narrow category and must be established by the Commonwealth which bears the burden of proof.” Commonwealth v. Young, 382 Mass. 448, 456, 416 N.E.2d 944 (1981). Among the exigencies providing justification for a warrantless entry into a home is an officer’s reasonable belief that the entry is necessary to prevent “the potential loss or destruction of evidence.” Commonwealth v. DeJesus, supra at 620. See Commonwealth v. Molina, 439 Mass. 206, 209, 786 N.E.2d 1191 (2003); Commonwealth v. Huffman, 385 Mass. 122, 125, 430 N.E.2d 1190 (1982). “[W]hether an exigency existed, and whether the response of the police was reasonable and therefore lawful, are matters to be evaluated in relation to the scene as it could appear to the officers at the time, not as it may seem to a scholar after the event with the benefit of leisured retrospective analysis.” Commonwealth v. Young, supra.

Here, two officers used LoJack receivers to identify the garage as the probable location of the stolen vehicle. They knew by the time they had arrived at the garage that it was suspected of being a “chop shop” where stolen vehicles would be dismantled and their VIN numbers destroyed. Avery heard the sounds of ratchets and wrenches from inside the garage, and after he knocked and announced his presence, he heard the sound of tools being dropped and people yelling. The officers did not know how many people were inside the garage. Before searching the garage, they had learned that the defendant, who lived at that address and who had been involved in previous motor vehicle thefts, was not among the men apprehended in the yard. One of the men who had been apprehended initially had attempted to conceal himself from police and was found hiding under a pile of trash bags. The rapidly unfolding events occurred at a point when only three officers were on the scene, although others continued to arrive. In these circumstances, it would have been objectively reasonable for an officer to believe that he needed to enter the garage and conduct a limited search in order to prevent further destruction of the vehicle, or the removal of the stolen vehicle’s parts, license plate, or VIN number, by any individual who might have remained in the garage. Cf. Commonwealth v. Grundy, 2004 PA Super 351, 859 A.2d 485, 488-489 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (probable cause and exigent circumstances existed where police officers followed LoJack signal to garage suspected of being “chop shop” and, upon arrival, heard sound of power saw). “If the police had taken the time to first seek a warrant,” they reasonably could have believed that “the [vehicle] would have been in parts and junk by the time they got back … [because] a car can be disassembled in a matter of minutes.” Id.

The defendant argues that even if there were a risk that evidence would be destroyed when the officers first arrived, the exigency had been extinguished by the time Avery knocked and announced his presence, because it could be inferred from the sounds of running that anyone who had been inside had fled the premises. We do not agree that a reasonable police officer was required to have relied on such an inference. At that point, it was not clear how many individuals were involved in the activities inside the garage, or whether any of them had remained to destroy or remove evidence that might provide a link to the stolen vehicle. An officer reasonably could have believed that evidence, including license plates or VIN number plates, was being destroyed, or that such identifying information or other evidence such as automobile parts was being removed from the garage through the partially open bay doors that faced away from the yard where police were actively engaged in apprehending other suspects.

There were also other factors present that reasonably may be considered in determining whether an exigency justifies an entry, among them “a clear demonstration of probable cause, strong reason to believe that the suspect was in the dwelling, and a likelihood that the suspect would escape if not apprehended.” See Commonwealth v. Viriyahiranpaiboon, 412 Mass. 224, 227, 588 N.E.2d 643 (1992). Here, the officers had probable cause to believe that a chop shop operation was being conducted in the defendant’s garage that involved the disassembly of stolen motor vehicles. Because the defendant, who lived at the address and previously had pleaded guilty to charges of stealing a motor vehicle, was not among the men who had been apprehended in his yard, the officers had reason to believe that he might still be in the garage destroying evidence. As the garage bay doors faced away from the yard and the house and onto the street, the defendant had a route of escape if he was not apprehended. The judge made no finding, and the record does not show clearly, that at the time Avery made his entry into the garage, there were officers who were not engaged in securing the residence or detaining the other three suspects, who would have been available to secure the garage while a warrant was obtained.

The warrantless entry into the garage was therefore justified by reason of exigency. Once inside, Avery’s observation of the blue Honda, the license plate on its seat, and the VIN number plate numbers, permitted him “on that basis to make a selective seizure.” Commonwealth v. Young, supra at 459. Accordingly, there was no error in the judge’s decision to deny the motion to suppress.