N.D.Ill.: Davis good faith is objective, so the gov’t doesn’t really have a burden of proof

The court previously held that use of defendant’s garage door opener to locate his place did not violate the Fourth Amendment. After Riley, the defendants moved for reconsideration, and the court first found Riley inapplicable and, even if it was, Davis good faith would apply because of prior case law. More interestingly, however, was the court’s discussion of the burden of proof of good faith since it is based on an objective standard. United States v. Correa, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6978 (N.D. Ill. January 21, 2015):

Finally, Defendants argue that the Government fails to carry its burden of establishing good faith. Defendants cite no case law for their assumption that the Government bears this burden. Although the Supreme Court did not explicitly address the issue in Davis, it did characterize the core inquiry as whether the government acted in “objectively” reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2423. Davis extends Leon, and Leon provides that courts are to “eschew inquiries into the subjective beliefs of law enforcement officers” because “‘sending state and federal courts on an expedition into the minds of police officers would produce a grave and fruitless misallocation of judicial resources.'” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 n.23 (citing Massachusetts v. Painten, 389 U.S. 560, 565 (1968) (White, J., dissenting)). In Herring, the Court reiterated that the “pertinent analysis of deterrence and culpability is objective, not an inquiry into the subjective awareness of arresting officers.” Herring, 555 U.S. at 145 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In other words, the Supreme Court has confined the good-faith inquiry to the “objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal in light of all of the circumstances.” Id. (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922, n. 23) (internal quotation marks omitted). The same rationale applies in the context of Davis, and here, in light of Concepcion, the answer to that question is “no.” Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant’s motion.