In this “post-Columbine age of increasing school violence”, a frisk of a student for a missing ID was valid

Defendant was validly frisked for his ID card under T.L.O. by school security despite the defendant’s admission that he did not have it on him. The increasing threat of school violence justified it. Also, citing Indiana constitution requires a separate analysis of why it should be interpreted differently in that case. D.L. v. State, 877 N.E.2d 500 (Ind. App. 2007):

We believe that in this post-9/11, post-Columbine age of increasing school violence, a public school police officer’s determination that she must identify the individuals with whom she is in contact similarly warrants our endorsement. See, e.g., Cochran v. State, 843 N.E.2d 980, 983-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (recognizing that it is an essential police function for an officer to ask individuals for identification and that doing so does not by itself raise a Fourth Amendment issue), trans. denied, cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 943 (2007). Indeed, the presence of an unidentified individual on school grounds has greater potential safety implications than does the mere scent of cigarette smoke as in D.B. or the fact of hearsay allegations regarding a student’s sale of marijuana as in Berry. D.L. was on school grounds during a non-passing period and was unable to present identification when asked. In our estimation, it was not unreasonable for Officer Lambert to respond to this situation by conducting a relatively limited pat-down search of D.L.’s pocket in search of his identification. We are unpersuaded that D.L.’s admission to being in violation of school rules somehow obviates the officer’s need to confirm this violation, or her accompanying need to identify him via any identification card potentially on his person. Given the circumstances of the unidentified individuals in a school setting, Officer Lambert’s clear need to determine their identities, and this court’s generally finding school searches to be reasonable under the circumstances, the limited pat-down search for identification in this case was justified at its inception.

Comment: This is one of those potentially dangerous “timebomb opinions” waiting to go off later in another context. Here, the court of appeals, incidentally hearing this case at a high school (fn.3), Giulianiistically invokes “9/11” and “Columbine,” the latter of which alone semi attempts to make the point. But, the Columbine shooters were students at the same school, as are almost all school shootings. I bet this oral argument at Lawrence North High School sure got the attention of the students when the questioning at argument essentially left them with the impression that they have no rights against search and seizure of their persons at school if there is now a “Columbine risk” exception to T.L.O. Under “post Columbine” rationale, anything is possible. The court succumbed to a spurious public safety argument without factual or logical basis to support a search for an ID?

Double hearsay from citizen informants was a valid basis for a stop. Two carnival workers in town reported to the City Superintendent at the grounds that the defendant attempted to sell them meth. That person called and talked with the police. The basis of knowledge of the carnival workers was not relayed to the police officer, but he could rely on hearsay from others. Defendant’s stop and frisk only escalated when defendant refused to be frisked. State v. Bishop, 2007 Ida. App. LEXIS 108 (December 4, 2007).*

Exclusionary rule did not apply to a revocation proceeding, except where there was bad faith, which was not evident on this record. Police were responding to a domestic disturbance call called in by a neighbor who reported that defendant was standing over his wife threatening her with a crowbar. Stephens v. State, 2007 Ark. App. LEXIS 863 (December 5, 2007)* (unpublished).